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PREFACE 
This has been a painstakingly difficult study. At various stages of my writing I 
asked myself whether I was doing the right thing, touching upon subjects that 
many people whom I know hold dear. Though I have Latvian citizenship, I 
belong to the Russian minority that constitutes a considerable fraction of the 
population. The hostility between Russians and Latvians in this small Baltic state 
– not so long ago a part of the former Soviet Union - often gets reinforced by 
equating things ―Russian‖ with ―Soviet,‖ and the negative connotations of both. 
Many of my compatriots still believe that Latvia was industrialized and saved 
from backwardness by the Soviet State, and thus its citizens ought to feel 
gratitude to their former rulers. Indeed, the Soviet citizens built bridges, roads, 
rail systems, houses, factories in all 15 republics of the former USSR. This 
creates grounds for thinking that the Soviet regime was on the whole a positive 
phenomenon which brought prosperity to poor countries. Many people still 
believe that life under the Soviet Union offered better opportunities for them and 
their families. Some of them made great personal sacrifices in the service of the 
Communist Party. And many deserve the utmost respect. I thus feel it necessary 
to explicitly state that it is not my intention to disparage the beliefs or hard work 
of these people, even it was necessary at times to take a critical stance toward 
certain aspects of the history of the Soviet Union  
It was never my intention to write a dissidenting study in the tradition of Cold 
War literature. Nor did I intend to tell scary stories about the horrors attributed to 
the Bolshevik regime. Alas, the results of my research indicate that the history of 
repressions in the Soviet state still continues in Russia. My personal negative 
experiences included the constraints imposed on visitors of the archives I 
researched for this project:  metal detectors, the police surveillance, prohibition 
ix 
 
of photo-cameras and mobile phones, restrictions of copy services applied to the 
material issued before 1922 (including the original of The Plan for Electrification 
of the R.S.F.S.R.), etc. Conducting research under these circumstances was a 
difficult task. During my last visit to Russia I was interrogated by the FSB-officer 
about purpose of my study and my life in the Western countries. I was asked ―to 
be patriotic,‖ and I had to reply to questions like: ―Are there any rumors about 
students at the University of Oslo being recruited by the Norwegian Secret 
Service?‖; or ―Which Non-Profit Organizations might serve as a cover-up for the 
Norwegian Secret Service?‖ Apparently, old habits of the notorious KGB die 
hard. Those incidents, combined with my observations of the current state of 
affairs in Russia – the ongoing censorship and propaganda of the ruling party 
resplendent in the media as well as the latest policies launched by the 
government in the spheres of the education and healthcare – led me to the belief 
that it is wrong to withhold the truth about social and economic ―development‖ 
as conceived by the former Soviet commissars and now used by their successors 
for their own advancement. I can only hope that my people, confronted by the 
harsh economic conditions of our time, will think twice before again attempting 
development through of oppression and unfreedom
1
.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1  This term is not commonly used in English and the problems of using it are linked to multiplicity of 
meanings and connotations of freedom. The context of using "unfreedom" in this study has a distinctly Orwellian ring 
to it; as a sort of propagandistic or euphemistic way of avoiding discussing specific types of repression.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Amartya Sen is a key figure in the discussion on ―development as freedom‖ since 
the 1980s and in his work of the same name (Sen, 1999). This book focuses on 
international development, arguing that it amounts, simply, to the expansion of 
capabilities.  Sen's concept of 'capabilities' is a revolutionary one, as it brings 
together perspectives that have been neglected in traditional economics. His ideas 
contribute to development economics and studies of social indicators—such as 
the UN's Human Development Index—by advancing a broader definition of 
development that includes, for instance, the increase in quality of life 
corresponding to the freedom to choose between different ways of thinking. He 
argues that development requires the removal of major sources of so-called 
unfreedom: ―poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as 
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or 
overactivity of repressive states‖ (Sen, 1999:3). 
This thesis aims to take a closer look at Sen's assertion and inquire into the 
degree to which sustainable development (as the electrification in Russia can be 
conceived) was generated by unfreedom. The practical implications of this term 
corresponds to what Soviet leadership considered a positive and self-less 
sacrifice of individual freedoms for the benefit of what they proclaimed to be the 
recognized necessity of the Soviet state or the proletariat throughout the world.  
Fueled by positivist notions of industrialization and technological advancement, 
development in the Soviet Union began to liberate of human capabilities but not 
without a price. At the same time the progress involved depriving Soviet citizens 
of their basic freedoms. By discussing development as ―a process of expanding 
the real freedoms that people enjoy‖ (Sen, 1999:3), this study attempts to cast 
new light on the Bolshevik Party‘s electrification of Russia, with reference to its 
cost in human lives.  
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The main questions addressed in this study are the following: What was the 
historical and cultural context of the Soviet idea of development as unfreedom? 
What were the consequences of this development for the lives of the people it 
was designed to serve? Who were the agents of modernization, first in Russia, 
and later in the Soviet Union (the tsarist government, the Communist party, 
Lenin
i
, engineers, etc.)?  And finally, what is the legacy of unsustainable 
development in Russia, and what consequences does it have for the country‘s 
future? 
Focusing on the role of electrification in the development of the Soviet state 
necessitates an interdisciplinary approach with a framework that can join 
perspectives from humanities and the social sciences.  This will facilitate the 
tasks central to the discussion.  
The thesis has the following structure: Chapter I, The GOELRO-Plan
2
, describes 
Lenin‘s ambitious electrification initiative, which is interpreted in light of 
―unfree‖ development and economic change. The review of social, cultural, 
political and economic development provides a broader approach, filling the gap 
left by the previous studies on Lenin‘s New Economic Policy (NEP), or NEP-
period and the GOELRO-Plan.  This helps lay the groundwork for an alternative 
account of the electrification project in Russia. Chapter II, The Historical 
Background of NEP, is devoted to a brief outline of the sequence of events which 
transformed the economic policies implemented by the Bolshevik Party. Chapter 
III, The Authors of the Revolution, provides a short description of the policies 
that, together with the industrialization of the country, were central not just to the 
foundation of the Soviet state but also to its subsequent development. These 
policies, as discussed in this chapter, were the bi-product of the state of mind of 
the intelligentsia of the Russian Empire long before the onset of the Revolution. 
                                                          
2  GOELRO is the transliteration of the Russian abbreviation for "State Commission for Electrification of 
Russia" 
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Chapter IV, Modernization and the Banishment of Nature: Russian and Soviet 
Visual Art, argues that a normative erasure of nature in the Russian psyche 
occurred, as seen in the gradual disappearance of the images of nature in the 
works of Russian artists. Finally, the meaning of ―cultural development‖ in the 
Soviet state is the subject of discussion of Chapter V, From Culture to Industry, 
demonstrating how a secularized form of belief—the Soviet ideology—aimed to 
transform not only society but the very nature of man. 
 Re-reading Amartya Sen 
Amartya Sen, who inspired the title of this study, is considered a sensation 
among late-twentieth-century economists for his insistence on discussing issues 
deemed marginal by most economists. He was praised by the Nobel Committee 
for bringing an "ethical dimension" to a field previously dominated by technical 
specialists. For him, freedom is central to the process of development in general, 
and is particularly applicable in analysis of the effectiveness of development 
strategies. Based on the example of the former Soviet Union, Sen argued that 
political liberties are necessary for sustainable development. He argued that 
governments should be measured against the concrete capabilities of their 
citizens for evaluative reason, and that the ―assessment of progress has to be done 
primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced‖ (Sen 
,1999:4). Whether or not Sen‘s approach to economic growth holds any 
explanatory power in relation to Soviet Russia, or indeed for modern China as 
well, should be explored. 
Sen‘s approach is closely related to Mary Therese Winifred Robinson‘sii newest 
project Realizing Rights: the Ethical Globalization Initiative. Her goals are to 
foster equitable trade and decent working conditions, to promote the right to 
health care and more humane immigration policies, to strengthen women's 
leadership and encourage corporate responsibility. In a recent speech, she made a 
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connection between the tools civil societies can use under the human rights 
treaties to hold governments accountable, and the need to make the law work for 
everyone. As a priority for the 21st century she called for the expansion of the 
human rights agenda. She claims that this idea is a direct continuation of Sen‘s, 
attempting to build a corresponding legal framework. This thesis will further 
build on these ideas and promote studies of ethical development, which requires 
taking human rights beyond their more traditional political and legal realms and 
applying them to other fields. 
 Notes on Theory and Method  
The historical approach is the angle of choice in this thesis, but I also combine 
the methods of the textual analysis, the study of the primary sources
iii
, and field 
work. Juri Lotman‘siv semiotic approach to culture and his concept of the 
semiosphere
v
 provide the theoretical framework of this study, because they are 
helpful in reconstructing the system of signs and signs relations in Soviet Russia 
from 1917 to 1927. Semiotics allows a broad spectrum of sources to be studied 
holistically. For our purpose here "text" is any message preserved and enduring 
in a form whose existence is independent of both sender and receiver. Here the 
material under scrutiny includes such diverse ―texts‖ as Russian clichés 
originating from the period of the Soviet Union formation, literary and non-
literary works, posters, children books, the visual media, the mass media, 
advertising, etc. Samples of this wide variety of texts were collected in the 
Moscow State Library and the St.-Petersburg National Library archives. 
Apart from archival materials, extensive secondary sources were utilized 
including mainstream literature about the NEP-period in the West. Works by 
Pipes, Conquest, Service, Coopersmith, H.G. Wells and several other authors 
give attention to the philosophical, historical, social and cultural backdrop of 
early Soviet electrification, which inform the present study.  
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To discover the processes through which meaning is produced and reproduced 
within a culture, I have used Michael Foucault‘svi examination of power 
structures.  His narrative approach to ways people imagine knowledge and 
knowing, as presented in The Order of Things, can help answer the question of 
how the new socio-political order was built and a new identity constructed in the 
early Soviet state. In this context, Antonio Gramsci‘s notesvii on international 
politics and economics are enlightening, especially his concept of hegemonic 
formations as a complex dynamic system comprising overlapping and 
interpenetrating subsystems. Gramsci's concept of Cultural hegemony explains 
how a complex culture can be ruled or dominated by one class in part through 
common sense, and those every-day practices and shared beliefs that provide the 
foundation for complex systems of domination. Although the analysis of cultural 
domination was first advanced in terms of economic classes, it can be applied 
more broadly. Gramsci's ―state theory‖ envisions "historic blocs"viii or dominant 
configurations of material capabilities, ideologies and institutions as determining 
frames for individual and collective action. Elites, furthermore, are seen to act as 
"organic intellectuals" forging historic blocs. Neo-Gramscianism
ix
 is a relatively 
new approach to the study of International Relations (IR) and the Global Political 
Economy (GPE). This movement analyzes how the particular constellation of 
social forces, the state, and dominant ideation define and sustain world orders. 
 Note on Western Sources 
Robert Gellately began his book Lenin, Stalin and Hitler: The Age of Social 
Catastrophe without initially including Lenin as a major figure. But, as he tried 
to reconstruct the events leading to the Second World War, much of what he 
wanted to say lead him back to Lenin and the beginning of the Soviet 
dictatorship. I encountered the same trend while exploring the process of 
electrification in Soviet Russia. The emergence of the planning economy in the 
Soviet Union is rarely explained, but, when it is, studies about the country‘s 
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economic development and industrialization tend to concentrate on the period 
following the first Five-Years Plan, hardly without mention of NEP or The 
GOELRO-Plan, introduced and espoused by Lenin. Moreover, what is often 
missing in this perspective is a better understanding of Lenin‘s personal character 
and his motives for supporting NEP. This study, thus, diverges from the standard 
approach described above by giving attention to the social events which lead the 
Bolsheviks to build Communism by means of industrialization.  Further focus is 
given to why specific institutional arrangements restricted the people's freedom. 
The effect that the NEP-period had on economic development in Russia (and the 
Soviet Union subsequently) requires an inquiry into how it transformed the pre-
conditions for the social and cultural development of the country, with particular 
emphasis on the psychology of so-called Homo sovieticus. This term was 
introduced by dissident writer Alexander Zinoviev
x
, expelled from the former 
USSR for his views. The concept of Homo sovieticus refers to a new type of 
human being with behavioral qualities molded by the changed social conditions 
of Soviet Russia, representing the end product of the Soviet regime‘s efforts to 
transform the population into embodiments of the values of communism (Kelly, 
2007).  
 CHAPTER I: THE GOELRO-PLAN 
The main objective of this chapter is to offer a cultural and historical 
interpretation of the electrification of Soviet Russia by highlighting the Soviet 
development plans resulted in restrictions to freedom in the state. 
The GOELRO-Plan was received as the first plan in the world for complex 
development of the national economy. This electrification project demanded 
highly-developed industrial centers, skilled personnel, and the availability of the 
resources to generate electric power.  At the time, proposals for centralized, 
regional electrification of such large scale were only in development in Holland, 
and their benefits had only been discussed in England as part of a technocratic 
movement by engineers. Lenin, on the other hand, was throwing all his weight 
behind a scheme for the development of great power stations in Russia to serve 
all provinces with lighting, with transport, and industrial power.  
Can one imagine a more courageous project in a vast flat land of forests and 
illiterate peasants, with no water power, with no technical skill available, 
and with trade and industry at the last gasp? (Wells ,1920:29) 
This question altogether bridges the bright idea of the sustainable development, 
which The GOELRO-Plan could have been, with the idea of ―development as 
unfreedom‖ which disempowered citizens of the Soviet state for many years to 
come. 
 1.1. The Pre-Revolution Electrification 
The energetic historiography of the Soviet state counts adoption of The 
GOELRO-Plan as the beginning of the electrification of Russia. The first 
practical results of The GOELRO-Plan implementation were obtained in the 
Soviet state in the late 1920s. A reasonable question, however, is whether the 
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Figure 1. Poster announcing that ―30 November 1902 
will be the concert-ball of the electricians,‖ and 
indicates the development of the electrical engineering 
community in the Pre-Revolutionary Russia. 
rapid economic and industrial growth in the tsarist Russia in the late third of the 
XIXth century had not touched upon electrification? 
Extraction and mining of fuels 
(wood, coal, peat, oil, black mineral 
oil, kerosene) in Russia at the end of 
the XIXth century were mainly used 
as an energy source for generating 
―steam power‖ (i.e., individual 
boilers and steam-engines).  Eighty 
percent of this power was used in the 
widely-developed manufacturing, 
metal-working, and food industries. 
Those three branches dominated the 
economy of Russia (85%). The 
remaining resources were used on the 
railroads and by river- and sea-fleets. 
When it comes to electricity, which 
is a product of more complicated 
technologies, Russia was economically not ready for its usage. This delay was 
related to the late abolishment of serfdom in 1861, as one of the indicators of 
socio-economic development.   
In 1886, the Society of the electrical lightening 1886 (Society 1886) was 
registered in Petrograd, founded by a group of industrial enterprises and banks. 
This society had several chapters in different cities and it promoted the 
development of electrification in Russia.  
The first contract of the Society 1886 in Moscow from 31 July 1887 was about 
the inclusion of the locomobil block-station in the electrification of the market 
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rows and rental rooms of the Passazhe-house, belonging to the merchant 
Postnikov. Later, in 1888 on George‘s Lane, a small locomobil electro-station 
was installed. In 1897, on the Riga‘s Quay the first steam-turbine electro-station 
was set in motion, with a 2000 horse power capacity (equals 1470 kilo watt). At 
first, this station used oil, but starting in 1915 it was fueled with peat, extracted 
from the Moscow area. The first electrical train was installed in Moscow in 1899. 
This is how the electrical business (as referred to in many books originating at 
the beginning of the XXth century) began in Russia.  
An important historico-technological fact is that despite decades-long delays of 
the capitalistic development in Russia, delays in the commercial usage of the 
world‘s achievements in science and technology by the Russian market capital 
were minimal. 
At the initial stages, the cheap labour and the absence of infrastructure based on 
electric power were opening the possibilities to raise money mainly in the sphere 
of the electrical lightening, which demanded comparably low capital 
investments. Gradually, electric business was getting involved in more capital-
intensive services as the electric supply of the phone and telegraph networks, 
electro-medical equipment, fire- and railroad alarms, and city transportation 
systems. Demand for electric motors, wires, cables, etc. stimulated further 
development of the electro-technical industry, which in turn spurred usage of 
electricity for railroad electrification, and finally began the substitution of steam-
power by electric power. The development of electric energy created demand for 
planning and construction of the different electro-stations, using different types 
of fuels. Pre-revolutionary Russia had already successfully passed those natural 
economic stages .  
The pre-war years witnessed the increase of enterprises connected to the electro-
technical industry from 12 to 22, with increases in their capital during the period 
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of 1910 to 1914 of 71%.  In electro-energetic industry, the number of enterprises 
increased in those 4 years from 13 to 24, and their capital increased by 100%. 
The development rate of the electro-technical and electro-energetic branches in 
this short period were faster than the average capital increase in Russian industry. 
In 1915, during WWI, construction was finished on the electro-station on the 
Raushen Quay in Moscow, with a 21 thousand kilowatt capacity. 
The most backward was the production of incandescent-light lamps. Import of 
the lamps prevailed. During the war, the incandescent-light lamps factory of the 
Society Svetlana was built in Moscow with electrified production.  
In 1910 The Petersburg Society of the Electric Transmission of the Waterfalls 
Power was founded.  With the participation of banks, financial groups were 
established for the realization of this power in the area close to Petersburg, then 
in Karelia. Later, and for the same purpose, the society Imatra was established.  
In 1913 and 1914 The Petersburg Society of the Electric Transmission of the 
Waterfalls Power introduced construction proposals of several electric stations, 
one of those with a capacity of 250 thousand kilowatts in Finland, which at that 
point in time was a part of the Russian Empire.  
The rapids of the Dnepr-river also attracted attention. In 1912 a consortium of 
societies and banks was created to study possibilities of the creation the Volga-
Don canal and the construction of the hydro-station on the Dnepr-river.  
Expertise for the powerful hydro-stations project was provided by German 
engineers. 
 1.2. Fuel Crisis 
Today we are facing fuel crisis which has been perceived in peacetime. 
Nowadays it has become even more intense. The main reason of the current 
situation originated in the following: from one side discrepancy between 
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fuel consumption and resource output, from other side – resource gluttony 
(Bukhgeym 1915: 1, my translation). 
In several of his articles the head of the State Commission for Electrification of 
Russia, Gleb Krzhizanovsky, referred to the plan of the electrification of the 
country, proposed by Ernest Ottovich Bukhgeym, a Russian of German descent. 
It suggested electrification of an entire region with electric motors to replace 
imported coal and steam engines. In Coopersmith‘s book, E.O. Bukhgeym is 
mentioned, referring to opposition to foreign concessions (page 93-94) and the 
technical electrification proposal (used by Krzhizanovsky) from 1915 (page 116). 
A brochure from 1915, written by Bukhgeym and later used by Krzhizanovsky 
for references, contains an interesting calculation, based on comparison of the 
caloric effect of burning wood and coal: 
In order to achieve calorific effect by wood burning equal to definite 
amount of 7,000 caloric coal-burning fuels on which all the calculations of 
heat budget are made [fuel consumption of Petrograd industrial district in 
1915 comprised about one billion pud
3
 of 7.000 caloric fuels a year], three 
to four times the amount of dry wood should be burnt (Bukhgeym 1915:5-6, 
my translation). 
His further calculations demonstrated that to deliver one million carriages of coal 
to a certain district a total of 3,5 million carriages of wood would need to be 
delivered to reach an equivalent caloric effect by wood burning. Another 
abnormality was that for lifting and delivering of 3,5 million pud of firewood
4
 
from the cutting place to the railway station using a one-horse cart of 25-pud 
lifting capacity it would be necessary to perform 140.000.000 horse trips plus 
almost the same amount of trips from the place of delivery to the plant itself. It is 
                                                          
3  Russian old measure of weight, one pud equals to 16 kg 
4  According to Bukhgeym, in peace-time in 1914, annual industrial fuel consumption consisted of 4 billion 
pud. It was equal to 4 million carriages with one thousand pud capacity 
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clear that, within certain limits, wood heating instead of handling the problem of 
the fuel crisis only limited the fuel supply to Russian industry and hindered 
development of towns. Bukhgeym also made a point that it was much more 
reasonable and profitable to utilize forest resources for the production of 
furniture, paper, paper pulp, resin, vinegar essence, and other chemical 
substances instead of as wood for heating, which was extremely unprofitable.  
Having said that, it is understandable why the only solution to the fuel crisis at 
the beginning of the XXth century by many was seen as large-scale 
electrification: 
Electrification of our industry might help to increase heat recuperation for 
the production of driving force on 5 – 8 and even to 10 per cent. 
Consequently, if we suppose that calculations made by engineer Yasinski 
are correct and apply them all over the industry, we can get the following: 
instead of 4 billion pud of fuel we would need 1 - 1.5 billion pud only, 
besides half of the amount might be substituted by water power. At the 
same time we would perform the rail shipment of fuel necessary to supply 
industrial needs in casting, drafting, swaging, etc. (Bukhgeym 1915:7, my 
translation).   
Bukhgeym largely promoted usage of water power resources, as the cult of 
hydropower was deeply entrenched in the mythos of electrification. He 
exemplified Sweden and Norway and compared those countries with the 
Petrograd industrial district in Russia: 
Sweden and Norway, countries which possess large-scale water power 
sources, in the supply of their industrial enterprises by driving force were 
fully dependent on Britain and, consequentially, on political collisions the 
country had been involved. But in the due time Sweden and Norway 
appreciated this fact and started to implement wide deployment of their 
13 
 
waterfall energy for the aim of electrification. (…) Petrograd industrial 
district is also far from being poor in water resources and peat lands. Imatra, 
Kivach and Narva waterfalls, as well as Volhov, Ladoga, Luginsk and other 
rapids are located in this district (Bukhgeym 1914:2, my translation). 
He also argued that if a project to supply the energy needs of Petrograd through 
electric power had been fulfilled—namely through use of the Imatra and Narva 
waterfalls, as proposed by engineer Dobrotvotski in 1896—the Petrograd district 
would not have experienced a series of crises based on insufficient equipment 
involved in fuel delivery. In 1920, his idea about the possibility of building 
hydro-stations near Petrograd was repeated in The Plan of Electrification, 
prepared for the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It was justified by the 
presence of factories, seaport, railroads, and a large population in Petrograd. As 
such, the Volkhov became a symbol of the electrified future as much as 
Petrograd‘s main power source. 
Despite the great possibilities of hydropower, the opening part of The Plan of 
Electrification contained skeptical remarks about the construction possibilities of 
the hydro-stations in Russia and the costs it would cause. The skepticism was 
based on Western experience, which had shown that the construction of a hydro-
station demanded six to ten years and cost three to five times more than thermal 
stations: 
 Trend of the last years to use water power has quite strengthened its 
positions not only abroad, but also in our state; expressions such as ―cheap 
hydro power‖, ―falling waters free power‖, etc., are in a common and 
frequent use. They are the evidence of an extreme optimism among 
technicians and in the large population circles when it comes to the subject 
of the aforementioned question. However, we have to admit the fact, that 
even in the leading economical countries this matter hasn‘t received such a 
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great development as it could be expected on the grounds of the recent 
judgments; and, in any case, the thermal power plants still don‘t give the 
first place to the water, except in such countries as Sweden, Italy, 
Switzerland, where the abundance of water resources is combined with fuel 
shortages (Krzhizanovsky et al., 1920:65-66, my translation). 
The major problem was that Russia‘s hydro-power possibilities were (and 
remain) located mainly on the peripheries of the state. When it comes to 
country‘s interior, only the Ural region provides adequate sites for the utilization 
of the "white coal" energy. As the State Plan Commission has viewed it, the 
plains of European Russia and large plains of Siberia could use the hydro power 
only in the form of small plants, which could not exceed 1-2 thousands horse 
power, and in the majority of the cases these plants were limited to hundreds or 
even just dozens of horse power. As a result, those plants were seen as, to use the 
French term, la houille verte—the ―green coal‖. At the beginning of the XXth 
century the ―green coal‖ played a major role in France in the agriculture and 
small enterprises related to it. The qualifying adjective verte, as opposed to the 
―white‖ one, blanche, indicates that the sources of the energy are the rivers and 
watercourses, with the exclusion of snow- and glacial-fed torrents. Conversion of 
a mill or building a small hydroelectric station in the rural areas of Russia had 
proven to be cheap both in building and operation. Those ―green coal‖ stations 
were based on existing equipment and peasant services while operating on local 
fuels. 
 1.3.  The Future State 
During his exile in Finland, Lenin worked on his last major tract, which 
permanently changed the discourse of left-wing politics. In The State and 
Revolution he outlined his vision of Russia‘s future. Citing the passages from the 
influential works of Marx and Engels that he considered suitable, ―Lenin 
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postulated that two historical stages had to be traversed after the overthrow of 
capitalist rule‖ (Service, 2007:63). The new order would begin as an iron-fisted 
―dictatorship of the proletariat,‖ expropriating the former exploiting classes and 
implementing the principal that ―from each according to his capacity, to each 
according to his work
5‖. It would soon mature, however, into a ―commune state‖ 
in which ordinary citizens would manage all society‘s affairs through a direct 
democracy. Then the operational principal would at last be from each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs. (Service, 2007)  
The State and Revolution proposals, of course, were never applied; but it created 
the illusion of a ―radiant future‖ and generated belief in the prophetic vision of 
Marx and Engels which kept Lenin‘s successors in power for seventy-four years.  
I cannot see anything of the sort happening in this dark crystal of Russia, 
but this little man at the Kremlin [Lenin] can; he sees the decaying railways 
replaced by a new electric transport, sees new roadways spreading 
throughout the land, sees a new and happier Communist industrialism 
arising again. (Wells, 1920:29). 
Those views were even ―scientifically‖ supported.  In his book, The USSR after 
15 Years: Hypothesis of General Plan as a Plan for Building Socialism in the 
USSR, L. M. Sabsovich states: 
The working class should know that socialism is a practical task to be 
performed within the next one and half of dozen of years and not only an 
ideal of distant future. The working class should understand why under the 
direction of the party it is able to build socialism after about 15 years, how it 
will be able and how it will build socialism (Sabsovich, 1929:14, my 
translation). 
                                                          
5  This statement was often featuring in the propaganda posters in the Soviet State. 
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Sabsovich‘s view of the project of building socialism called upon the need for a 
cultural revolution involving the complete changing of human nature. Changes in 
the mode of life and forms of existence of mankind were viewed as necessary.  
They included abolishment of individual households and liberation of women by 
means of increased use of public services, development of a complicated and 
mechanized system for cooking and having meals, expansion and improvement 
of the canning industry, public mechanized laundries, public bathhouses, factory-
produced textiles, and mechanized home cleaning. Sabsovich viewed the need to 
raise children individually in each family as one of the reasons for maintaining 
the otherwise ‗obsolete‘ individual household.  According to him, they were too 
time-consuming and limited the possibility of educating professionals or public 
servants. In order to change this system he proposed ―entrusting children to the 
state with their physical training and education…[in order to] organize such 
processes in a more rational and efficient way for children and society in 
general‖ (Sabsovich 1929: 130, my translation). Organization of new housing 
conditions demanded creation of ―mechanic slaves‖ with substitution of the 
labour force with 
…a huge network of power plants that will cover the whole country and will 
supply power at largest distances, railway network extended several times, 
considerably improved water transport and intensive network of local roads 
suitable for freight traffic – all such factors will deprive modern cities of 
their advantages as industrial centers, allowing to distribute industrial 
factories in the whole territory of the Union, sometimes in combination with 
the largest state or with collective agricultural enterprises. (Sabsovich ,1929: 
132, my translation). 
Sabsovich‘s views were in line with the VIII Congress of the Soviets‘ adoption 
of the long-term (i.e. 10 years) plan for electrification of Russia ―as the first step 
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Figure 2. Poster ‖Victory of the Revolution lies within the cooperation of workers and peasants.  Labours of the 
cities and villages shall keep abreast shoulder to shoulder against iron chains of landlords and factory owners of 
the world‖. On the background are seen buildings with the denotations ―Izba-Chitalnja (House of Reading)‖, 
―School‖, ―Library‖, ―Quack‘s  Point‖ , ―Veterinary Point‖, ―Rental Store‖, ―Cooperation – able to obtain in 
credit‖. The queues are heading to the ―Congress of the Soviets‖-building. Apparently, in the left corner of the 
poster, a peasant is tilling land with the help of a tractor. In the right corner is smoke from the pipes. People are 
reading the newspaper, with the headline ―One newspaper for every 25 households,‖ and as a source of light 
they use an electric bulb. It is important to note the absence of intellectuals in the picture. 
of the great economic development.‖ In general, the main scientific concept was 
redefinition of the national economy as an integral system. The key element in 
the development of such a system was electrification of the country. The energy 
sector was classified as a unified dynamic system, uniting generation, 
transmission, distribution, and utilization of electric and energy supply resources.  
It is often said that The GOELRO-Plan was based on the idea of a rationing 
system developed by Carl Ballod (the Commission for the Electrification of 
Russia referred to him in the opening chapter of its electrification proposal). This 
reference makes The GOELRO-Plan the first-ever Soviet plan for national 
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economic recovery and development, and the prototype for subsequent Five-Year 
Plans drafted by Gosplan
xi
 (the State Plan).  
Carl Ballod was born in 1864 in Koknese (Latvia). After being a Lutheran 
minister in Russia, and from 1900 to 1902 a journalist in Latvia, he gained 
widespread reputation as an economist. During the First World War, while 
working at the University of Berlin, he developed the first comprehensive 
structure for equitable food distribution in an emergency. His most influential 
works are Der Bankerott der freien Wirtschaft, Der Zukunftsstaat, Quel 
maximum de population notre terre est-elle en etat d'alimenter, and Garden 
Cities or Agricultural Cities? Der Zukunftstaat. These works described how to 
organize a centrally planned socialist economy, and influenced the vision of 
Lenin and the Communist party on the feasibility of a planned economy 
(Coopersmith, 1994). The weak response of Western economists to his proposals 
was explained with the theory that Germany was not a socialist state; it only had 
socialistic premises.  
 1.4. “Wide-Ranging Ideas” 
The Soviet state was getting ready for more wars. While fearful of its capitalist 
neighbors, it was also preparing to bring the socialist revolution to the world.  At 
the same time, it had to count on its own resources. It is no wonder, as G.M. 
Krzhizanovsky
xii
 recollects in Lenin and Equipment, that Lenin was so interested 
in the advance of technology (for example, he is known for recording eight of his 
speeches on gramophone records in 1919).  
As Krzhizanovsky acknowledged, he knew Lenin for thirty years and their 
acquaintance was mainly based on Lenin‘s need for technical advice. On page 6 
in Lenin and Equipment Krzhizanovsky recalls that one of the personal 
characteristics of the ―leader of proletariat‖ was a great credulity in questions 
related to technical equipment and compulsion to implement new technology 
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without long considerations or theoretical calculations.  Apparently, many knew 
of this obsession and tried to use it for their own advancement or economic 
benefit. Additionally, Krzhizanovsky recalls that among the ―innovations,‖ which 
were of particularly special interest for Lenin, X-rays were believed to be capable 
of long distance trajectory that would forever change manners of warfare. Those 
―magic rays‖ were the innovation of one fortunate adventurer, who for the 
advancement of his experiments brought a large colony of his kinfolk from the 
South to the electric station where he was placed with beneficial conditions given 
luxuries not allowed to the rest of society.  
At the end of January 1919, Krzhizanovsky sent an article to Lenin on tasks 
related to electrification of industry, and on January 23 he received a reply letter 
with a request to write more such articles for a further publication as a brochure. 
In this letter Lenin complained about the lack of professionals with ―wide-
ranging enterprise‖ or ―wide-ranging ideas‖ and asked if it would be possible to 
speak of the economic or state plan (i.e., task to the proletariat), rather than of the 
technical plan which would not concern as many people and not appear as 
urgent: 
Within about 10 (5?) years, we will build 20-30 (30-50?) stations all over 
the country within the radius of 400 versts (if not more); they will operate 
on the basis of peat, firewood, slate stone, coal, oil (it is necessary to make 
approximate evaluation of all resources of Russia). We will start purchasing 
necessary equipment and models right now. After 10 (20?) years, Russia 
will become ―electric‖. (…) I believe that you could develop such plan – I 
repeat the state draft plan and not the technical plan. (Krzizhanovsky 
1924:17, my translation) 
The ideological reason behind The GOELRO-Plan was to distinguish Soviet 
Russia from the Russian Empire, where electrification received less attention 
20 
 
than construction of the rail-road because it did not appear as economically 
important. This attitude lasted until the Russo-Japanese War. The large loss of 
ships in the battle at Tsushima in 1905 created a demand for newly built ships in 
the West. Those ships were equipped with electrically-powered machinery for 
the systems operating the armament.  As a result, new ships built on Russian 
shipyards after 1905 were equipped with mechanisms based on an electro engine. 
Furthermore, World War I was perhaps the single most important factor which 
forced the tsarist government to recognize the economic importance of 
electrification. A sharp increase in electricity demand for military needs brought 
electric power to the attention of state officials and industrialists. While the 
response to this demand came too late, and in a much disorganized manner, the 
rise in the economic importance of electric power stimulated a parallel political 
rise of Russian electrical engineers. Years of wars and revolutions created a 
political situation where electrification became the new state technology. 
Moreover, the slow pre-war diffusion of electrification and its weak introduction 
in rural areas made it possible for the Soviet government to claim sole 
responsibility for electrification of the country. 
One of the major problems of the Soviet state starting from its foundation was the 
gap between reality and the idealized picture, as depicted in propaganda. 
However, the electrification project of the country was not the Soviet 
government‘s only ambition. The authorities had eagerly embraced other 
unrealistic plans to control all planning of the country, which first appeared in the 
adoption of The GOELRO-Plan. However, the timing for the great building 
projects was wrong. It was neither a ―technology transfer,‖xiii as the technique of 
zoning had never been implemented before on a large scale, nor was it a 
―technology advancement,‖ as the country simply did not possess the resources 
for the groundbreaking solutions in the field of electrification. 
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It is often cited that the concepts of the centrally planned economy, The 
GOELRO-Plan and, subsequently, the Five Year Plan, can be traced directly to 
the influence of Taylorism
xiv 
on Soviet thinking. Taylorism in the Soviet Union 
was advocated by Aleksei Gastev
xv
 and 'the movement for the scientific 
organization of labour' (SOL). Building on those ideas, the Soviet 
state implemented a system where economic planning, a political 
bureaucracy, and technical elite divided control over the economy through 
institutions like the Gosplan or The GOELRO-Plan. While political concerns 
influenced Soviet planning, and engineers were politically persecuted, the 
political bureaucracy designed plans to achieve technical development, and used 
production price accounting as a technical, rather than economic measure. The 
Soviet planners used the gross output (valovaya produktsiya) to set their targets 
and measure their progress: 
Without a market mechanism to determine the value of credit, goods and 
services, [the Soviet planners] assigned arbitrary costs and prices to capital, 
labour, raw material and equipment. Most damaging of all to nature, the 
planning system treated all natural resources - land, water, mineral deposits 
and forests, for example - as state property, virtually as a free good the cost 
of which to the user was either minimal or nil (Feshbach and Friendly, 
1991:40). 
 Taking into consideration that mainly engineers were trained—people with a 
non-economic education but who could yet run an enterprise—their technically-
focused thinking created a divide between manufacturers and consumers and 
their preferences. ―In one infamous example, a nail factory was given a 
production target measuring the total weight of nails to produce. The factory‘s 
managers found that the easiest way to meet the target was to produce 
exceedingly large nails, which were of no use to consumers‖ (Weil, 2005:276). 
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Post revolutionary planners had three technological choices, each with a different 
set of political, economic, and social assumptions and priorities. The possible 
paths were a conservative approach, desired by cities, of supporting their existing 
utilities; a radical approach of rapid rural electrification, supported by political 
and engineering advocates of social transformation; and a centralized approach of 
regional stations for Moscow and Petrograd, and later for other industrial centers, 
promoted by engineers, planners, and Communists with a technocratic leaning. 
The Communist party chose the third and most technically demanding approach, 
despite opposition from advocates of radical and rapid decentralized rural 
electrification and proponents of existing medium-scale urban utilities. Although 
justified on the technical criteria of maximizing economic rationalization and 
industrial development, the decision was inherently political. The importance of 
electrification ensured that authority over its development rested not in the 
leadership of the electrical engineering community but in the Communist party 
(Coopersmith, 1992). 
 1.5. From Bright Vision to Bitter Reality 
The implementation of The GOELRO-Plan differed greatly from its creation; 
possibly, it absorbed resources better used in other spheres, hindering economic 
growth. Kzhyzanovsky was not hiding the fact that enounced attempts left actual 
construction behind, justifying those enunciations with the needs of propaganda. 
Referring to Sen, the role of transparency freedom—or rather its absence—was 
significant in creating the pattern of risk and improper investments. The Soviet 
state was never characterized as democratic (except in the official rhetoric), and 
the absence of the instrumental freedoms, such as the freedom of open 
discussion, public scrutiny, electoral politics, and uncensored media, made it 
impossible to call for reassessment of resources from outside the government.  
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Instead of generating a well-funded, well-organized, and centralized program to 
build regional stations, the drive to electrify split into competing factions which 
vied for the resources, especially in the slow economic recovery of 1921-1922. 
Bad planning resulted in a thin spread of limited resources, as partially 
constructed stations contributed nothing to economic growth. In June 1921 the 
government was forced to stop construction of all regional stations except for 
projects promising short-term results.  
The GOELRO-Plan postponed the date of Volkhov station‘s opening to 1924-
1925. Nonetheless, July 1925 found construction only partially finished. Swiss 
engineers only began installing the turbines in August 1925  and workers didn't 
complete the transmission line to Leningrad until November 1926. The hydro-
station officially opened on 19 December 1926. Costs had also significantly 
exceeded the original estimates; the capital-intensive Volkhov project consumed 
93 million rubles of the 229 million directly invested in regional stations from 
1920 to 1926.  The view of ―development as unfreedom‖ is reinforced by these 
empirical connections. The heavy investment in the Volkhov raises the question 
of whether the capital-short country should have focused its resources elsewhere.  
In February 1922 Krzhizanovsky pessimistically forecast that the 
construction of the twenty-seven regional stations would demand ten to 
twenty years, which would be potentially more than twice of the original 
goal. In May, a major article claimed ongoing construction on thirteen of 
the twenty-seven stations. Half a year later, only ten stations were so 
described, work on two had stopped, and two other stations remained in the 
planning stage.  The NEP shift of the political and economic environment 
toward decentralization and short-term, profitable operations was the major 
causative factor (Coopersmith 1992:201).  
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In 1926 Krzhizanovsky called the delay in hydro-station construction 
electrification‘s major problem. The situation of overpaying tens of millions of 
rubles only to speed-up construction process was weighed against the vision of 
massive dams feeding the country‘s vibrant industries tomorrow. The return to 
the pre-war dependence on British coal for the Soviet Russia was a politically 
impossible decision. Shipping southern oil and coal would strain the 
transportation system and contradict the concept of regional autarchy. Besides, 
oil was supposed to become a ―valuta fuel‖ for export, and Gosplan urged the 
conversion of oil-fired stations to local fuels. However, as the economy and 
railroads recovered, utilities turned their interest to the Donets coal and Baku oil. 
The state has worked against itself by structuring prices in a way that the 
attraction of low-quality fuels was lower, instead of providing skilled staff, 
improving the quality of local fuels and availability of equipment.  
Local fuels suffered from unfamiliarity, variable quality, inadequate 
specialized equipment and trained personnel, unattractive costs, and no 
established organizational framework (Coopersmith, 1992:234). 
An interesting comparison can be made with the construction process of the 
Hoover Dam in the Black Canyon of the Colorado River, on the border between 
the U.S. states of Arizona and Nevada. When completed, it was largest electro 
station in the world. Construction began in 1931, and was completed in 1936, 
more than two years ahead of schedule. The acceleration of the construction was 
a response to the Great Depression, to create more available jobs. During 5 years 
of construction, there were 112 deaths associated with the construction of the 
dam (96 of the deaths occurred during construction at the site). There are no 
records available to see how many people have died realizing the project of the 
electrification in the Soviet state. 
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 1.6. The Great Bluff?  
There is one disturbing question—what if The GOELRO-Plan, the great project 
of the rebuilding country based on its complete electrification, was never meant 
to be an enterprise of such proportions  by the engineers who participated in its 
drafting? 
Although electrical engineers occupied important government positions, they 
discovered that their monopoly of technical expertise did not give them a 
monopoly on decision making and resource allocation. 
It took less than a year for the Commission for the Electrification of Russia to 
come up with the proposal. In the opening paragraph of their work there is the 
following amendment:  
We are deeply grateful for everyone who has helped to accomplish this 
extremely difficult task of the composition of the general plan of the 
electrification. The Commission is very clear about this work‘s drawbacks. 
The majority of the Commissions members were unable to devote 
themselves entirely to that scientific work which was stipulated by the very 
tasks given to the GOELRO. All members of the Commission work in the 
state establishments of the RSFSR and had to simultaneously participate in 
a current routine of those establishments. Maybe it is for the best. There will 
be others after us, who in more peaceful time with greater reserves of 
powers and means will continue our scientific analysis, correct our mistakes 
and develop greater perspectives (Krzhizanovsky et al., 1920:5, my 
translation).   
Further reading of the proposal reveals that the Commission has regarded their 
work merely as a beginning, which could serve only as a material for the further 
development of the national economy plan.  
26 
 
Despite the decree issued by the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets to create 
plan of building the network of the electric station within 2 months by the 
GOELRO Commission, the Commission‘s members described this task 
impossible to fulfill because: 
To create a plan for the national economy of Russia based on electrification 
is impossible without an understanding (…) of the perspectives of the 
national economy in general. (…) What does the national economy plan 
mean in its broad form? Can we give a prescription of such a plan for all 
countries and nationalities disregarding conditions of concrete place and 
time? Of course, not. Otherwise we would receive an empty, abstract 
formula, which lacks any real content (Krzhizanovsky et al. 1920:8, my 
translation).  
Many participants of the Commission, while not being against The GOELRO-
Plan in general, were considering its realization a matter of the future. Their 
main argument was that the most favorable conditions would allow finishing the 
construction of even the prioritized stations not faster than ten years. The time 
and resources were precious; the main task was to rebuild devastated country 
after the seven-year-long period of wars. The objecting voices were silenced with 
a counterargument that rebuilding the country, even without including the 
electrification program, was a long process anyway. The idea was to concentrate 
on the most important and sufficient directions of development, particularly 
electrification, and move that way without being distracted with the roughness of 
the other contours of the plan. 
Another aspect which was used against the immediate implementation of The 
GOELRO-Plan was the lack of realism of this program. The reliable functioning 
of the electric stations was possible only if the accompanying electro-technical 
industry was in order. At that period of time the trust (a business entity) of the 
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Soviet electro-technical factories was devastated, with large damages to the 
factories resulting from the Revolution and the Civil War. Besides, all the key 
factories were built by the foreign companies, mainly German, and their 
continued operation was dependent on the support of plants abroad. The staff in 
those factories was comparably better qualified, which was important since the 
labour force crisis of that period was especially felt in the area of the highly 
qualified professions. This area previously was filled with a large percentage of 
foreigners who left the turbulent Russia as soon as they got a chance. Besides, 
even the full occupation of the factories in the pre-war period was not enough to 
satisfy the demand for the electro-technical equipment. The rest in the period 
from 1904 to 1913 was imported from Germany (86,6%), the U.K. (6%), and the 
U.S. (1,8%). Considering the state of the Soviet electro-technical factories and 
the occupation of the factories abroad with the inlands orders and the difficulties 
to import, the tasks of the electrification of Russia looked to many prominent 
electro-engineers very gloomy.  
Despite that, The GOELRO-Plan, incomplete, full of drawbacks, lacking any 
exact numbers and calculations, was praised as a new state policy, as a future of 
the state. The reason for that could reside in the authority of Lenin, who stood 
behind the idea of the development of this plan. 
Krzhizanovsky wrote in Lenin and Equipment that at the initial stage Lenin 
merely asked to develop special article on ―the state plan‖ for the network of 
electric power stations with map attached thereto: 
Such plan should be developed now for the people to see and be captivated 
by clear and bright (rather scientific) prospects: let‘s start working and 
within 10 – 20 years we will transform industrial and agricultural Russia 
into electric Russia. Let‘s reach the certain number (maybe thousand or 
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million horse powers or k.u.?? damn how the hell if I know) of ―equipment-
type slaves‖, etc. (Krzhizanovsky, 1924:8, my translation). 
Vladimir Lenin‘s further initiative was the creation of the State Commission for 
Electrification. The Commission started working in February 1920. The more 
tasks were accomplished by the Commission, the greater it stirred the interest of 
Vladimir Ilyich. He got acquainted with several members of the Commission in 
person and with Krzhizanovsky‘s help became aware of all main aspects of their 
work. Lenin did not support the first draft proposals on activities related to 
electrification considering them too bare. In a letter to Krzhizanovsky from 
March 14, 1920 he specified what he wanted to see in The GOELRO-Plan. He 
wanted an article to prove or even to illustrate great benefits and necessity of 
electrification, which would compare the abilities to repair transport system, 
steam power, and agriculture based on old methods (i.e. based on human labour) 
and on the basis of electrification. For example,  
to restore transport using old methods – α million (according to pre-war 
prices), or α fuel +β working days are required. 
To restore on the basis of electrification 
-α-χ million roubles 
α-у fuel +(β-z) working days 
for the same  , but with effect exceeding the previous ….. times 
(Krzhizanovsky 1924:20, my translation). 
Lenin needed the approximate figures to illustrate electrification-based cost for 
this article. He believed that a real professional will do such work within two 
days (if he will work qualitatively), taking either figures of pre-war statistics 
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(few—really few final figures) or approximations (approximation of first 
approximation
6
). Then he would get a storyline for propaganda. It was essential 
for him, and he insisted on popularization of electricity by all means—―By an 
example and not only by words,‖ as he wrote in another letter to Krzhizanovsky: 
For such purpose, it is necessary to develop a plan for electricity supply for 
each house in the RSFSR. 
It will be a long period, since there will not be enough wires and other 
facilities required for 20.000.000 (40.000.000?) lamps. 
[I]t is necessary to arrange competition and activities of the people so that 
they would be ready to take actions immediately. 
Isn‘t it possible to develop the plan as given below immediately 
(approximate plan) ? (Krzhizanovsky 1924:23, my translation) 
As it is seen from the letter, Lenin needed to create an illusion of the existence of 
some sort of plan of what to do next. His desperate actions inevitably had the 
unintended but predictable consequence of poor planning, reflected in the final 
form of the electrification proposal known as The GOELRO-Plan. He anticipated 
supplying all municipalities (10 – 15 thousand) with electricity within 1 year; all 
villages within 2 years.
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Russia in the Shadows by H.G.Wells contains a description of a meeting of the 
Petersburg Soviet in October 1920:   
The presidential bench, the rostrum, and the reporters remained, but instead 
of an atmosphere of weary parliamentarianism, we found ourselves in the 
                                                          
6  "Statistics," Lenin directed in 1921, "must be our practical assistant, and not scholastic." Scholars who 
would not assist, he said in 1922, were "patent counterrevolutionaries ... spies and corrupters of the student youth." 
(Feshbach and Friendly 1991:31) 
7
  Number of villages, estimated by Lenin in the letter was ‖ 1/2 – 1 million, probably, not more than ¾ 
million‖ (Krzhizanovsky 1924:23, my translation) 
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Figure 3. Painting by L.Shmatko: V.I.Lenin by the GOELRO-Map. The VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets. 
December 1920. 1957.  
 
crowding, the noise, and the peculiar thrill of a mass meeting. There were, I 
should think, some two hundred people or more packed upon the semi-
circular benches round about us on the platform behind the president, 
comrades in naval uniforms and in middle-class and working-class costume, 
numerous intelligent-looking women, one or two Asiatics and a few 
unclassifiable visitors, and the body of the hall beyond the presidential 
bench was densely packed with people who filled not only the seats but the 
gangways and the spaces under the galleries. There may have been two or 
three thousand people down there, men and women. They were all members 
of the Petersburg Soviet, which is really a sort of conjoint meeting of its 
constituent Soviets (Wells, 1920:25).  
In December 1920 Gleb Maksimovich Krzhizanovsky presented an illuminated 
map of a future electrified Russia to the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets. 
Assuming that his audience was not significantly different from what H.G.Wells 
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saw in Petrograd—with shouts and interruptions and a debate ―much more like a 
big labour mass meeting in the Queen's Hall than anything that a Western 
European would recognise as a legislature‖ (ibid.)—then, manipulating the 
language, Krzhizanovsky persuaded the Congress to approve The GOELRO-Plan 
with all its flaws and without long considerations. Its official title was The Plan 
of Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R.; to any Russian language speaker it can sound 
both as ‗plan‘ and as ‗proposal‘—a meaningful distinction between those words 
is very weak. Presenting the GOELRO-Commissions work as a ready-made plan 
for national economic recovery and development, not as a merely proposal, 
Krzhizanovsky could get his way quite easily, especially being supported by 
Lenin: 
We must show the peasants that the organization of industry on the basis of 
modern, advanced technology, on electrification which will provide a link 
between town and country, will put an end to the division between town and 
country, will make it possible to raise the level of culture in the countryside 
and to overcome, even in the most remote corners of land, backwardness, 
ignorance, poverty, disease, and barbarism (Lenin, "Collected Works", vol. 
30, p. 335). 
―…the above notes entitle us to call the lamps that will give electric light to our 
peasant Russia as the lamps of Ilyich‖ (Krzhyzhanovsky 1924:23-24, my 
translation). 
I do not take stand that my interpretation of events, which draws on some letters, 
policy statements, memos originating the beginning of 1920s (see the Reference 
list) and Recollections of the Veteran-Electrical Engineers, published in 1984, is 
ultimately correct. After all, Coopersmith could be right suggesting that 
electrification together with planning became the way to reconstruct economy 
and modernize the country because of the entrepreneurial drive of several 
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electrical engineers. In December 1917 two prominent members of the yet 
existing Petersburg chapter of The Society of the Electrical Lightening 1886, I. 
Radchenko and A. Winter, managed to meet Lenin in spite of great difficulty. 
They both knew well the history and the margin of the electrification of Russia 
and could help Lenin to understand the importance of the electrification as the 
basic branch of economy. No doubt, it was a first stimulus for the GOELRO-Plan 
development, though postponed when the Civil War broke out.  
Considering the low attention the tsarist government paid to the problems of 
electrification, the engineers might as well be willing to seize the moment to 
expand their mandate to propose a state network of regional power stations 
claiming that they created the first comprehensive industrial plan.  It is even easy 
to tell who those engineers could be—initially the State Commission for the 
Electrification of Russia consisted of eight members. Those engineers were Gleb 
Krzhizanovsky, who, presumably, was the one forging an actor-network that 
created allies and promised resources for state electrification, as he personally 
knew Lenin (he sat in Butyrka prison in 1897 together with Lenin because of his 
participation in The Emancipation of Labour Group) and was considered to be 
one of Lenin‘s personal friends; professor Genrikh O. Graftio, who had 
formulated tsarist hydropower proposals; professor Karl A. Krug who before the 
WWI wrote the monograph Electrification of the Central-Industrial Area, 
published in 1918 (this monograph later on became a part of The GOELRO-
Plan); professors G. D. Dubellir and B.I. Ugrimov; and engineers A.G. Kogan, 
M. A. Lapirov-Skoblo, B.E. Styunkel. ―A vacuum about the country‘s future 
course existed, and this group of electrification advocates, fashioning a political 
alliance with the Communist party, filled it‖ (Coopersmith, 1992:151).  In other 
words, as Bolsheviks could not produce any real plan for economic and social 
reconstruction, they joined their hopes to create communist society in Russia 
with the electrical engineers‘ utopian vision.  
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When Lenin endorsed the original hundred-power-station version
8
 [reduced 
a year later to twenty-seven power plants] "as our second Party program" - 
following the promises of bread, land, peace and power to the Soviets - he 
asserted, in effect, the primacy of Communists as economic, not just 
political, decision makers. That extension of authority accelerated the 
transformation of revolutionaries into monopolists, with the secret police as 
their economic overseers (Feshbach and Friendly, 1991:39). 
After the adoption of The GOELRO-Plan as a state plan of the national 
economy‘s development, it apparently did not matter for the policy-making what 
the intentions were behind the creation of the country‘s electrification proposal. It 
had several serious implications, however, in terms of ―un-free‖ development. 
There is a direct link to what Amartya Sen is critical of, as the denial of certain 
behavioral rules (such as basic business ethic) and their role:  ―[W]hen these 
values are not yet developed, their general presence or absence can make a 
crucial difference. In the analysis of development, the role of elementary 
business ethics thus has to be moved out of its obscure presence to a manifest 
recognition‖ (Sen, 1999:113). 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
  Feshbach and Friendly call The GOELRO-Plan for "the first, abortive effort at planning" (Feshbach and 
Friendly 1991:39) 
 CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NEP 
Treating history, culture, and politics as the pieces of one larger picture allows to 
apply holistically semiotics, Gramsci‘s notes and Foucault‘s concept of power 
while providing an overview of the historical trajectory of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) in Soviet Russia. Taking into consideration the uneven and 
fragmented nature of the plan for rebuilding Russia, NEP‘s implementation can 
be viewed as the outcome of a process of bargaining, compromise, and alliance 
formation. 
 2.1.  The Alternative Cost of Electrification in Terms of Warfare 
From the assassination of heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne (the proximate 
catalyst for World War I), the Russian Empire, then under the rule of the 
Provisional Government
xvi
, was involved in war for three years on the side of the 
Entente
xvii
.  The Provisional Government did not offer much motivation for 
victory outside of continuing Russia's obligations towards its allies. Thus instead 
of ending Russia's involvement in WWI, it launched a new offensive against the 
German and Austro-Hungarian army in July 1917, thereby weakening its 
popularity among Russia's war-weary people.  The army was disintegrating due 
to a lack of discipline, which fostered desertion in large numbers. Meanwhile, 
Lenin and his Bolshevik party were promising "peace, land, and bread" under 
the Communist system. Regardless, the Provisional Government was deposed as 
a result of the October Revolution, handing power to the Soviets dominated 
by Bolsheviks. 
The October Revolution was followed by the multi-sided Russian Civil 
War (1917–1921), with the Bolshevik Red Army and the loosely-allied anti-
Bolshevik forces of the White Army as the main actors
9
. With the end of World 
War I, the Allies, fearful of Bolshevism, openly intervened in the Russian Civil 
                                                          
9
  Other nationalist and regional political groups also participated in the war. 
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War giving support to the pro-tsarist, anti-Bolshevik forces of the White Army, 
causing the Soviets to accuse their opponents of representing the interests of 
foreign powers. 
Troops from the U.S., France, Great Britain
xviii
, and Japan landed in Vladivostok 
in late June 1918 (only in 1923 did Chukhotka and Yakutia become Communist). 
The intervention in Ukraine and Southern Russia involved French, Polish and 
Greek troops. A limited participation by the contingent of U.S. Army soldiers 
took place in The North Russia Campaign at the Russian ports of Arkhangelsk 
and Murmansk
xix.
 The Allied troops were soon combined with Poles and White 
Army forces. But they failed to unite or to co-operate effectively amongst 
themselves. Divided objectives and a lack of an overarching strategy also 
hampered the effort. Opposition for an ongoing campaign in the West became 
widespread, due to a combination of a lack of public support and war weariness, 
eventually resulting in the end of allied intervention. With the end of allied 
support, the Red Army was able to inflict defeats on the remaining White 
government forces, leading to their eventual collapse. 
WWI slowed the electrification of the Russian Empire, but even so some 
development programs were fulfilled during the fighting, such as the 
electrification of the railroad, and construction of several electro-stations.  The 
trench war with Germany did not directly impact Russian electro-technical and 
electro-energetic industries. Rather, losses were indirect, due to the diversion of 
specialists and finance. This stage of economic development was interrupted by 
the October Revolution. The subsequent Bolshevik electrification of the country 
was politically without due ceremony or sincerity in true Soviet fashion.  They 
simply took credit for the work of their predecessors, claiming it as the grand 
achievement of the Soviet power on its march toward Communism. 
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The Brest-Litovsk treaty represents a huge set-back for the electro-technical 
development of Russia. One of the major achievements of the October 
Revolution was Russia's final withdrawal from the war. Bolshevik Russia made 
its exit from World War I by signing the treaty between the Bolshevik Russia and 
the Central Powers
xx
 on unexpectedly humiliating terms that "cost Russia (...) the 
territory where nearly one-fifth of its industrial output was produced"  (Feshbach 
and Friendly, 1991:30), took away a third of Russia's population and nine-tenths 
of its coal mines
xxi
. The Bolsheviks initially demanded a settlement under which 
the revolutionary government that succeeded the Russian Empire would give 
neither territory nor money, while Germany demanded the "independence" of 
Poland and Lithuania, which it already occupied.  The German army did not 
destroy industrial infrastructure though since most of it belonged citizens of 
Germany.  
The process of electrification was stifled even more during the Civil War, 
although the industrial sector wasn‘t seriously damaged. This war was in general 
without long and devastating sieges or battles in the large cities were industry 
was concentrated.   
Coincidentally before the October Revolution the government concentrated the 
national economy‘s key industries in its hands. The railroad belonged essentially 
to the treasury, while the energy and electro-technical industries were heavily 
monopolized by the state. Many entertained the thought of manipulating the 
influential position of the state-monopoly on industry for the development and 
implementation of post-war electrification in Russia.  
Professor Krug, who participated in the GOELRO Commission, mentions in his 
memoirs the fundamental role of Georg Klingenberg in the development of 
electrification in Russia.  Klingenberg was head of the large electro-technical 
industry, Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft  (A.E.G.) and professor at the 
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Polythechnic School in Berlin. The principal ideas of this work were later used 
by Krzhizanovsky to lay the groundwork of The GOELRO-Plan. Professor 
Klingenberg was not among the Commission‘s members. The power, rather, lay 
in hands of people, who were absolutely ignorant of either management of the 
economy or of technical progress. Lenin in one of his letters to Krzhizanovsky in 
1920 stated: ―Krasin says that railroad electrification is impossible for us. Is that 
true?‖ Obviously, he wasn‘t aware of the fact that the technical project of the 
Petersburg‘s railroads stations had been under development since the end of 
1909. 
The first large electro-energetic projects, considered the great achievements of 
Soviet power undertaken at the time, were achieved much later than planned, 
with construction having begun long before the October Revolution.  The plans 
to build the Volkhov-station became official in 1910 and if realized in time, 
would have already begun generating electricity in 1915. Instead, electrical 
output did not start until 1926. The same fate befell the Dnieper Hydroelectric 
Station, the Volga-Don Canal, and the Moscow Metro with the same protracted 
sequence of delays. Such was the historic price Russia and its economy had to 
pay for the protracted conflicts between the Bolsheviks and their opponents. 
 2.2. What Was New about NEP? The Historical Context of the 
Concept of Development as Unfreedom 
Only after the long and bloody Russian Civil War of 1917–1921 was the new 
Soviet power base secure. The country was still in crisis after military clashes, 
and Soviet power did not have any experience of peaceful development. Food 
and transport were a policy priority, leaving other issues without proper attention. 
And if the situation on the domestic front was turbulent, the international position 
of Soviet Russia was very uncertain. Russia was a backward society compared 
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Figure 4. The anti-Bolshevik poster ‖The happy worker 
in Sovdepia‖. The derogatory term Sovdepia was often 
used by the Bolsheviks‘ opponents. It is a contraction of 
the Russian expression, "Sovet Deputatov" 
with its great Western rivals in 1914, and World War I, the Revolution, and the 
Civil War only made things worse.  
Russia‘s gross industrial output in 1921 was 69 percent lower than in 1913. 
Agricultural production was down as much more, and the country faced 
famine. The utopian dreamers were professional revolutionaries but were 
almost completely without any relevant practical experience in governing 
(Gellately, 2007:141). 
Compared with the previous policy of 
military communism
xxii
, compromises 
and concessions to independent 
peasantry and private capital (before 
the year of 1925) were new. That‘s 
why the subsequent economic policy 
was called as the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). This name was 
tentative and even misleading. It did 
not take into account that the ―new‖ 
aspect of NEP was actually old. In 
November 1917 the decree of 
workers‘ control over the production, 
was called ―the Red Guard‘s Attack 
on the Capital‖ with all factories, 
plants, manufacturing workshops, 
ateliers, bakeries and all other centers of production were confiscated.  However, 
money was needed to pay for raw materials, energy, transport, salaries to pay to 
workers themselves. But the bank system had collapsed, and all investments 
made in enterprises and banks were gone (while gold and valuables were 
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confiscated by the new power for their own means).  Factories and factories had 
stopped, prices had sky racketed, salaries remained unpaid, and money lost its 
value.  
The credit and industrial system that produced commodities has broken 
down, and so far the attempts to replace it by some other form of production 
have been ineffective. So that nowhere are there any new things (Wells, 
1920:4). 
As a result, the class supposed to be the main supporter of the revolution—
workers, begun to hesitate. On July 20-21 the All-Russia congress of workers has 
signed the resolution: ―The experiments of the socialization and nationalization 
of factories and manufactories must be stopped. (…) [Proletariat] can and ought 
to square its activity with the efforts of other progressive classes, interested in 
development of the means of production. (...) From now on, the main political 
goal of the working class—struggle against the Soviet power and restoration of 
the democratic regime.‖ (Independent labour movement in 1918. Paris, 1981. 
page 285-286). Delegates to the congress were arrested at once by the Red 
Latvian Riflemen
xxiii
. 
The intellectual elites (intelligentsia) were also shocked over how its dreams 
about the radiant future had turned out. In 1918 in Moscow, Petersburg and other 
cities, the bureaucrats, doctors, and the All-Russia union of the engineers were on 
strike. Transport, electro-stations and schools had stopped.  
Communism was pressing too hard and too fast, and destroying before it 
was ready to rebuild. They had broken down trading before they were ready 
to ration; the co-operative organisation had been smashed up instead of 
being utilised (Wells 1920:30). 
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Then Bolsheviks made a decision to change course from the failed ‖control over 
means of production‖ to the enforcement of work on everyone. That is how the 
military communism had begun. The denial of basic civil and political rights for 
alleged advantage in promoting economic development (Amartya Sen refers to 
this thesis as ―the Lee thesis‖, attributed in some form to the former prime 
minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew) certainly couldn‘t rebuild the shattered 
economy. Rather it had an opposite effect, proving that ―economic growth is 
more a matter of a friendlier economic climate than of harsher political system‖ 
(Sen 1999:16). ―The amount of the industrial production was only falling 
drastically; in 1920 it was about 4-20% from the level of 1913 (or, respectively, 
3,3-16,5% from the level of 1916)‖ (БCЭ. 3-е изд. Т. 7. page 234, my 
translation). Production of cotton, for example, fell to 5 percent, and iron to 2 
percent, of the prewar level. The reserves of bread in the central areas of the 
Soviet Russia were running short, causing hunger among the urban population, 
where support for the Bolshevik government was strongest. To supply the Red 
Army, urban population and provide raw material for different industries, a 
governmental program was introduced which obliged peasantry to surrender the 
surpluses
xxiv
 of almost any kind of agricultural produce for a fixed price. This 
Soviet state‘s policy became one of the most important elements of the system of 
the military communism. Bolsheviks denied the ability of the market 
mechanisms to contribute to the economic growth and rejected the freedom to 
participate in the transactions (the authorities had prohibited selling of bread and 
grain). The denial of the economic opportunities and favorable consequences that 
markets offer and support resulted in deprivations, damage to the agricultural 
sector and caused the peasant's growing discontent. Further it negatively 
influenced many, if not all aspects of relations between the city and the village in 
the early Soviet state. The peasants responded to the requisitioning of their crops 
by refusing to till their land. By 1921 cultivated land had shrunk to some 62 
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Figure 5. ‖Kronshtadt‘s card is 
bitten‖. The sailor holds in his hand a 
black flag with the notation CP (for 
Social Revolutionaries). The second 
figure reminds of the last Tsar of the 
Russian Empire Nikolai II. 
percent of the prewar area, and the harvest yield was only 37 percent of normal. 
The number of horses declined from 35 million in 1916 to 24 million in 1920, 
and cattle fell from 58 to 37 million during the same span. The exchange rate of 
the US dollar, which had been two rubles in 1914, rose to 1,200 in 1920. It is a 
remarkable fact that economic unfreedom of the rural households, as the absolute 
limit of a given product for personal or household needs, was pre-determined by 
the state and bred social unfreedom of the urban areas, in the forms of poverty, 
hunger, and illness. 
Lenin summed up these three and a half years in the following way:  ‖…For the 
working class, for proletariat meant such afflictions, such deprivation, such 
sacrifices, such exacerbation of the lack of necessities as never before in the 
world‖ (Ленин В.И. Полн. собр. соч. Т. 43. page 132, my translation).  
This situation led to strikes and violent unrest in 
the factories on the one hand;  on another, it lead to 
uprisings in the countryside, because many 
peasants were extremely unhappy with foodstuffs 
requisitioning policy and tried to resist it. The 
Tambov rebellion was one of the greatest uprisings 
of people against the Soviet power and the 
Communist party that was organized in the region 
of Tambov in 1918 – 1921.  
The last major revolt against Communist rule 
occurred in 1921, when a group of sailors and 
soldiers and their civilian supporters rebelled 
against the Bolshevik regime in Soviet 
Kronshtadt, which had previously been a center of 
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major support for the Bolsheviks. Their demands (the Petropavlovsk resolution
10
) 
included freedom of speech, a stop to the deportations to concentration camps, a 
change of Soviet war politics and the liberation of the soviets (workers‘ councils) 
from Party control. The Government asserted that the revolt had "undoubtedly 
been prepared by French counterintelligence" and that the Petropavlovsk 
resolution was a "SR-Black Hundred"
11
 resolution. Although Red Army units 
ruthlessly suppressed the uprising after brief negotiations, the general 
dissatisfaction with the state of affairs could not have been more forcefully 
expressed.  This made Lenin realize that the time for the ―world revolution‖ 
wasn‘t imminent. In the spring of 1921 the Bolsheviks replaced the military 
communism with NEP. 
  2.3. Resolutions of the VIII Congress of the Soviets 
NEP began with the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets that ended in the last 
days of 1920. Resolutions of the Congress, although very contradictory, called 
upon working people of cities and villages for making the greatest effort to 
recover economy and rebuild the country.  On the one hand, the Congress passed 
a resolution to organize crop-committees in villages – special organizations 
whose purpose was to develop plans for spring crops
xxv
 and control peasants‘ 
compliance. On the other hand, long-term (i.e. 10 years) plan for the material and 
technical modernization of the national economy on the basis of electrification 
was adopted (Resolution On Electrification of the Republic approved the 
program developed by the State Commission for Electrification of Russia formed 
in 1920). The unfavorable preconditions for the realization of The GOELRO-
Plan were overlooked. Instead, the Communist party embraced it as the means to 
transform society not only economically, but, first and most important of all, 
                                                          
10
  The crews of the battleships Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol approved a resolution raising fifteen demands. 
11
  SR (CP in Russian) stood for Social Revolutionaries, a democratic socialist party that had been dominant 
in the soviets before the return of Lenin, whose right-wing had refused to support the Bolsheviks. The Black 
Hundreds were a reactionary proto-fascist force dating back to before the revolution which attacked Jews, labour 
militants and radicals, among others. 
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Figure 6. This poster belongs to the period of the 
Volkhov Hydro-Station construction, as the caption 
reads ―Volkhovstroi gives the electricity!‖. The heading 
contains ―Lenin and electrification‖, while footer is a 
famous Lenin‘s quotation ―The Communism is Soviets 
plus electrification‖.  
socially and politically. The electrifications‘ meaning during the emergence of 
the central planning economy and in early Soviet industrialization became so 
great, that Lenin defined communism as ―Soviets plus electrification‖.‖ Posters, 
from the early twenties, concentrated strongly on bright workers, men and 
women, standing in front of towering machinery‖ (Conquest, 2000:92).  
NEP was a period when The Plan for 
Electrification of RSFSR was 
intensively promoted. There were 
preparations to the VIII All-Russian 
Electrical Congress that was planned 
to be held in spring 1921 on the basis 
of the Decree passed by Soviet of 
People‘s Commissars (SPC)xxvi on 
February 22, 1921. The Soviet of 
Labour and Defense (SLD)
xxvii
 
formed the general commission—
Gosplan. The Commission was 
chaired by G.M. Krzhizanovsky 
responsible for development of The 
Plan for Electrification of the 
R.S.F.S.R.  
The new economic policy was 
strengthened by resolutions of the X 
Congress of the RCP (B). They were based on the main principle – to preserve 
and strengthen results of the main revolutionary changes. All resolutions of the 
Congress approved the nationalization, centralized methods of administration, 
and implemented managerial methods within the state sector. The Congress 
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Figure 7. ―From NEP-Russia will arise 
socialistic Russia (Lenin)‖. The background of 
this poster contains a construction site of a 
hydro-station. Presumably it is the 
Volkhovstroi. 
passed the resolution On Unity of the Party, prohibiting existence of oppositional 
groups among the members of the RCP(B) on the threat of expulsion from the 
party. Such strict measures enabled strengthening of ideological and 
organizational unity of the party, its leading role in the society and forming 
single-mindedness among its members. 
Those general restrictions were swiping 
away more freedoms from the Soviet 
state—including that of public discussion 
and participatory political decisions. From 
the middle of 1920s, the Communist Party 
was the only party in the country. Despite 
the fact that the party did not formally 
form the party government, its actual 
status as the leading force of the Soviet 
society and one-party system in the USSR 
was legally included in the Constitution of 
the USSR. 
Amartya Sen‘s approach to the prevention 
of devastating crisis which involves a 
sudden eruption of severe deprivation for a 
considerable section of population can be applied with some reservations to the 
situation in the Soviet state in the beginning of 1920s. The connection between 
political and civil rights and the prevention of major disasters is vividly seen in 
the adoption of political decisions, directed to ease the situation of the people in 
the suffering country. If the decisions passed by the X Congress of the RCP (B) 
came without delay, Kronshtadt presumably could have been prevented, and 
other mass anti-Bolshevism uprisings of the end of 1920 and beginning of 1921 
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could have been stopped and many lives could have been spared. The 
government, however, failed to undertake timely action by responding to the 
pressure and critique from the opposition. Another tragic aspect in such a delay 
was that it prevented the expected political compromise between Bolsheviks and 
revolutionary-democratic parties of Russia (Social Democrats and Social 
Revolutionaries) based on recognition of the urgency of measures for the 
termination of the Civil War and commencement of peaceful restoration of the 
national economy. The rejection of democratic methods of fighting for political 
power in the state, and the growing urge to find solutions mainly through terror, 
certainly revealed the darker side of the Bolshevik Party, also showing its 
internal weakness. The establishment of a one-party, one-ideology state would 
not by itself have solved the problems. The absence of political rights (to vote, 
criticize, protest, and so on) resulted in the disregard for general needs, and the 
government‘s lack of response to the acute suffering of the people.  
 2.4. Legitimizing and the New Course 
 Synchronizing of decisions passed by the X Congress of the RCP (B) on the 
abolition of surplus-appropriation system and free trade barter, with objective 
needs of agriculture, does not alter the fact that it was mainly Bolsheviks who 
were most active in preventing the abolition of food dictatorship. They accepted 
it as a true method for implementation of their program of revolutionary 
transition to the socialist forms of production and distribution. ―It is not 
acceptable to the labour power and we will not be threatened in fighting against 
it‖, Lenin said in March 1920.  
Regarding the proposals on approval of tax in kind and legalization of free trade, 
the X Congress of RCP (B), speaking in the same way as Lenin did, called 
previous prevention of those proposals ―mistaken‖ and contrasted it with the idea 
of gradual transformation of agriculture into a socialist system, in the way 
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Figure 8. ―Kulak-The World Eater‖- this poster 
became a classics of the Soviet propaganda. It‘s 
narration ―What business do I have to the hungry 
ones?‖, is contrasted with the image of wealthy 
peasant ―kulak‖, who is sitting on grain.  
―material base, equipment, mass use of tractors and machines, mass 
electrification‖ were to be ensured. Huge collective farms were the closest the 
Communists would go to replicating the highly productive great estates of the 
pre-revolutionary era without compromising their ideology. Peasants, including 
the rich ones,  stigmatized as ‗kulaks‘ (fists), who held the rest of the peasantry 
tight in their last grasp - would no doubt 
object, but they would have to be 
suppressed. Soviet communism was never 
going to be implanted in the minds of the 
peasantry without providing the better 
yields under the Bolshevik rule. The 
wealth of peasants in the USSR by the 
yardstick of the rich capitalist countries 
was no wealth at all. Indeed, in some parts 
of the country there was no chance to 
profit from agriculture. The Russian north 
was poor in soil and harsh in climate. 
Small fields, wooden ploughs and horses 
had been used for centuries. The 
Bolsheviks thought they had an answer to 
this. They had always believed that the 
future lay with the ‗industrialization‘ of 
Soviet agriculture. Collectives, with their economies of scale, would release a 
mass of surplus rural labour for industry, especially if industry could equip them 
with tractors and other farming machinery. Tractors were almost unknown to 
inhabitants of the rural area, including to those designated as kulaks. In a 
conversation with H.G. Wells, Lenin, apparently exaggerating, said:  
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"Even now all the agricultural production of Russia is not peasant 
production. We have, in places, large scale agriculture. The Government is 
already running big estates with workers instead of peasants, where 
conditions are favourable. That can spread. It can be extended first to one 
province, then another. The peasants in the other provinces, selfish and 
illiterate, will not know what is happening until their turn comes...." (Wells 
1920:29). 
 Leaders of the RCP (B) had to make lots of efforts to convince other members of 
the party about the reasonableness of the new economic course, and faced 
opposition at the local level. Some district political organizations perceived 
activated private trade and talks with foreign capitalists on concessions as 
―capitulation to the bourgeoisie‖. There were cases of leaving the RCP (B) ―for 
non-acceptance of NEP‖ practically in all political organizations. The common 
opinion on the tactical approach of the X Congress, allegedly aiming at 
stabilization of political situation in the country, was rather wide-spread as well. 
Representatives of the People‘s Commissariat on Food Matters12 saw little 
difference between forced requisition of food and the compulsory barter.  Due to 
increasing dissatisfaction of ―lower classes‖, the Central Committee of RCP (B) 
decided to convene extraordinary All-Russian Party Conference in May 1921. 
V.I. Lenin, speaking at this Conference tried to prove inevitability of the new 
economic policy, confirming that it was to be introduced ―seriously‖ and would 
take ―a long time‖, probably  5 - 10 years.  
Before the X All-Russian Party Conference, Lenin used the concept of ―retreat‖ 
by referring to ―state capitalism‖. Such a concept implied concessions, trade 
barter with peasants through the bodies of cooperation, commission-based private 
                                                          
12
 People‘s Commissariat on Food Aspects of RSFSR was a central state body of RSFSR. 
48 
 
trade, and lease of small state enterprises. Affirming the need to protect 
capitalism, Lenin explained this in terms of the Marxists economics. Bolsheviks 
recognized that many sectors of the Russian Imperial economy were ‗backward‘ 
and needed to undergo capitalist development so as to attain a concentration of 
production. Once this has taken place, it would supposedly be easy for the party 
to expropriate and switch them to producing goods for the benefits of the entire 
society (Service 2007).  
Paradoxically, the desire to learn from the capitalists was accompanied by fear of 
capitalism. Capitalism was perceived as a threat by both common and responsible 
members of the party. V.I. Lenin was no exception. His plan - supported by L.D. 
Trotsky and L.B. Krasin - to prevent de-monopolization of foreign trade despite 
the fact that activities of People‘s Commissariat Foreign Trade Organization 
were too wasteful, was accompanied by anxiety and fear. Unlike pre-
revolutionary cooperation, cooperation at the beginning of the 20s was developed 
mainly by using assets and finances borrowed from the state under strict control 
of People‘s Commissariat of Finances (PCF)xxviii, the Supreme Soviet of the 
National Economy (SSNE)
xxix
, the State Plan and other central and local 
economic bodies. Communist factions were formed in all sectors and territorial 
Unions of Cooperation that had considerable impact on the process of 
appointment and transfer of the managerial staff. 
Declaring that NEP is introduced ―in a serious manner and as a long term 
project‖, leaders of Bolshevism did not miss the opportunity to stress that all such 
measures were not instituted ‖forever.‖ Not without reason, at the beginning of 
the 20s, the Political Bureau of the CC
xxx
 drew special attention to legal 
regulation of private economic relations to have relevant legal basis against them. 
Lenin wrote in March 1922: ―It is a serious mistake to think that NEP put an end 
to terror. We will face terror, economic terror, once again‖(my translation).  
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 2.5. International Reception of the Revolution 
The Bolshevik comrades‘ optimism and hopes for further ‗export of communism‘ 
to the West were increased by the ease of their intermittent political advance after 
the February Revolution. If this could happen in Russia, it surely made sense to 
predict revolutionary successes in Germany, Austria, Britain and France.  
Worries about a ―Red scare‖ did not go away in Germany, and even if 
popular support for far-left radicals was minimal, that did not mean there 
was no basis for concern. After all, the Bolsheviks had little backing in 
Russia and never intended to wait for a majority to claim all power 
(Gellately, 2007:85). 
The frame of Lenin‘s geopolitical perspective was constituted of the certitude 
about the condition of the world. War in Europe had discredited the entire 
international capitalist system. Millions of people had been killed or were 
suffering in the trenches. Profiteering by financiers and arms manufacturers was 
notorious. Nationalism was exploited by all governments. Churches had become 
megaphones for the military cause of the countries. The rhetoric about ‗the war to 
end war‘ failed to convince many far-left socialists in Europe and North 
America. To them it was unlikely that the current war would be the last world 
war (Service, 2007). 
He [Lenin] had to argue (…) that modern Capitalism is incurably predatory, 
wasteful, and unteachable, and that until it is destroyed it will continue to 
exploit the human heritage stupidly and aimlessly, that it will fight against 
and prevent any administration of natural resources for the general good, 
and that, because essentially it is a scramble, it will inevitably make wars 
(Wells, 1920:30). 
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The conclusion seemed to be self-evident—capitalism was the disease and had to 
be cured by the surgery of revolution
xxxi
. Bolsheviks claimed there was no 
alternative. Lenin was aware that France and Britain were far stronger in military 
sense than the Soviet state, but considered that this physical superiority was now 
eroded by worker‘s revolutionary movements in those countries, thus envisaging 
an English revolution among other things. 
In late 1919 Lenin, inspired by the Red Army's victories over White Russian 
anti-communist forces and their Western allies, began to see the future of the 
revolution with greater optimism. The Bolsheviks proclaimed the need for the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and agitated for a worldwide Communist 
community. Their avowed intent was to link the revolution in Russia with an 
expected revolution in Germany and to assist other Communist movements in 
Western Europe
xxxii
. However, all attempts at starting a communist revolution in 
Europe ended in a fiasco - but NEP as followed by RCP (B) was received around 
the world as offering certain hope for liberalization of the Soviet regime. Such 
hope was actively, though misleadingly, supported by the emigration circles from 
Russia which included Cadets
xxxiii
, Mensheviks
xxxiv
, and Socialist Revolutionaries 
(SR). For example, in opinion of the editorial staff of the Mensheviks Socialist 
Bulletin issued in Berlin: 
…those who said A, should say B. New rational economic policy aimed at 
development of productive forces cannot be pursued by the state machine 
and methods adapted to economic utopia and led to economic catastrophe 
(my translation). 
 In their opinion, the aspect ―of democratic liquidation of Bolshevism period of 
the Russian revolution‖ became of high importance in Soviet Russia.  
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However, having said A, i.e. allowing certain economic freedom, RCP (B) did 
not plan to say B, i.e. to limit its claims on monopoly of power, information, etc. 
Taking into account that administration of the parties of Socialist Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks had priority in development of economic principles of NEP; the 
Bolsheviks had actual reasons for being afraid of attempts at political and 
military counter-revolution. It should also be mentioned that Russia‘s most 
talented Marxists–theoreticians, such as Plekhanov, Trotsky (initially), and Yuli 
Martov, were to be found among Mensheviks.  
Western attitudes to the Russian Revolution and to the new government of the 
state could be summarized with words of Sir Winston Churchill, by that time 
Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air. Churchill was a staunch 
advocate of the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, declaring 
that Bolshevik regime must be "strangled in its cradle". This statement was 
largely addressed to the general lack of any idea what the Bolsheviks and their 
ideal of communism were. In the Soviet propaganda in many years to come such 
skepticism was defined as ruthless attempts of the foreign ―invaders‖ to destroy 
the country. Most commentators abroad rejected the view of Bolshevism as the 
proletariat rule. Occasionally, Lenin and other party leaders had to concede that 
the working class was not really running the Soviet state. They blamed this 
mainly on Russia‘s cultural backwardness. In fact, at the early stages of the 
Bolshevik rule, anybody living abroad had tremendous difficulties obtaining any 
accurate information about the current state of affairs in the Soviet state. But by 
the end of 1920es, reports on the Soviet state greatly improved. ―The structures, 
practices and policies of communism were becoming better known through the 
work of diplomats, newspaper correspondents and intelligence agents‖ (Service 
2007: 141). 
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 2.6. Some Conclusions Regarding the Conception and 
Implementation of NEP 
Slogans of the unlucky Kronshtadt‘s rebels13—―All power to soviets and not to 
parties‖, ―abolition of surplus-appropriation system and freedom of trade‖—
repeated the provisions set out in the main program documents of the 
revolutionary democracy parties at the end of the Civil War, which the 
Bolsheviks did not accept although they more or less tolerated so as not to lose 
allies in the fight against White Army and foreign invaders. The Kronshtadt 
events put an end to such tolerance, granting social democrats and socialists-
revolutionaries the doubtful ―privilege‖ of political leadership of the anti-
Bolshevism struggle, which many of them did not want at all. 
As a weak excuse for Lenin‘s diminishing understanding of freedom, it is fair to 
say that the traumatic geopolitics of that time was at least partially responsible 
for the actions and decisions he made. For example, occupation of Siberia by 
Japan, which lasted until 1922, worried not only Lenin, but made the Allies wary 
of Japanese intentions too. Japanese army general staff viewed the situation in 
Russia as an opportunity of securing Japan's northern border, with a desire to 
establish a buffer state in Siberia. The presence of the foreign troops within 
borders of Russia was not contributing to the development of the peace-oriented 
policies of the Bolsheviks, as fear of losing power never could serve as the 
ground for the good intentions.  
 It is also important to note that the preconditions for Soviet Russia‘s continued 
tradition of ‖unfreedom‖ were to be found in the history of the country long 
before Lenin and his supporters seized  power. For example, the food 
appointment program, largely associated with the military communism policy, 
                                                          
13
 Most of people fighting for the fortress died, some – left for Finland (8 thousand), others gave up (of whom 
2103 people were executed by shooting according to the revolutionary tribunal sentences). Participants of Kronshtadt 
events who survived were later repressed. In the 1990s they were rehabilitated. 
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was actually first introduced in the Russian Empire during World War I, in 1916. 
The serfdom, abolished in tsarist Russia only in 1861 out of fear that peasants 
would rise up to win their freedom, in the Soviet state soon found its renascence 
in kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The basic principle of voluntary membership in the 
agricultural commune was violated by the very process of forced collectivization; 
peasants were tied to the collective farms through a system of internal 
passports and household registration. They had to plant crops according to 
instructions from the central authorities, especially if they were on state-run 
farms. These authorities would then "buy" their agricultural produce at vastly 
reduced prices and use the surplus to invest in heavy industry. 
The period of NEP became for the course of the economic and social 
development of the Soviet Russia the crucial turning point. Until the appearance 
of The GOELRO-Plan, the Bolsheviks lacked any real development program—or 
indeed, any clear idea how to rule the country.  On the one hand, the decision to 
industrialize the country with electrification as the key momentum was at least 
setting some clear goals. This idea was even to some extent underpinning Lenin‘s 
assumption (as discussed in Chapter I), that incandescent lightening, machinery 
and other attributes of the technological civilization would free the people and 
allow creation of the perfect society.  On another hand, the new leaders of the 
country were unable to predict the costs involved in the implementation of the 
program.  This inability was because of many different reasons, including 
ideological factors such as motivating the masses and internal structural issues 
involving the vacuum of scientific knowledge after the revolution and many 
other scientists trying to please Lenin for their own benefit.  
The Bolsheviks used human resources as a building material for the 
technological base.  Almost with bare hands people were building hundreds of 
power-plants, factories, mines, etc. Those mines and factories had to be filled 
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with the workers afterwards, sometimes for three shifts. Not to mention the 
buildings of canals, railroads, metro, and, never before implemented on this large 
scale, the expansion of armaments.  
A crucial aspect of the path suggested by Bolsheviks was changing the 
proportion of the population living in urban and rural areas. At the wake of the 
Soviet states‘ industrializations process the majority of the working population 
was the agrarian work-force, with 82% living in villages. As a result of the 
collectivization, relocations, organizational recruiting, and—most important—
hunger
14
 , a large portion of the population came to the cities searching for jobs, 
took part in large and small building projects, and joined the working class.  
Another major problem which the Soviet Russia had faced at the initial stages of 
its industrialization was the need to create the internal market for the high-tech 
(by the standards of that time) production—electrical equipment, tractors, 
mechanical plugs, etc. Peasants were not used to consuming the external 
resources; and that subsequently meant for the country rulers a challenging 
project of the complete rebuilding of the peasant‘s psychology (more about the 
social engineering it the following chapter). For that purpose the collectivization 
was imposed, as the collective farms became the main consumers of the 
industrial production. This, in effect, was an artificial concentration of the capital 
through very harsh means. It is hard to say to what extent people had any other 
choice but to comply with the Soviet program of development which, as I have 
shown, oppressed them greatly. 
                                                          
14
  The first famine in the Soviet state happened in 1921-1923 most probably due to the Soviet government‘s 
policies of the forceful foodstuffs requisitioning 
 CHAPTER III: THE AUTHORS OF THE REVOLUTION 
The mysterious ―Russian soul‖15 has supposedly never sought order, 
technological advancement, or a trust in rational thought. Despite that, the 
program of rebuilding of the country and its economy after the wars and 
revolutions was based on industrialization and modernization, which were not 
appealing to the majority of the population. Wells provided a possible reason: 
And so when the crash came in Russia, when there remained no other 
solidarity of men who could work together upon any but immediate selfish 
ends, there came flowing back from America and the West to rejoin their 
comrades a considerable number of keen and enthusiastic young and 
youngish men, who had in that more bracing Western world lost something 
of the habitual impracticability of the Russian and acquired a certain habit 
of getting things done, who all thought in the same phrases and had the 
courage of the same ideas, and who were all inspired by the dream of a 
revolution that should bring human life to a new level of justice and 
happiness (Wells 1920:16). 
However, the social development in Russia has a much longer history of the 
foreign influence than Wells suggested. The relationship between Russians and 
Germans
16
 in the former Russian Empire was seen in the Ivan Goncharov novel, 
Oblomov. Philip Longworth in Russia’s Empires: Their Rise and Fall: From 
Prehistory to Putin refers to this work comparing the general state of the Russia‘s 
Empire in the nineteenth century with the main hero—Oblomov, who cannot find 
the will to transform intention into action. His friend, a German who embodies 
                                                          
15
  The term Russian Soul has been used in literature to describe Russian spirituality.  
16
  According to the first Census of the Russian Empire in 1897, there were about 1.8 million respondents who 
reported German as their mother tongue. German-Russians were disproportionately represented among Russia's 
engineers, technical tradesmen, industrialists, financiers and large land owners.  
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the dynamism that Oblomov lacks, tells him what he needs to do, encouraging 
and cajoling him, but in vain.  ―Oblomov is, of course, a metaphor for Russia at a 
point of crisis, facing—or rather avoiding—the challenges of the modern world‖ 
(Longworth, 2006:212). Rulers of Tsarist Russia held the generally shared belief 
that Russia's established Germans could be the driving force which would 
transform Russia into a more modern European state. For example, an aspect of 
Russian electrification (and industrialization in general) which should not be 
underestimated was the large foreign influence to which it was subject. Nemtsy
17
, 
which meant either German or Western foreigner, played an important role in the 
process of electrification of Russia and in the forging a new socio-economic 
system
18
. Influences ranged from the obvious financial and material transfers to 
the less overt but very important flows of ideas and people. 
The early foreign influence on the social and cultural life in the Russian Empire 
represented by Germans and German which was the language of the 
businessman, created and underpinned the ―foreign is better‖ bias (Coopersmith, 
1994:36), which at large extend still exists in the consciousness of the Russian 
population.  This bias could serve as a ground for the political rise of the non-
Russian nationalities in the governance apparatus in the early Soviet state. The 
presence of the foreign influence in the cultural development of the country poses 
a different set of questions, which have immediate bearing for today's Russia. To 
what extent the Russian people were responsible for current state of affairs, 
whether the end of the old regime was brought about by peasants' ostensible 
'love for freedom' or was imposed by foreign influences; and to whom the 
country's future belonged. The questions I wish to ask are: Who, apart from 
Lenin, were the ideologues of NEP? What was their concept of freedom? And 
                                                          
17
  In modern Russian, this term refers to German nationality. 
18
  Several lines of Western involvement ran deeply throughout the GOELRO-Plan and the accompanying 
discussion. Some 200 scientists and engineers took part in the GOELRO-Plan, more than a half of whom were 
presumably of German origin (according to their surnames). 
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what was the relationship of the "development as unfreedom" and the fact that 
this development was designed by the members of non-Russian nationalities and 
"outsider" groups?  
 3.1. From Marxism to Leninism 
As the country modernized and drew closer to the rest of Europe, it became 
increasingly clear that the autocracy would have to share power with the landed 
gentry, professionals, businessmen, and other members of emerging civil society. 
Even liberals committed to the rule of law believed that such a change would 
probably require a revolutionary break (Malia, 2001). Since the Great Reforms of 
the mid-century, university students had increasingly demanded changes to a 
repressive and hostile system. Those demands stemmed from a fundamentally 
middle-class intellectual tradition and from a pervasive, though far from 
universal, sense of guilt about the peasantry. In this environment Marxism soon 
gained appeal. ―Its ideas—purveyed by educated, idealistic, sometimes resentful 
young people—came to be interpreted at pie stalls and factory gates, and were 
debated enthusiastically in bookshops.‖ (Longworth, 2006:228). The drift to 
violence, such as bomb throwing or assassinations, stemmed in the first place, as 
Longworth puts it, from the intellectuals‘ tendency to differ in the analyses of 
conditions and the interpretation of the revolutionary literature, such as Marx‘s 
ideas. This, in turn, gave rise to divergences and splits. Repression and hence 
further radicalization followed. Revolution was the general expectation of the 
Russian intelligentsia after 1900, with Lenin advancing the most radical program. 
Marx and Engels had not really had a fixed standpoint on violent revolution 
and proletarian dictatorship. But they had written frequently about violence, 
and it would seem that Marx used phrases like ‗the dictatorship of 
proletariat‘ about a dozen times. Lenin scoured their writing for reference 
like an intellectual detective. His analysis, while having degree of 
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justification, therefore rested on the props of a highly selective treatment of 
the inconsistent writings by his intellectual heroes (Service, 2007:62). 
The problem also resides in that Lenin‘s reading of Marx, and his projection of 
the intelligentsia's attitudes toward the workers, had proven to be drastically 
problematic. Until the early 1880s the revolutionaries of the Russian Empire, 
notably People’s Will fraction, upheld the axiom that their socialism should take 
account of the predominantly agrarian and backward nature of the economy. 
Britain, France, and Germany had accomplished a vast industrial and cultural 
advance. Russia and its borderlands had lagged behind. The revolutionary 
thinkers started from proposition to put peasants at the core of ideas. Inspiration 
for the future socialist society was drawn from the Russian village commune. 
The peasantry‘s tradition of periodic redistribution of the land could serve as the 
basis of an egalitarian transformation. Such thinking, however, started to lose its 
grip. Peasants themselves were persistently indifferent to calls for revolution.  
Lenin made his name among young Russian radicals as one of the founding 
members of Iskra (Spark) in 1900. The émigré newspaper was published in 
Germany and favored underground activity that would ―spark‖ the fires of 
revolution (―Iz iskri vozgoritsja plamja!‖). Lenin became far better known for the 
pamphlet What is to be Done? from 1902, which urged the need for the severe 
rules in the party to guarantee centralism, discipline, and the vetting of the 
recruits. It won over people like Stalin
xxxv
, who were excited by the idea that a 
small band of revolutionaries could bring fundamental change (Gellately, 2007). 
Investigating Lenin‘s What is to be Done?, in which he sets goal to change all 
Russia with ―a party of a new type,‖ Service argues that Lenin substituted an 
intelligentsia faction for the real proletariat; and this is not Marxism but the 
specter of the People’s Will (Service refers to the People’s Will as to ―narodniki‖, 
like in most historical Russian books).  
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Marx emphasized that social development sprang from the inherent 
contradictions within material life and the social superstructure. This notion is 
often understood as a simple historical narrative: primitive communism had 
developed into slave states. Slave-based states had developed into feudal 
societies. Those societies in turn became capitalist states, and those states would 
be overthrown by the self-conscious portion of their working-class, or proletariat, 
creating the conditions for socialism and, ultimately, a higher form of 
communism than that with which the whole process began. Marx illustrated his 
ideas most prominently by the development of capitalism from feudalism, and by 
the prediction of the development of socialism from capitalism. But, in the 
process of  mass translation,  Marx's ideas  were sometimes oversimplified and 
often misunderstood.  The vocabulary of Marxism conjured up believable icons 
of oppressed workers and an exploitative, unproductive bourgeoisie, together 
with the promise of an inevitable ‗crisis of capitalism‘ and the ultimate triumph 
of communism. Marxism iconography presented a congruent parallel of Christian 
iconography, and, in the absence of Christian inspiration, many of the young 
immigrants in  the cities took to the new ideology as to religious belief. 
Organizations, whether in unions or movements, also offered a sense of purpose 
and comradeship (Longworth, 2006).  
 3.2. Korenizatsiya and Razmezhevanie 
One of the greatest paradoxes of the new, Soviet state was that the stewards of 
imperium
19
 in the Soviet state were not the Russian people per se, but the 
members of the Communist Party, as the following passage suggests:  
[N]ot only could you lose your class background on becoming a Bolshevik, 
you could lose your ethnic background too. Trotsky said early in the century 
that he was neither a Jew nor a Russian but a Social Democrat. The 
                                                          
19
  Imperium in a broad sense translates as ‘power‘. In ancient Rome the concept applied to people and meant 
something like 'power status' or ‗authority'.  
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Communist Ukraine was ruled at various times by a Bulgarian and a Pole. A 
Latvian commanded the Red Army in 1918. The first head of the secret 
police, Felix Dzerzhinsky, was of course Polish, as was his immediate 
successor (Conquest, 1997:6) . 
The project of the Soviet state as a multi-national culture for the Soviet nation 
was initially based on a contradiction between the proclaimed ―stronghold of the 
friendship of peoples [nationalities]‖—a line from the Soviet national anthem 
from 1944—and the formation of the ideologically-based nation of Soviet mono-
culture. Citizens were encouraged to reject their homelands and only recognize 
the otechestvo—literally  fatherland. This word represents the notion of power 
and statehood, and as thus was enthusiastically used by Soviet nationalist 
propagandists.  
Lenin's Bolshevik government, being strongly hostile to Russian nationalism in 
particular, introduced korenizatsiya. The idea was formulated by Joseph Stalin as 
means to appeal to the many non-Russian residents of the former tsarist empire 
populating the Soviet regime. It arguably helped the government exert its 
influence on the many ethnic minorities throughout the country.  
Korenizatsiya implied the widest possible introduction of local languages into all 
spheres of public life, particularly in education, publishing, culture, and most 
importantly government and the Communist Party. This was intended to counter 
the historical practice of Russification. Several of the ethnic groups in Russia that 
had no literary language created alphabets to teach their national languages in 
schools and to increase literacy for the people in their native languages.  
Minorities would thereby be brought out of their backwardness into the modern 
world. Not only was the local cadre of titular nations promoted at all levels but 
ethnic Russians who served in local governments were encouraged (or required) 
to learn the local culture; and local languages were to be used in official affairs. 
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In the early Soviet period, even voluntary assimilation was actively discouraged, 
and national self-consciousness of the non-Russian populations was promoted. 
The initial period of korenizatsiya followed in tandem with the development of 
the national-territorial administrative units and national cultures. The policy of 
razmezhevanie lasted through the 1920s and most of the 1930s. 
Lenin sought a more open-ended federation that might soon include the 
Soviet republics of Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Finland. (…) Lenin 
wanted to create a new level of federation and to appeal to the sense that 
nations wanted self-determination and should be able to have it inside an 
ever-expanding USSR (Gellately, 2007:149). 
The Soviet Union that took over from the Russian Empire in 1917 was not a 
nation-state, nor was the Soviet leadership committed to turning their country 
into such a state. Each officially recognized ethnic minority, however small, was 
granted its own national territory where it enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, 
national schools, and national elites. The process relied on The Declaration of 
Rights of the Peoples of Russia, adopted by the Bolshevik government on 15 
November 1917, immediately after the October Revolution. The Declaration 
recognized equality and sovereignty of all the peoples of Russia, and their right 
for free self-determination, up to and including secession and creation of an 
independent state. The system aimed to accommodate the aspirations of the 
‗nationalities,‘ and to a large extent it succeeded. It ensured that a larger 
proportion of each group would get official jobs and that most of the subject 
population would be administrated by people of their own kind.  
In the short term the policy enjoyed some success, but it was military power 
rather than political ideology that often decided outcomes on the ground. 
National sovereignty was used by the new regime as a means to pay non-Russian 
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nationalities for the momentary alliances in Communist Party‘s struggle against 
the anti-Communist White Forces. For example, as Longworth explains, the 
Terek Cossacks were ejected from their farms and their land handed over to the 
Chechens, whose Sufi leader, Ali Mitaev, made a deal to ally with the 
Bolsheviks. It was therefore thanks to the Soviet regime that Chechens were able 
to claim a moment of sovereignty in 1921, though Mitaev met his death at Soviet 
hands only a few years later (Longworth, 2006). By the same means, 8 million 
other Russians were trans-located to other states. According to a 1920s 
population census, 5.250.000 Russians were registered in Poland (in Malorussian 
(Ukraine) and Belorussian lands specifically), 742.000 in Bessarabia in Romania, 
231.000 in Latvia, 91.000 in Estonia, and 55.000 in Lithuania. The People‘s 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin
xxxvi
 explained these events as 
follows:  
We gave to Estonia a truly Russian piece of land, and the same to Finland 
Pechanga, despite reluctance of its population; we did not consult Latgalia 
when we gave it to Latvia, and we gave truly Belarussian territories to 
Poland. This is all connected to the current situation in which the Soviet 
Republic fights against capitalistic beseigement; the leading principle of the 
Soviet Republic is to survive as a citadel of the revolution… We are lead 
not by nationalism, but the interests of the world revolution (Archive of the 
Foreign Affairs Politics of the Russian Federation. Ф.4. Оп.51. №321а. 
Д.54877. Л.21., my translation) . 
In 1924 a constitution for the Union of Soviets was promulgated. The Union was 
to be a ‗federal multinational socialist federation‘ based on the principle of self-
determination. It consisted of three Republics of the Union – Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus – and eleven Autonomous Republics – including Kazakhstan, Karelia 
and Crimea, and others for Buriat-Mongols, Volga Germans, Tatars and others. 
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There were also thirteen Autonomous Provinces designed to accommodate the 
Udmurts of western Siberia, the Komi, the Chechens and the Maris. The Jews 
were allotted Birobijan in the Amur region of the Far East as a national home, 
and the Ulch and other small ethnic groups were given ‗national districts‘ in 
other areas.  
The Russian Empire was a nation-state unified by the Russian Orthodox Church 
under an Orthodox tsar. The Bolsheviks declared a separation of church and 
state, though they tried to form the so-called ―Living Church‖ that was loyal to 
the Soviet power almost in all aspects. Originally begun as a "grass-roots" 
movement among the Russian clergy for the reformation of the Church, it 
quickly discredited itself by supporting the secret service. One of the first decrees 
of the new Communist government (issued in January 1918) declared freedom of 
"religious and anti-religious propaganda". In February 1922 the decree of 
confiscation of all ecclesiastic values was implemented. Such actions caused 
waves of indignation among supporters of the Orthodox Church. As a result of 
the anti-religious policies of Bolsheviks, thousands of priests were put to death.  
 3.3.  The Role of  The "Freedom Loving" Intelligentsia  
Before Bolsheviks came to power, the most well-known attempt in Russian 
history to lead the country into the modern era came from Peter I ―The Great.‖ 
Obviously, he sincerely wished to make Russia a modern, European state; but the 
chosen methods of ―europization‖ were based on violence and the blind copying 
of new political forms without changing the old customs. However, his activity 
brought the image of ―the new Russia‖ and ―the new people,‖ which became a 
special kind of myth. This myth was passed on to the later attempts to create 
cultural consciousness and national identification. It can be evaluated in the light 
of the subsequent Russian history, both positively and negatively, depending on 
whether to regard it as ensuring rapid cultural progress or as entailing the loss of 
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national character and the establishment of a new order under the influence of 
Western revolutionary thought. It was central to a tradition of introspection and 
moral self-perfection that arose in the early nineteenth century as a response to 
the dilemma of the Russian in the gloomy, backward, generally illiterate country.  
Examination of Russia‘s cultural history corroborates Robert Conquest‘s 
explanation of the emergence of an ideology-prone intelligentsia. From 
Enlightenment rationalism, German romantic philosophy, and French utopian 
socialism, many educated Russians absorbed a vision of history as a collective 
process leading to the fullest self-realization of man through the healing of all 
painful divisions between individuals and the social whole, a vision of the 
radiant future. This ideological cliché, widely used in the Soviet propaganda, had 
as strong a psychological impact as the American dream. Radical critics urged 
writers to speed up the advance to this goal by creating images of ―new men,‖ 
integrated personalities whose personal fulfillment was achieved through heroic 
labours for the good of society. Conquest, Fitzpatrick, and many others who 
studied Lenin‘s life and work closely agree that Lenin was greatly influenced by 
Chernyshevsky‘s novel of 1863 What is to be Done?:ˮChernyshevsky envisaged 
a 'new man' of the intelligentsia who would 'destroy' the old order and, ruling 
from above, would institute a social utopia‖ (Conquest ,1995). In Conquest‘s 
study Reflections on a Ravaged Century, he views intelligentsia as one of 
determinants of Russia‘s general acceptance of the idea of ―the total destruction 
of the existing order and its replacement by a perfect society run by none other 
than the intelligentsia
20‖: 
…as Pasternak put it (Paris Review, no. 24, 1960), in the 1840s, though 
serfdom was obviously obsolete, no tangible hope was to be seen; in the 
                                                          
20
  The condition of being an intelligent was defined not by intelligence but by acceptance of the Idea. (…) 
None of the great writers, or other effective figures in Russia, qualified as ―intelligentsia‖. The bulk of the educated 
classes were not revolutionaries (Conquest 2000:86-87). 
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1860s ―liberal landowners have appeared, and the best among the Russian 
aristocrats begin to be deeply influenced by Western ideas‖; and in the 
1880s came ―the birth of an enlightened and affluent middle class, open to 
Occidental influences, progressive, intelligent, artistic.‖ The Russian 
Enlightenment, not yet sufficiently translated into political action, had 
emerged (Conquest, 2000:87). 
Similar reflections can be found in the final chapter of Revolution on My Mind: 
Writing a Diary Under Stalin by Jochen Hellbeck: 
Bolshevik‘s activities were successful in propagating the urgency of 
individual growth through adherence to the revolution because such 
thinking was rooted in Russia‘s historical past. The moral duties of self-
improvement, social activism, and self-expression in concert with history 
were a staple of Russian intellectual and political life for almost a century 
before the revolution of 1917. As Stalin-era diarists worked to align 
themselves with history and to achieve a historically grounded notion of 
self-hood, they acted in striking consistency with generations of educated 
Russians since the early nineteenth century. To behave in such ways was 
what distinguished a member of the Russian intelligentsia (Hellbeck, 
2007:432). 
Speaking, though, about an overwhelming effect of Western revolutionary 
thoughts combined with ―the physical and mental effects of the railway or of 
Darwin‖ had striking consequences. In Russia—a country ―that had no real 
previous experience of assimilating novelty, acute mental indigestion ensued, as 
with starving man suddenly given too much food‖ (Conquest, 2000:87)—the 
Western analytical free-thinking has resulted in the conditions of the emergence 
of the totalitarian ideology.  
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The interpretation of the "new-man"-myth as an ideal of freedom as self-
realization has the implications for the further discussion of the meaning of 
freedom in Russia. The spiritual freedom, often connected with  the notion of the 
―Russian Soul‖, found reflection in many writings of the Russian authors.  One 
of the later views of the ―Russian soul‖ was articulated by Alexander Benoisxxxvii 
in 1917:   
…I am convinced that Russian people in their soul and in the scope of their 
existence are freer than anyone else. Even under the tsarist regime there was 
nowhere that freedom (extended to the degree of permissiveness) in 
customs, in speeches, in thoughts than in Russia. Even our notorious ―right 
for ignominy‖ is just an expression of that inner, immanent to any human 
freedom, based on racial peculiarities, but also nourished by the Christian 
idea of ―the Lord‘s Kingdom inside us‖ (Benois, 2005:508, my translation). 
The obvious state of "un-freedom" in Tsarist Russia, which was partially based 
on slavery and partially on a feudal system, contradicts this description and thus 
raises a question who represented this great spirit of freedom.  The answer might 
be found in the descriptions of the "Russian Soul" offered by Leo Tolstoy, 
Dostoevsky, Pushkin and Gogol among many others. Their writings often were 
inspired by and addressed to Decembrists (members of the Decembrist revolt 
which took place on 14 December 1825). The dissatisfaction with the state of 
affairs in the Russian Empire the Decembrists expressed, in the aftermath of their 
defeat, brought some significant changes in the Tsarist Russia eventually 
resulting in the abolishment of serfdom. The Decembrists and their sympathizers 
were the elite of the Russian society in the beginning of the XIXth century. The 
views and perceptions of freedom in Russia they inspired—embracement of the 
peasant (as a truly Russian) way of life combined with the revolutionary and 
reformative ideas brought from abroad—clearly cannot be extended to the whole 
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population of Russia. The perception of freedom which became common  for  the 
majority of the Soviet citizens has been far from the Decembrist‘s ideal.  
There was a long period after the October Revolution when the word "freedom" 
was practically absent in its philosophical transcription in the social lexicon. 
Freedom as the paradigm after the bloody Civil War was no longer the same in 
the Soviet state as for the rest of humanity. For almost thirty years after 1917, 
until the death of Stalin, freedom was considered as something harmful, 
reactionary, a relict of the petit bourgeois concepts. The very word "freedom" in 
the Soviet state was almost unprintable, because the possible enemy from without 
was denoting freedom as a different kind of value than it was described in the 
"scientific communism" manual. The solely correct definition of freedom for the 
Soviet citizen was suggested by Marx "freedom as recognized necessity" 
(svoboda - eto osoznanaja neobhodimost'). This quotation was used promptly, 
without citing the source or references to the context. Translated in the Russian 
language, it implied sacrifices of individual freedoms for the needs and goods of 
the society. Possibly, it was not just because of propaganda or inertia of the 
revolutionary romanticism, which brought the notion of freedom as the 
forthcoming happiness that could be reached only by rejecting small and 
unimportant individual freedoms. Freedom as the social ideal was never praised 
in Russia as much as equality or fellowship.  The notion of freedom was absent 
in the Russian folktales, songs, sayings, or proverbs. The narrow perspective of 
what life can offer, combined with indoctrination,  made many citizens of the 
Soviet state to believe that they live in the most open and free country in the 
world. A popular song from 1936
21
 contains the following line in chorus: "I don't 
know any other country, where a man can breathe so freely" ("Ja drugoi takoi 
strani ne znaju, gde tak vol'no dishit chelovek").  This translation is quite 
                                                          
21
  The Song About Motherland was created by Lebedev-Kumachev and Dunaevskim for the movie The 
Circus. 
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tentative, as for the native Russian speaker use of adjective vol'no (adrift) instead 
of svobodno (freely) on the emotional level means longing for freedom, rather 
than freedom itself.  This choice of adjective in the hymn of Stalinism
22
 looks 
either as a blooper or a deliberate substitution.  
 The claims that the country needs to be brought from the backwardness justified 
oppressive measures (if needed, by sacrificing the present generation for the sake 
of the future), prior to the enhancement of constitutive freedoms. The liberal 
conception of freedom, stressing the importance of natural rights
23
,  was 
incompatible with the idea of personal growth imposed from without. The social 
progress in the liberal sense was supposed to flow from the absence of state 
constraints; in Soviet Russia the notion of governance as a facilitator of optimum 
development of individual capacities was closely connected to the state dream of 
the grand goal.    
 3.4. The "Judeo-Bolsheviks" as Designers of Soviet Development 
In Lenin: A New Biography, Dmitri Volkogonov
xxxviii
 analyzes Lenin‘s origins 
and states that his paternal grandfather was Russian, his paternal grandmother 
Kalmyk, and his maternal grandmother German. He also speculates that Lenin's 
maternal grandfather, Dr. Alexander Blank, was Jewish. The Ulyanov family, 
though thoroughly Russified, was of mixed origin, and possibly without one 
Russian among them. Origins of other members of the Bolshevik party even 
resulted in a sort of conspiracy theory in the West at the time of the allied 
intervention in the Russian Civil War—indeed, many leading Soviet statesmen 
were Jews.  
                                                          
22
  The version of "The Song About Motherland" from 1936 contains the line "With the golden letters are we 
writing the All-National Law of Stalin" (Золотыми буквами мы пишем Всенародный Сталинский закон). 
23
  There are different perspectives on what constitutes the natural rights, but as the highest priorities are 
usually viewed the right to life and liberty. 
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Alexander II, known as the "Tsar liberator" for his 1861 abolition of serfdom in 
Russia, was also known for his suppression of national minorities. Under his rule 
Jews could not commission Christian servants, could not own land, and were 
restricted to where they could and couldn't travel. The systematic policy of 
discrimination banned Jews from rural areas and towns. They had endured a form 
of physical segregation in the Pale of Settlement
xxxix
, as well as sporadic 
persecutions supported by Tsarist governments. The reasons for those actions 
were primarily economic and nationalist. While Russian society had traditionally 
been divided into nobles, serfs, and clergy, industrial progress led to the 
emergence of a middle class, which was rapidly filled by Jews, who did not 
belong to any sector. By limiting places where Jews could reside, the imperial 
powers attempted to ensure the growth of a non-Jewish middle class. Strict 
restrictions prohibited Jews from practicing many professions. The idea of 
overthrowing the Tsarist regime was attractive to many members of the Jewish 
intelligentsia because of the oppression of non-Russian nations and non-
Orthodox Christians within the Russian Empire. For much the same reason, 
many non-Russians, notably Latvians and Poles, were disproportionately 
represented in the Bolshevik party leadership, while revolutionary movements 
and parties were not popular among Russians. Lenin mentioned that ―Jews are of 
the especially large percentage (compared with the Jews‘ population density)xl 
among the leaders of the revolutionary movement‖ (Ленин В.И. Полн собр. соч. 
Т. 30. С. 324, my translation).  
He [Hitler] painted Lenin as a failure who had surrendered the Russian 
people to the dictatorship of the Jews. Exaggerating the extent of Jewish 
influence, he said that they constituted 430 out of 478 people‘s commissars. 
(…) He dwelled on the point, that the victory of Marxism in Russia was the 
triumph of the Jews (Gellately, 2007:100). 
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Figure 9. The caption 
reads: "Peace and 
Liberty in Sovdepia" 
The label "Judeo-Bolshevism" became popular after the October Revolution 
(1917), featuring prominently in the propaganda of anti-communist forces during 
the Russian Civil War. Partially it has to do with the fact that after the Revolution 
a large number of Jews were employed in the bread- offices (of a high 
importance for survival in that period), trade, media, cinema, science, literature, 
and diplomacy (including foreign affairs). Among Russians this built a basis for 
anti- Semitic attitudes, which last even today. The White Army‘s propaganda 
posters literally ‗demonized‘ the founder of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky (see 
Figure 9), who with his pince-nez and shock of auburn, curly hair, became one of 
the most readily recognized of the Bolsheviks.  
―Judeo-Bolshevism‖ was used by many enemies of 
Bolshevism, as well as contemporary anti-Semites, accusing 
Jews of pursuing Bolshevism to benefit Jewish interests. 
Notably, Hitler played on the theme that Russia suffered 
―hunger and misery‖ and that ―the guilt for this 
development‖ was attributable to ―none other than the 
Jews‖ (Gellately, 2007). During the Civil War tales linking 
the Jews to Bolshevism and its terror had become a reason 
for the pogroms of Jews in Ukraine. Many peasant revolts 
had an anti-Semite character, because bread-brigades and anti-church 
commissions were often lead by Jews. Anti-Jewish sentiment was aggravated by 
the fact that after the beginning of the NEP-policy, the majority of the ―new 
bourgeoisie‖ were Jews: 
In sales business in Moscow they owned 75,4 % of all apothecaries, 54,6 % 
of perfumery shops, 48,6 % of textile shops, and 39,4 % of luxury-clothing 
shops. Of 2469 large entrepreneurs in the capital during the NEP, 810 were 
Jews. In the western part of the country the proportion of Jewish 
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Figure 10. Soviet caricature originating 
the period of NEP: "Nepman" 
entrepreneurs with private businesses was even larger: 66% in Ukraine, 
[and] 90% in Belarus (…). Negative reaction in the society also provoked a 
comparably high level of representation of Jews in establishments of higher 
education. In the RSFSR at the beginning of 1927, the Jewish student 
contingent in pedagogical high educational establishments was 11,3%, in 
technical [schools] 14,7%, [and] in art schools 21,3% (Larin, 1929:97-99, 
my translation). 
Anti-Semitic attitudes, initially emerging from 
the stereotypes of Jews, were easily linked to 
the negative images of the ‗Nepman‘—the 
quintessential entrepreneur who made his 
money by getting hold of products in scarce 
supply—in his luxurious fur coat, smoking his 
expensive cigar. The usual hostility toward the 
'Nepman' was caused by the notion that the 
USSR was meant to be a 'proletarian state' and 
not a 'breeding bowel for parasites' (Service, 
2007).  
At the same time, the vast majority of Russia's Jews, much like their non-Jewish 
Russian neighbors, were not in any political party. The attempts of the socialist 
Jewish Labour Bund
xli 
to be the sole representative of the Jewish workers in 
Russia had always conflicted with Lenin's idea of a universal coalition of workers 
of all nationalities. Soon after seizing power, the Bolsheviks established the 
Jewish section of the Communist party in order to destroy the rival Bund and 
Zionist
xlii
 parties, suppress Judaism
xliii
 and replace traditional Jewish culture with 
atheistic and internationalistic "proletarian culture". The teaching of Hebrew at 
primary and secondary schools was officially banned by the Narkompros 
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(Commissariat of Education) as early as 1919, as part of an overall agenda 
aiming to secularize education. The anti-religious laws against all expressions of 
religion and religious education were being taken out on the Jewish population, 
just like on other religious groups.   
 3.5. Concluding Remarks 
There are several connections to make between the intelligentsia, Jews and 
unfreedom. The intellectuals‘ tendency to differ in the analyses of conditions for 
the social change and the interpretation of the revolutionary literature led to 
violence, such as bomb throwing or assassinations, that "reflected a romantic 
compulsion to act, and frustration with an exclusionary and seemingly 
unresponsive autocratic governmental system" (Longworth, 2006:228). The 
passiveness of intelligentsia after the October Revolution was the result of the 
uncertainty what to do next, as the overthrow of the tsar's rule was giving after all 
some hope for the possibility of the democratic and free development, the 
glimpses of the radiant future.  Lenin was one of the best examples of the 
Russian intelligentsia at the breach of the centuries, the product of an elite 
educational system that brought the fruits of ―enlightenment‖ to the European 
backwater. But, unlike Decembrists, he wasn't dreamer and idealist; he had a 
very practical ideas concerning the future of the state. However, the 
implementation of those ideas was apparently incompatible with democratic 
methods and peaceful development. Despite Lenin and the Bolshevik‘s 
enlightened dedication to industrialization and urbanization, and eagerness to 
promote education, they were the agents of ―development as unfreedom‖, who 
suppressed the capabilities of the population of Russia and their free will. Instead 
of creating the most progressive country on Earth, with popular participation in 
government and unprecedented social guaranties, the Bolsheviks were building a 
new empire.   
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Regardless these explanations, we cannot forget the mass that bore - and 
accepted - the inhuman costs of the revolution.  Russians often lived in worse 
conditions than other nations, and as part of Empire, even less so. They tended to 
be less literate and culturally and economically developed than the Balts, 
Estonians, Finns, Poles, or indeed even the German and Jewish minorities inside 
the country. The general passiveness of the titular nation led Bolsheviks (with 
Jews heavily overrepresented in the ranks of party and state officials) to seek the 
alliances with the other nations inhabiting the vast territories of Russia, thus  
implementing the policies of korenizatsiya and razmezhevanie in 1920s.  One can 
say that members of the Bolshevik party who were Jewish initially affected the 
concept of development in Soviet Russia. Most vividly it is seen in the 
suggestions for more rapid development and greater state control provided by 
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev during the period of NEP ("Trotsky's 
alternative"). This group believed that profits should be shared among all people 
implying the narrowing of the NEP in the countryside in favor of the technical 
reconstruction of the industry (the higher tempo of the development of the state 
industry was supposed to happen at the expense of the heavy centralization of the 
amortization funds and minimizations of the non-state reserves). Thus, before 
1927-1928 working year, the Trotsky's oppositional group suggested the 
requisition of no less than 150 million pud of grain as an additional tax imposed 
on the most well-off peasants ('kulaks'). Stalin, who initially didn't support idea 
of the greater state control, adapted it in 1927, with the same turning the 
"Trotsky's alternative" into "Stalin's alternative". "Stalin's alternative" lacked, 
however, the democratic rejuvenation  of the party's regime suggested by Trotsky 
and applied extraordinary administrative measures, which became the source of 
peasants' oppression during the process of the collectivization in agriculture and 
wasteful hyper-industrialization.  
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 CHAPTER IV: MODERNIZATION AND THE BANISHMENT OF 
NATURE: RUSSIAN AND SOVIET VISUAL ARTS  
Development in the Soviet state cost not just human lives but, as I shall show 
later, involved an unprecedented ecocide. This term originates the book by 
Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, jr. Ecocide in The USSR: Health and 
Nature Under Siege: 
Like other assaults on human dignity and hope - mass arrests and 
deportations, man-made famine - the indifference to pollution and human 
health is a consequence of the Revolution. Ecocide in the USSR stems from 
the force, not the failure, of utopian ambitions (Feshbach and Friendly, 
1991:28) 
 It is interesting to ask how the change of nature perception was reflected in the 
Russian and Soviet visual arts. The visual representation of nature plays a central 
role in the dichotomy of ―human being vs. nature‖, namely as a shaping cultural 
force towards society‘s attitude toward nature. What were the dominant 
representations of nature before the Soviet time, and how they were changed by 
the Bolshevik propaganda? 
The challenges of reviewing trends in the arts are similar to the problems of 
conducting a qualitative study, namely the issues of reliability and imprecise 
modes of data analysis. Investigating the presence of images of nature or an 
absence of those has drawbacks in terms of the interpretation of the focused 
samples and personal subjectivity of the researcher in data collection. 
The methodology used to collect data on art included observation of various 
images and research into their related subjects. In this particular case the focused 
samples are landscape paintings and posters from Russian artists who produced 
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works from the second half of the XIXth century till the beginning of the 1930s. 
Some of these works are placed in other chapters as the illustrations. 
A qualitative research approach was applied to this subject in order to gather an 
in-depth understanding of the connections between socio-historic events, cultural 
orientations of Russian artists as representatives of the intellectual groups, and 
the general attitude toward nature reflected in visual art in a given period.  
To facilitate data collection, the research concentrated on a holistic and 
contextual review of the significant and prominent images of nature (or its 
absence) in visual arts within two periods. The first period is characterized by the 
peculiar attention that painters gave to Russian nature—either by directly 
depicting it (as by members of the Peredvizhniki-society), or making implicit 
relations between ―Russian soil‖ and ―Russian soul‖ (as by many Symbolists 
who strengthened World of Art-movement). The second period‘s characteristics 
imply a general interest of painters to symbols of modern life, including the 
urban style of life in case of the avant-garde artists, and images of new 
technologies and mechanization included in the composition of the early Social 
Realists‘ paintings.  
 4.1.  Russian Landscapes-Painting before NEP  
It is hard to imagine the fine art in Russia at the end of the XIXth to the 
beginning of the XXth century without considering works of members of the 
Peredvizhniki movement. Like Lenin, influenced by the public views 
of Chernyshevsky, Peredvizhniki envisaged the creation of the ―new man‖ in a 
backward—compared to its neighbors—Russia. They were a group of Russian 
realist artists who in protest at academic restrictions (and tsarist officials‘ 
censorship) formed an artists' cooperative which evolved into the Society for 
Traveling Art Exhibitions in 1870. They proclaimed the realization of 
Chernyshevsky‘s work in practice by ―bringing art to people" and facilitating 
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their cultural education. The Peredvizhniki‘s society, during their blossoming 
(1870-1890), developed an increasingly wider scope, expressed as an increasing 
naturalness and freedom of the images. In spite of multi-talented artists that 
worked in many genres, subjects, and heroes, the images of Russian nature and 
human destiny remained the main themes of their creativity.  
Russian landscape painters were part of a movement towards realism in art which 
arose in the context of the dominant Romantic Movement of the time; their 
works were characterized by strong expressiveness and deeply national sound. 
The core of the aesthetic program of the landscape painters in 1860-1870 was a 
search for an inspiration in the Russian landscape, in its wide and often direct 
connections with the life of people. This has distinguished the Peredvizhniki 
landscapes from the previous works of Russian painters (representatives of 
the Russian Academy of Arts), who mainly depicted nature as seen in Italy.  
Studying the Russian countryside and landscapes, the future Peredvizhniki used 
as much true passion as the genre painters used to study the many-sided 
characters of social life, strength of characters, and the beauty of the traditional 
ways of life. The range of themes represented in these works was broad, 
embracing studio works depicting everyday life in the city and peasant life in the 
country. For the landscape painters it was equally important to not only 
accurately depict a specific landscape, but also to see the peculiarity of Russian 
nature.  
Works by Alexey Savrasov, Ivan Shishkin, Vasiliy Polenov, Arkhip Kuinji, and 
Isaak Levitan were well received by the public. These masters showed the 
highest importance of ordinary motifs, scenes, and seasons of the year. Country 
scenes were approached by artists much more often than urban motifs, thus 
emphasizing peasant themes. But it was not based purely on social problems. The 
whole gamut was captured on canvas. Plain green expanses, fallowed fields in 
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Figure 11. I.Levitan: Above Eternal Peace (1894) 
 
Above Eternal Peace (1894) 
the rain, endless travel-worn roads, narrow paths that stretched from different 
parts of the vast land, dense forests, impassable thickets, small lakes like blue 
saucers, hidden copses, and the beauty of the big Russian river Volga were all 
acceptable subjects for Peredvizhniki. 
The concept of nature, for 
Peredvizhniki movement artists and 
since, has always been closely 
connected with a man being painted in 
his natural environment. Concerns 
about people and their thoughts and the 
Russian character were very much 
affected by landscape. Indeed, the 
narrations about Russian nature 
involved the telling of the life story of human beings living in nature. In 
particular Isaak Levitan‘s landscapes contained a reflection on people's destiny 
and the meaning of their life, having at the same time a profound understanding 
of nature. His paintings, such as Over Eternal Peace and Eternal Chime, are full 
of literary associations and philosophical ideas. His last painting, Russia, was not 
finished. He dreamed of creating the common artistic image of his homeland in 
this painting. Levitan fell deeply in love with the Motherland, as did all of the 
Peredvizhniki. They dreamed and believed that their art would give people 
happiness and hope and recognition of the need to develop a high moral ideal in 
Russia. 
In the period 1903-1906 Nikolai Dubovskij created a series of works, the most 
prominent of which is Motherland (1905).  The idea of this painting was close to 
the lines of the great Russian poet Nikolai Nekrasov: ―You are so miserable, you 
are so abundant, You are so powerful, you are so weak, Mother Russia.‖ The 
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Figure 12. N.Dubovskij: Motherland (1905) 
composition of this painting has collected everything found by Dubovskij‘s 
predecessors in the creation of  large, plain areas, so characteristic of the Russian 
landscape. The whole composition 
of the painting is simple, strict, and 
exhibits a sense of grandeur. The 
beautiful land is segregated in small 
areas; separate shreds are covering 
hills and plains which stretch to the 
horizon.   
The revolutionary movement of the proletariat influenced the art society as well, 
causing a sharply idealistic differentiation. The differences could be felt during 
the last decade of the XIXth century. Though the Peredvizhniki held sway over 
Russian art for the first ten years of the XXth century, in 1898 their influence was 
superseded by Mir Iskusstva (World of Art), a movement which idealized the 
XVIIIth century as the "age of elegance," which strived to conserve the art of 
previous epochs, particularly traditional folk art, and yet also advanced modern 
trends in Russian art. World of Art activists aimed at assailing low artistic 
standards of the obsolete Peredvizhniki school and promoting artistic 
individualism and other principles of Art Nouveau. Benois and his friends were 
disgusted with anti-aesthetic nature of modern industrial society and sought to 
consolidate all Neo-Romantic Russian artists under the banner of fighting 
Positivism in art. In Benois‘ Diary from 1916-1918 there is a special amendment 
to the possible reasons of WWI linked to the usage by officials of a ―national 
idea‖ in arts: 
The old-men [members of the Peredvizhniki-society], in all the ways 
desiring the national art, were convincing each other that the period of 
slavish imitation of the foreign dominance was over, that they from now on 
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will ―freely create in their own fashion‖, and that in front of them a large 
field of tremendous success was opening both at home and abroad. The 
facts proved these ideas to be illusions. Every society in each state tended to 
forget about village and remembered this genre of art and paid attention to it 
only to support the national whimsies and nationalism (…) And that already 
was a war (Benois 2006:460, my translation). 
For him, the attempts of the nations to find their own path seemed horrible and 
dangerous, something he called a ―development of the national egos.‖ 
Furthermore, implemented in arts and religion, he saw it as the heresies, which 
corrupted the grounding principles of those spiritual spheres.  
The admiration-worth became not that was per se a creation of an artistic 
inspiration, not the prompting of freedom—but what was striving-fictional 
in the name of the narrow, cruel theories of insulation and even secession 
(…) The victory in the spheres of art belonged to the imperial customs, that 
is to say the backward movement from freedom to the casemates, to the 
squalor (ibid.) 
If there were critical observers in Russia, who perceived the monstrosity of 
Lenin‘s (and tsarist‘ before him) idea of development, no doubt Alexander 
Benois was one of them. In fact, the notion of "development as unfreedom" for 
the first time was articulated almost one hundred years ago by Benois in his 
Diary. Notably, the artist came up with comparison of the Soviet state to the 
existence and activity of an anthill ("an ant-slavery is the bitterst to accept" 
(Benois, 2006:508)) —which is not the way of saying a "free society"—only a 
month after the October Revolution.   
World of Art members were not interested in depicting nature, per se; their works 
should be understood in light of a spiritual search, characteristic of Symbolism. 
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Probably the best example of this artistic approach might be viewed in works of 
the prominent Russian Symbolist painter Mikhail Vrubel, who achieved fame 
with the decorative panels he painted for the 1896 All-Russia Artistic and 
Industrial Exhibition in Nizhny Novgorod. The first alluded to a medieval source, 
Edmond Rostan‘s Princess of Dreams and was meant to embody the Art 
Nouveau ideal of beauty. Another, Mikula Selyaninovich, was dedicated to the 
heroes of ancient Russian tales, the heroes who personified the power of the 
Russian soil. Vrubel arrived at a complex artistic hyperbole in his attempt to 
communicate the specifics of the mythic mindset. His Russian heroes of choice 
are not those who gained fame on the battlefield, but the farmer Mikula 
Selyaninovich and a Varagian tribute collector, the wizard Volga. The 
composition was based on the dialogue of the heroes in a fantastic landscape 
decorated with Russian motifs. The robust figures of the Bogatyrs, which seem to 
grow from the Russian soil, are perceived as the personifications of the spiritual 
power and the irrational natural strength coming from the true Russian soil in the 
image of Mikula, and the supernatural powers that come from the rational Nordic 
West in the image of Volga. In the context of symbolism, this diametrical 
opposition can be seen as a reflection on the priority of spiritual values embodied 
by each of the heroes.  
Russian Symbolism‘s representation of nature was deeply rooted in Russian folk 
tales, where the notions of spiritual kinship between man and nature belonged to 
the images of Russia as space—matushka-zemlja (mother-soil), zemlica rodnaja 
(earth from the home-place). As such, Russian soil, soul, and spirit are 
interconnected; for example, the image of the vast Russian field (shirokoe pole) 
finds the reflection in the perception of the big-hearted Russian man, ready to 
share the last he has with a stranger (shirokaja dusha).  
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Figure 13. M. Dobuzhinsky: From Petrograd’s Life in 1920 (1920). Besides obvious 
images of devastation, hunger, and cold winter, this painting features the theatrical 
posters and announcements of ball and dancing. It is hard to understand – are those 
posters left from the pre-revolutionary time as a reminder of a better life, or is it an 
amendment to the famous mini-tragedy by Pushkin‘s Feast during the Plague.  
Another aspect 
of the social 
activities of the 
World of Art 
group is the 
critical stand to 
the events of the 
Revolution they 
witnessed as, for 
example, an 
urbanistic 
phantasm From 
Petrograd’s Life 
in 1920 (1920) by Mstislav Dobuzhinsky. Dobuzhinsky was distinguished from 
other World of Art activists by his expressionist manner and keen interest in the 
modern industrial cityscape. He often painted seedy or tragic scenes from urban 
life which expressed the nightmarish bleakness and loneliness of modern times. 
Among his works were also humorous vignettes and sketches with demon-like 
creatures which seemed to embody the monstrosities of urbanization.  
 4.2.  From Depiction of the Urban Life to “Industrial Art” 
Russian Symbolism had begun to lose its momentum by the second decade of the 
twentieth century. Many joined the ranks of the Futurists, an iconoclastic group 
which sought to recreate art entirely, eschewing all aesthetic conventions. 
Russian futurism is said to have been born in December 1912, when the 
Moscow-based group Hylaea issued a manifesto entitled A Slap in the Face of 
Public Taste. 
82 
 
Figure 14. ‖Hail the Genious of the World‘s Wanders – 
the Mighty Artistic Labour‖ An abstract figure of a 
man presumably depicts a painter, who holds an easel. 
The caption on one of figures on a background reads 
―Art‖ 
The Russian Futurists were fascinated with the dynamism, speed, and 
restlessness of modern urban life. Even the established artists Mikhail Larionov, 
Natalia Goncharova, and Kazimir Malevich found inspiration in the refreshing 
imagery of Futurism. 
The 1910s saw striking experiments by Russian masters in all spheres of the fine 
arts—a total destruction of the plastic laws inherent in the figurative art of the 
previous age was under way. Suprematist canvases by Kazimir Malevich, 
including the famous Black Square (1913), became one of the most impressive 
manifestos testifying to a crisis of a narrative trend in art. Non-objective 
paintings by Olga Rozanova and Ivan Klyun, ―painterly counter-reliefs‖ by 
Vladimir Tatlin, ―plastic painting‖ 
by Liubov Popova, ―painterly 
sculpturing‖ by Ivan Pougny, 
―made-up pictures‖ by Pavel 
Filonov, ―spatial painting‖ by Peter 
Miturich, and ―painterly treatment 
of materials‖ by Lev Bruni were all 
based on a tendency to make easel 
art closer to material objects and 
technology. It was not a mere 
coincidence that the newspaper 
Iskusstvo Kommuni (Art of The 
Commune) (December 1918 – April 
1919), an organ of the ―leftist‖ 
artists who enthusiastically met the 
Revolution of 1917, presumed ―an attitude to the picture as a goal in itself as a 
constructive system of forms-colors.‖  
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Russian Futurism gave growth to the Russian Constructivism. This movement of 
the 1920s and early 1930s not only asserted itself in painting, graphic art, 
architecture, cinema and design, but also vividly reflected the specific features of 
the October Revolution. There was a great deal of overlap in this period between 
Constructivism and Proletkult
24
, the ideas of which concerning the need to create 
an entirely new culture struck a chord with the Constructivists. This movement 
emerged on the basis of the ideas of ―industrial art.‖ 
The enthusiasm of industrial progress and a growing urbanization forced artists 
to explore how they could mix the technical and aesthetic, the utilitarian and 
beautiful. The canonical work of Constructivism was Vladimir Tatlin's proposal 
for the Monument to the Third International (1919) which combined a machine 
aesthetic with dynamic components celebrating technology, such as searchlights 
and projection screens. The ideas of ―industrial art‖ received a theoretical 
development in a number of essays by Osip Brik, Boris Kushner, and Nikolai 
Chuzhak. They asserted the priority of engineering devices in creative work and 
opposed the rational necessity of the everyday objects to the ―useless‖ beauty of 
easel works. The theorists of the ―industrial art‖ aesthetic program, universal for 
all kinds of artistic activity, resolutely denied the ―pure‖ art of the past based on 
the creator‘s imagination and intuition. Instead the ideal was to create real objects 
necessary for daily life—furniture, clothes, shop-signs, tableware and crockery—
by means of exact calculation and machine activity. Several artists tried to work 
in clothes design with varying levels of success. In these works Constructivists 
showed a willingness to involve themselves in fashion and the mass market, 
which they tried to balance with their Communist beliefs. 
Believing that only the Revolution of 1917 gave an opportunity to the proletariat 
to master technology, the adherents of production supposed that only with its 
                                                          
24  Proletkult ("proletarian culture") was a movement active in the Soviet state from 1917 to 1925 to provide 
the foundations for what was intended to be a truly proletarian art devoid of bourgeois influence. 
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help the problem of harmonizing the entire sphere of material objects in new 
society could be solved. The emphasis on a technical aspect was explained not 
only by its practical reasons but also by its wide possibilities for the social 
transformation of the country.   
Leading Constructivists were heavily involved in film, with Mayakovsky starring 
in The Young Lady and the Hooligan (1919), Rodchenko's designs for the inter-
titles and animated sequences of Dziga Vertov's Kino Eye (1924), and 
Aleksandra Ekster designing the sets and costumes for the science fiction film 
Aelita (1924). 
The ―industrial art‖ theorists Osip Brik and Sergei Tretyakovxliv also wrote 
screenplays and intertitles for films such as Vsevolod Pudovkin's Storm over Asia 
(1928) or Victor Turin's Turksib (1929). The filmmakers and LEF
xlv
 contributors 
Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein, as well as the documentary filmmaker Esfir 
Shub also regarded their fast-cut, montage style of film making as Constructivist. 
Many posters created during late 1910s and 1920s have bared a specific feature 
of the period connected with technical progress in the Soviet state. The cult of 
machinery was an important aesthetic principle for adherents to ―industrial art.‖ 
From the first days of the Soviet state, posters became a favorite tool of many 
ideologists. Posters were viewed as street-art: large-scale and accessible to many. 
Many posters included elements of the technological progress—industrial 
objects, machine-tools, mechanisms, etc.—even if they were devoted to other 
subjects. The Constructivists actively included those details into posters 
combining them with photographic and type-face details. The poster was quickly 
becoming the most relevant genre of graphical art in the Soviet country, as is 
evidenced by the first retrospective in Soviet Russia The Poster in Six Years, held 
in February 1924 in the Historical Museum in Moscow. The exhibition laid the 
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beginning of the assertion of ―revolutionary,‖ politically engaged posters as 
principal accomplishments of the contemporary graphic art.  
The Constructivists were the first to turn not only to posters, but also sweet 
wrappers, trademarks and packages as a means to educate and enlighten working 
people. This education soon was corrupted by the efforts of the state ―to make 
more Soviet,‖ or make popular products synonymous with the identity of the 
country. These efforts pervaded the country, including renaming of the tobacco 
brands Thais and Allegro to be more understandable to the ―working smoker‖ 
Dneprostroi
xlvi
, Industrialization and State Loan. 
 4.3. The Fiction of Freedom in Soviet Realism   
According to the authorities, the task of the Soviet painters in the first years after 
the October Revolution was to distinguish Soviet art from the works created 
under the previous regime. It was important to show the new realities brought by 
the Soviets and with the same to promote an idea of the changing character of 
labour and hard work. In Labour in the Works of the Soviet Painters from 1971 it 
is stated, that: 
Russian Realistic paintings of the XIXth century, by showing the inner 
contradictions that existed in the exploitative society, were depicting the 
slavery-labour, depressive, impenetrable, degrading and killing. (…) 
Sympathizing the bitter destiny of the dejected Russian people, 
[Peredvizhniki] could only express the protest against the right-less position 
of workers in the tsarist Russia. After the October Revolution work ceased 
to be a matter of exploitation. New relations appeared between people in the 
process of working, a new attitude appeared to the labour itself. In front of 
the painters stood a totally different task – to show the labour of the freed 
person, who won it in the revolutionary battles, became the master of his 
homeland; to hail labour as the basis of the country's rejuvenation, building 
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Figure 15. Zolotarev: Development of the Agriculture. (1930). This postcard 
depicts industrial progress (represented by airplane and heavy machinery), high 
yield, an electrified village, as suggested by the electric lines, and Soviet power 
(represented by the red flag over the roof). 
 
of the new, radiant life (Советский художник [Sovietskii Chudozhnik] 
1971:1, my translation) 
In reality the situation was quite the opposite. The attempt to turn an illiterate 
peasant society into an advanced industrial economy in a single decade brought 
intense suffering upon those who were building this new state. This, of course, 
was never depicted 
by the Soviet 
painters. Instead, by 
the 1920s critiques 
saw a turn in the 
Russian visual art to 
Realism, which was 
meant to depict 
rather than to 
abstract, and was a 
continuation of the 
traditions of the 
classical painting 
school. Turn to classics was also explained in terms of ideology: the Soviet 
state‘s art was supposed to adopt the best achievements of the world‘s culture. 
Lenin believed that art should belong to the people and should stand on the side 
of the proletariat and be easily accessible for the masses of illiterate people of 
Russia.  
The 48th exhibition of Peredvizhniki in 1923 was the last one. Out went the 
Romantic snowy landscapes with winter palaces gleaming in the distance, and in 
came Socialist Realism: tractors, smoking chimneys, and ―happy workers 
striving for radiant future.‖ Most members of Peredvizhniki joined the 
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Figure 16. Yakovlev: Transport is Tuning (1923) 
Association of Artists in Revolutionary Russia (AKhRR
xlvii
), whose members 
leaned on the traditions of Peredvizhniki and aspired to create works of art 
understandable by people and faithfully reflecting the Soviet validity. They 
gained favor as the legitimate bearers of the Communist ideal into the world of 
art and formulated a framework for the Socialist Realism style. The ideology 
behind Socialist Realism stood for depicting the heroism of the working class. It 
was to promote and spark revolutionary actions and to spread the image of 
optimism and the importance of productiveness.  
It is interesting to study the themes of the postcards released by AKhRR in the 
1920s to the beginning of the 1930s. Those postcards demonstrate the sphere of 
interest of the Soviet state: industrialization and industrial labour, new buildings, 
and mechanization of the agriculture. The majority of those postcards were 
dedicated to children. They depicted serious kids who were trying to choose their 
future profession while playing, and pioneers who not only rested, but worked as 
well.  Much attention was devoted to the image of the ―new man,‖ and in 
particular the new Soviet woman. This image carried a message of an ―engineer,‖ 
―prominent worker,‖ or ―sports-woman.‖ The ideal postcard was supposed to use 
its theme to agitate the further development of the new socialistic culture. 
The period of NEP had 
established new genres in 
Russian visual art, 
particularly industrial 
landscape.  The industrial 
landscape painting allowed 
an artistic expression without 
contradicting the official 
ideology. To the industrial 
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Figure 17. Brodskij: Dneprostroi. (????) 
landscape in those years had turned among others A.B. Kuprin, P.I. Kotov, P.V. 
Kuznetsov, Ju.I. Pimenov, I.I. Mashkov, A.N. Samohvalov, and V.V. 
Rozhdestvenskii.  The industrial landscape was devoted to honoring the period of 
rebuilding of the country. It reflected an industrial growth, building projects of 
factories, and hydro-stations. The creation of this genre was marked with 
Yakovlev‘s Transport is Tuning (1923). This painting was praised both as 
enouncing the ideas of the socialistic re-organization of the Soviet country and as 
permissive for the landscape paintings in Soviet art. Yakovlev achieved a feeling 
of space in his work by depicting railroads, stretching to the horizon and flanked 
by power lines. The smoking trains symbolized labour activities after a long 
period of decline.   
Isaak Izrailevich Brodskij used to work in 
the landscape painting style in the first 
years of Soviet power. Starting from the 
period of NEP he became an ―official‖ 
painter of the new authorities. He 
depicted the official events and painted 
portraits of the Soviet state‘s leaders. In 
the 1920s, based on sketches and photo-
documentary, he created Lenin at the 
Volkovstroi
25
, contributing to the myth of 
the direct involvement of Lenin in the 
process of the country‘s electrification. 
To his later works belongs Dneprostroi. 
In particular, the construction site of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station became 
the source of inspiration for the Soviet painters, reflecting the Soviet authority‘s 
                                                          
25
  Volkhov hydroelectric plant under construction. 
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Figure 18. Bogaevskii: Dneprostroi. (1930) 
demand for the popularization of electrification. More accurately, the painters 
received orders from authorities to depict this project of the First Five-Year Plan. 
The initial five-year plans were created to serve in the rapid industrialization of 
the Soviet Union, and thus placed a major focus on heavy industry. Arguably, it 
was the initial proposal of The GOELRO-Plan that served as the prototype and 
the probe for nation-wide centralized exercises in rapid economic development 
further developed by Gosplan.  
One of the founders 
of the industrial 
landscape was 
Bogaevskii, who in 
the 1930s went to the 
Dneprostroi. The 
scale of the building 
site and the human-
labour struggle 
against the forces of 
nature amazed him.  Being a master of the historic-romantic, heroic landscape, 
he, as many other Soviet painters, turned to depicting large construction sites.  
Bogaevskii created more than 30 painting devoted to the Dneprostroi. His 
industrial landscapes carried a sort of meditative social-utopist character, with 
clouds of soot and dust filling the horizon as emblems of hope, rather than as 
portents of environmental degradation. "Until environmental consciousness 
genuinely began to enter Soviet thinking in the late 1980s, factory smokestacks 
stood as symbols of the country's might, progress and, by extension, beauty" 
(Feshbach and Friendly, 1991:91). 
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Labour in the Works of the Soviet Painters contains the following description of 
one of the gravures devoted to the Dneprostroi: 
Pathos and romantic of the creative labour are filling the graphical works 
of A. Kravchenko. In 1930 he was sent [rather detached, as many other 
painters] to make sketches of the Dneprostroi. This travel facilitated the 
creation of six large gravures, one of those is Dneprostroi. The Dam. In 
those works one can feel the intensive rhythm of labour. The large masses 
of the dam stand out grandiosely—a creation by the hands of the Soviet 
workers. The clear-cut compositional structure is emphasized by the 
diagonally way-going dynamic of the growing construction. Painter-
romantic Kravchenko saw the beauty of the new Soviet industry in his way 
and handled it in heroic, elated images (Советский художник [Sovietskii 
Chudozhnik], 1971:2, my translation).   
Another industrial landscape, presented in Labour in the Works of the Soviet 
Painters is an etching by N. Nivinskii Azneftstroi (construction site of the oil 
recovery in Azerbaijan): ―The multifaceted ebullient life of the Soviet industry: 
not only oil extraction, but also fleet, tractors, trains, airplanes, houses under 
construction. And above all that is seen an image of V. I. Lenin‖ (ibid., my 
translation).  The idea was to create a view of the new Soviet industry that 
follows the path, envisaged by its leader: 
Combining in a difficult composition the images of the surrounding reality 
with the certain symbolic, Nivinskii was able to show in the figurative way 
the connection of all exploits and mighty enterprises of the Soviet people, 
its inspirational labour with the grandeur of the thoughts of the leader of the 
Revolution, the embodiments of his great visions (ibid., my translation)  
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 4.4. The Soviet Silent Spring. From Nature to Machine  
Taking into account that the aim of the Socialist realism was to present life and 
work of the common worker or peasant, nature played a role of decoration and 
backdrop for the heroic labour, a challenge to be conquered and satisfy human 
needs.  
Stalinist planning justified itself with a forthright slogan: "We cannot expect 
charity from nature. We must tear it from her". Nature existed to be 
exploited, to be wrestled into submission. To defend it was sabotage, a 
hostile act against the builders of the socialist paradise (Feshbach and 
Friendly, 1991:43)  
The planning became an instrument "that fit all the requirements of ambition and 
ideology, of central authority and gargantuan challenge" (ibid.).  The Five-year 
plans were approved by the council of ministers and the Politburo. Nobody on a 
lower level would dare to say a word contradicting those plans, even if the 
negative consequences for the natural environment were obvious. The views of 
nature presented in works of the Futurists, Constructivists, and later the Socialist 
realists reflected—and in some ways constituted—a general neglect of nature in 
policies and projects of the Soviet state.  Any intrinsic or spiritual value of a non-
human nature was reduced to merely instrumental terms (same is true to say 
about individuals and the mass of people, treated by the state "with the same 
indifference to their innate human value and well-being" (Feshbach and Friendly 
1991:40)).  
The concept of sustainability is no longer a new one, but in many aspects it 
remains rather controversial and unclearly defined. The Report of the Brundtland 
Commission
26
, Our Common Future, recognizing the needs of political and 
                                                          
26
  The Brundtland Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), known by the name of its Chair Gro Harlem Brundtland, was convened by the United Nations in 1983. In 
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social change in order to find balance between human environment and natural 
resources, defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs" (http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm). The 
―sustainable‖ in this definition is merely a qualifying adjective, characterizing 
living systems as limited, while development is a goal to achieve taking in 
consideration the limitations of resources. However, the development pursued in 
the Soviet state can't be described as sustainable even in those limited terms. The 
unsustainable development, aimed to meet the unrealistic industrialization targets 
of the Soviet planners, not surprisingly resulted in environmental degradation as 
a menace to human health and wrecking of human livelihoods not only for the 
future generations, but also for the present ones. Along with the culture of 
development and technical progress, the Soviet authorities promoted technical 
solutions for policy-making, whose implementation often resulted in degradation 
of the natural environment. One of the most prominent examples of this policy is 
the diversion of the rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya that fed the Aral Sea 
by Soviet Union irrigation projects for promoting the cotton growth in the 
southern Republics of the USSR (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Due to 
redirection of the Sea's sources, the Aral Sea has been steadily shrinking since the 
1960s.  
The possibility of facing a spring season without bird songs has inspired the title 
of Rachel Louise Carson‘s book Silent Spring (1962). In this book Carson argued 
that effects of pesticides usage are rarely limited to the target pests and stated that 
uncontrolled pesticide use leads to the deaths of animals, especially birds, and  
humans. Silent Spring became one of the most influential books of the XXth 
century, launching the global environmental movement. In the Soviet state the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
establishing the commission, the UN General Assembly recognized that environmental problems were global in 
nature and determined that it was in the common interest of all nations to establish policies for sustainable 
development. 
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silent spring in many places became the reality as a result of the massive but 
untutored use of toxic agricultural chemicals.  
25 million of acres of cropland are still overloaded with the poison [DDT
27
]. 
In some areas marked by pesticide abuse, the infant mortality rate runs 
twice as high as in cleaner, nearby regions. (...) As [the Aral Sea's] volume 
shrank by two-thirds, storms carried the toxic salts from its exposed bed to 
fertile fields more than one thousand miles away (Feshbach and Friendly, 
1991:2).  
Not only the destruction of ecosystems in the Soviet state went silent, unnoticed 
by the large audience and for a long time unattended. For many decades the cases 
of mismanagement and failures to measure the social costs of exploiting limited 
natural resources were sealed and kept secret by the regime. "The self-defeating 
logic of utopian totalitarianism could tolerate only facts that served and bolstered 
the myth. Any others were not truths but heresies to be suppressed along with 
anyone incautious enough to defend them" (Feshbach and Friendly, 1991:31). 
The current environmental crisis in all the former republics of the USSR is the 
offspring of this silence and indirectly the effect of the upbringing, education and 
―Soviet religion‖ imposed on the people by the Bolsheviks. Ukraine and 
Belorussia have to deal with the problems originating the catastrophe in 
Chernobyl as the abnormally radioactive soil and contaminated waters of the 
Dnieper. The Central Asian republics are facing consequences of the destruction 
of the Aral Sea. One of the largest environmental issues for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania is the contamination of the coastline and waters of the Baltic Sea (the 
chemical and other industries established in those republics during the Soviet-
period polluted the air and emptied wastes into rivers and lakes). The states in the 
Caucasus, where population density is high, are now challenged with the issues 
                                                          
27
  Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) is one of the best known synthetic pesticides. In the USSR tons 
of DDT were spread long after other nations banned it. 
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of the inadequate water treatment systems and impure waters. Despite the great 
ecological importance of the Caucasus area, waste management in the region is 
underdeveloped. All major rivers in the Russian Federation, which historically 
been the nation's lifelines, had been poisoned by chemical production, 
metallurgy, forestry, agriculture and energy producers by the early 1990s, thus 
becoming dangerous to ecosystems that depend on them. 
Industrial growth, pursued at a reckless speed, without effective measures of 
economic or social costs, has put 70 million out of 190 million Soviet living 
in 103 cities in danger of respiratory and other life-shortening diseases from 
air that carries five and more times the allowed limit of pollutants. Almost 
three-fourths of the nation's surface water is polluted; one-fourth is 
completely untreated. By themselves, the two giant ministries of energy and 
metallurgy account for half the air pollution. Untreated, waterborne 
agricultural, industrial and human wastes together threaten to kill the Sea of 
Azov, the Black Sea and the Caspian and have turned giant rivers, including 
the Volga, the Dniepr and the Don, into open sewers (Feshbach and 
Friendly, 1991:2-3) 
 4.5. Concluding Remarks.  
The semiotic analysis of Russian visual arts from the end of the XIXth century to 
the beginning of the XXth goes some way to give a general impression of the 
cultural transformations society was undergoing during this period, particularly 
the changes of the ways nature was represented. There are several conclusions to 
draw from this review applying the larger context of the study, namely 
―development as unfreedom.‖ 
First, the interest in the ―peasant Russia‖ expressed in realistic and romantic 
landscapes by the members of the Peredvizhniki society overlapped with the 
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revolutionary thinking before the 1880s, notably the ideas of the People’s Will 
fraction and, arguably, served as the basis for the nationalistic inclines. 
Second, the adoption of The GOELRO-Plan in 1920 by Bolsheviks was 
culturally underpinned by the avant-garde artists. They created preconditions for 
the technically-based plan of the country‘s reconstruction by setting certain 
expectations, such as amendments to the proletariat culture, free from bourgeois 
influence and ―unnecessary‖ beauty of the artistic works.  
Third, the freedom of the agency of the Socialist realism painters depicting and 
praising the Soviet reality is questionable. Their works, glorifying the 
modernization, electrification and technological advance, were biased by the fact 
that only one institution, the Soviet state itself, was able to patronize the arts. The 
absence of free markets and lack of ability to sell the objects of arts freely 
eventually resulted in the deprivation of artists‘ ability to remain freely employed 
and hence the deprivation of the freedom of expression—artists essentially 
became state employees. As such the authorities set the parameters for what it 
employed them to do. 
Fourth, the ways different artists presented nature in their works reflected the 
ethical values associated with human‘s attitudes to nature. While the natural 
landscapes, created by the members of the Peredvizhniki-society, largely 
correspond to the ―Arcadianism,‖ as romantic symbiosis between man and 
nature, which is an ultimate symbol of innocence and harmony, the general 
neglect of nature in works of Futurists and Constructivists bear a certain concept 
of nature as blind necessity, corresponding to the logic of the traditional Western 
ethics with regard to the nature as a fundamental resource:  
Other nations that the USSR saw as its competitors, the United States not 
least among them, long geared their development to the same dynamic as the 
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Soviets, to the ancient biblical injunction to Adam to "subdue" the earth and 
assert "dominion" over it and "every living thing" (Feshbach and Friendly, 
1991:40). 
The representatives of the Symbolism apparently viewed nature as mysterium 
tremendum
28
, which is a religious constitutive value. This concept implies the 
overwhelming immensity of scale and force in nature. The works of the Soviet 
realists, filled with towering concrete cliffs of dams, giant excavations of open-
pit mines and the ordered march of high-voltage power lines, praised the 
industrial progress also as the mysterium tremendum. This account allowed  the 
Socialist realism artists to prescribe nature another constitutive value as untamed 
wilderness, while the Soviet workers and peasants were viewed as romantic 
heroes, who were taming it. This image, planted in minds of the Soviet citizens 
by means of education and cultural upbringing, was for long time used to 
distance the glorified work with the environmental crisis provoking activities, 
raising identification difficulties. ‖For modern urban man the friendship with a 
natural environment is reduced to fragmentary relations. Instead he has to 
identify with man-made things, such as streets and houses‖ (Schulz, 2007:107). 
The transformation of the virgin lands into industrial sites while sacrificing vast 
human and natural resources was embraced whole-heartedly by the Soviet state. 
                                                          
28  Mysterium Tremendum (Fearful and fascinating mystery) is the description of object common to all forms 
of religious experience, referring to the power or presence of a divinity. 
 CHAPTER V: THE CREATION OF HOMO SOVIETICUS: FROM 
CULTURE TO INDUSTRY 
In the 1920s-30s, the transformation of ideas of the society took place around the 
world under the influence of political and economic crises and new needs 
stipulated by the industrial epoch. Herbert Wells supported the Soviet experiment 
related to managing and developing the economy and social sphere under the 
direction of the state. During his third visit to Russia in 1934 he, in a 
conversation with Joseph Stalin said: ―It would be reasonable to develop a five-
year plan for the reconstruction of [the] human brain lacking many particles so 
necessary for perfect social order.‖ This concept was embraced by Stalin, who 
called writers the ―engineers of human souls‖ in preparation for the first 
Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers on October 26, 1932. Questioning 
Wells, he asked, ―Do you plan to visit the Congress of the Association of Soviet 
Writers?‖ By this, Stalin hinted unambiguously that Western and Soviet practices 
could be combined in the process of so-called socialism construction. 
In this chapter I want to explore the practical implementation of the social 
engineering practices, as proposed by Soviet psychologists, with particular regard 
to the creation of Soviet literature, which eventually resulted in Stalin‘s 
perception of the writer‘s role in society.  I am interested in finding out how the 
new ideology of the Soviet state as expressed in schools and cultural programs 
created the basis and justification for ―development as unfreedom.‖  
P. J. de la F. Wiles pointed out that that considering the fair level of literacy in 
Russia (67% of men and 37% of women over age 9 in 1926), only a few had a 
higher education, and the vast majority of those with a pre-war commercial or 
economic education were dead or in exile. The stock of professionals and semi-
professionals was about 200,000 in 1913 and presumably similar to this in 
October 1917. From then until January 1928 about 300,000 graduated, yet the 
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stock of educated people rose only to 233,000 because many died during years of 
wars and revolutions. Of the post-revolutionary graduates, adjusting the death-
rates of 1926 upwards, no more than 15,000 could have died. From this data 
252,000 pre-war professionals must have died or emigrated, which is more than 
the total number of graduates. Backwardness, the petty bourgeois nature of its 
population, and the lack of professionalism
29
 among the members of the 
administration were factors postponing Lenin‘s hopes that during the historically 
short period the eradication of illiteracy would create the moral and psychic pre-
conditions for transfer to the new system, which he saw Communism to be. 
However, the process of education of the entire country was not an easy task to 
accomplish. One of the main NEP-policies—the move towards modernization—
rested on the transformation of the preexisting class structure. This created the 
connection between NEP and a massive education project, likbez.  
 5.1.  Likbez 
The premise that the Russian Revolution would set off a European one, turned 
out to be false, and the world‘s first proletarian dictatorship found itself barely 
afloat in a sea of peasants. Consequentially, cultural development during the NEP 
epoch was practically a mirror reflection of the situation in economic and social 
spheres. Those were the same external signs of liberalization, the same hesitation 
of the Communist party between strict control, dogmatism, and repression fast 
becoming entrenched in its culture and intentions to enter an agreement with 
some representatives of the intelligentsia. After the revolution of 1917 leaders of 
the newly formed communist party were encouraging experimentation of 
different types of art. Not having had time to raise a young generation of writers, 
painters, thinkers, technologists and scientists of its own, the party settled for 
reaching out to sympathizers of the Soviet regime. In return for limited freedom 
                                                          
29  Wells described it as ―Russia to-day stands more in need of men of the foremen and works-manager class 
than she does of medicaments and food‖ (Wells 1920:20 
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Figure 19. ―The illiterate man is as a blind one – 
everywhere failures and adversities await him.‖ 
of expression and a comfortable lifestyle, individuals had to avoid criticizing 
Bolshevik policies. A classical orchestra was formed which denied the need for a 
conductor. This was approved as an attempt to align musical performance with 
an orientation towards ‗collectivism‘ and ‗mass activity‘. Mayakovskixlviii 
produced his ‗futurist‘ poetry with the party‘s approval (even though Trotsky had 
to have its principals explained to him and Lenin simply hated it). In the cultural 
climate of the early Soviet Union, his popularity grew rapidly. Marc Chagall
xlix
 
set up a painting school in Vitebsk. The writer Maxim Gorky
l
 and the composer 
Sergei Prokofiev
li
 were also among those who strengthened culture in the young 
Soviet state. 
Besides, the Bolsheviks had actually 
been constrained to co-opt proponents 
of the progressive agenda. Many 
intellectuals in fact developed a degree 
of sympathy with Communism, 
especially because it advocated 
education, science, industry, and 
progress. Hence the government‘s 
enlightened attitudes toward women and 
minorities, its enthusiasm for literacy 
and education, and, in part, its 
campaigns against the obscurantism of 
the Church and all religions 
(Longworth, 2007).  Their desire to 
cleanse society of elitism, however, often led to contradictions on the road to 
development: 
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Lenin and [the] Bolsheviks despised the ―bourgeois‖ specialists in the civil 
service and elsewhere in the economy but had to rely on them. (…) The 
hope was to educate the masses quickly and thus relieve the Communist 
state from its regrettable reliance on the bourgeoisie. (Gellately, 2007:142) 
The party used the powers of government to educate the people, so as to remove 
the various modes of false (according to the ideology of Bolsheviks) 
consciousness, such as religion and nationalism. Illiteracy of people was 
explained as ―negative heritage of the Tsarist regime‖ and was opposed to the 
task of the Soviet government ―to liquidate illiteracy, making education, culture, 
and art into the ownership of the people‖ (Kon, 1960:8, my translation). Wells 
described the population in Russia in the time of Lenin in a following way: 
The great mass of the Russian population is an entirely illiterate peasantry, 
grossly materialistic and politically indifferent. They are superstitious, they 
are for ever crossing themselves and kissing images—in Moscow 
particularly they were at it—but they are not religious. They have no will in 
things political and social beyond their immediate satisfactions. They are 
roughly content with Bolshevik rule (Wells, 1920:19). 
All decrees passed by the Soviet government in the sphere of culture and 
education of the period of 1917-1919 were oriented to enlighten and to educate in 
accordance with the ideals of the Communism. In accordance with the 
Sovnarkom Decree "On eradication of illiteracy among the population of 
RSFSR" of December 26, 1919, signed by Vladimir Lenin, the new system of 
universal compulsory education was established for children. Millions of 
illiterate adult people all over the country, including residents of small towns and 
villages, were enrolled in special literacy schools. Actual results were seen by the 
end of the 1920/21 school year – a number of city schools in RSFSR, despite all 
difficulties of that period, improved considerably against the 1914/15 school 
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year, and a number of schools in villages progressed almost thirty-fold. The 
reform of education had worked against all odds: 
Namely during that period, when the state mechanism and the social system 
of old Russia in general were modified, the country in embrace of the Civil 
War and fighting against numerous invaders experienced the process of 
cultural development that was not observed before (Kon, 1960:7, my 
translation).  
The People's Commissariat for Education directed its attention solely towards 
introducing political propaganda into the schools and forbidding religious 
teaching. Some teachers ―were unable to realize the party‘s policy in the sphere 
of people‘s education‖ (Kon 1960:11, my translation), believing that education, 
school, science, and art were not related to the political struggle between classes. 
They wanted to believe that everything remained unchanged in the sphere of 
culture. The concern was to distribute ―old culture‖ among the people rather than 
selecting only some elements of this as defined by the party for the creation of a 
new culture. The All-Russian Union of Teachers sent the Draft Tactical Measures 
to local organizations of teachers, which recommended non-compliance with the 
orders of the Soviet government, organizing instead oral or written propaganda 
and strikes against it. Biology teachers, in particular those who supported ―pure 
science‖ raised their voices, refusing to use their teaching subject neither as anti-
religious propaganda nor solely for agricultural practice. At the Congress for 
Natural History Education, they decided to not include the theory of evolution in 
the curriculum for natural sciences, justifying this decision with the lack of 
professionals in this area. It was not only the scholarly intelligentsia which 
objected to the Communist eagerness to rule on what type of art and science 
should and could exist. Engineers, librarians, and doctors hated the intrusion of 
the state into their professional business (Service, 2007).  
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This period was also characterized by the development of a new system of 
grammar for the Russian language. This, according to Ludmila Kon, originated 
"the greatest drawback of the period" (Kon, 1960:35, my translation), as the 
adherents of the new regime were ready to destroy everything reminding about 
the countries non-Bolshevist past without questioning if it was really necessary. I 
found a description of the shift to the new system in a 1976 book called Votkinsk, 
by V.N. Stupishin. In the work, a librarian, Z.D. Nekrasova, recalls: 
I stood there (…) in a house filled with many books tossed into piles. A 
stove was glowing. On fire were many fine published works of Pushkin, 
Lermontov, Leo Tolstoy and other classics. ―Burn, burn everything!‖ A 
strange man was screaming. ―There are going to be many new books, and 
there is going to be a new grammar…‖ (Stupishin, 1976:82-83, my 
translation).     
Many books collected from different libraries and houses of the exiled 
bourgeoisie and aristocracy were burned and otherwise destroyed.   
 5.2. Literature for Children and “Industrial Books” 
The leaders of the USSR had good reason to consider children‘s literature an 
efficient method of indoctrination of the new generation during the industrial 
epoch. Literature for children is didactic, and can easily communicate in favor of 
a certain mode of life and thinking. Due to the fact that children and teenagers are 
predisposed to look for an ideal to imitate, bright artistic images leave 
unforgettable pictures in their souls. Considering that up until the end of the 
1930s young people made up the majority of the population, literature for 
children prove a method of disseminating ideology to the masses. 
Representatives of older generation were also fond of such literature. Since there 
were few  people with a 4-year education, many found children's books to be an 
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accessible and interesting form of literature, which discussed social problems and 
referred to ways of implementing decisions taken by the party. 
The book Soviet Literature for Children (1917-1929), written in 1952 by the 
literary theorist Ludmila Kon, discusses the problems faced with this new state-
sponsored literary genre. It emphasizes the drawbacks of literature during the 
Civil War and NEP, specifying that the years immediately after the October 
Revolution were a period of extreme importance for the history of all Soviet 
culture of Soviet literature for children in particular. The later analysis of Soviet 
literature for children of the period in question is given in the monograph by A.V. 
Fateev called Stalinism and Literature for Children in the Policy of the 
Nomenclature of the USSR (1930 – 1950s) published in 2007. As the task of the 
Soviet writers, the Bolsheviks viewed the study, design, depiction and 
acceptation of the new reality. The desire to implement such a task was one of 
the characteristic features of Soviet literature of the 1920s. A resolution called 
The Main Tasks of the Party in the Sphere of Publications was passed by the CC 
of RCP (B) on February 6, 1924, and it contained instructions that ―measures 
should be taken for the creation of literature for children‖.  
The party classified literature for children created during the pre-revolutionary 
period according to literary trends and social contents. The novels by L. 
Charskaya
lii
, depicting historical worship of Tsarist figures and full of secrets and 
mystical allure, were included in the list of the ―Black Hundred‖, the name given 
to those praising the Tsarist throne and the Orthodox Church. The novels and 
stories by Klaudia Lukashevich are an example, describing poor people who 
found help from the benevolence of the ruling class, whose humility and 
humanity were reminiscent of Jesus Christ.  These stories were accused of 
propagating bourgeois ideology by the Soviet government. Works by poets of the 
―Silver Century‖ that were published before the Revolution were recognized as 
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neglecting social functions and literature for children (meaning lacking any 
pedagogical element). Sometimes, absurd situations were observed. Books such 
as ―The Adventures of Nat Pinkerton‖, ―Nick Carter‖ and ―Jack the Ripper‖ were 
put by censors on the list of ―undesirable‖ literature and were sharply criticized. 
The Soviet government criticized the magazine for children, Pathway, which was 
published before the Revolution, as detached from reality and life in general. The 
reason for such a strong opinion was the 1908 piece by Alexander Benois in the 
newspaper, Speech, where he called for the censure of butchers, sick mothers, 
rags, stench, and filth in children‘s books and to stop ―teaching our children to 
feel sorrow or to cry‖. In the context of the time, such calls were viewed as 
attempts to protect children from the revolutionary influence. On the contrary, 
according to the article by the editorial staff of the magazine Red Dawn, 
published in 1919 in Petrograd, ―this was the first attempt to open access to 
children for clear understanding of the greatest events of the present epoch and 
the first attempt to free children from harmful influence of the old books for 
children that leads a child‘s soul into darkness and slavery‖ (Kon, 1960:57).  
New writers returned from the Civil War and created new novels, romances, 
plays, songs, poems about the October Revolution and the Civil War
30
. A central 
place in literature belonged to the new Soviet patriots, the Bolsheviks, fighters 
for the future of the Communist state. They were characterized by spontaneity, 
integrity, passion, immediacy, brutal honesty, conviviality, naivety, curiosity, 
collectivity, and hostility towards the intelligentsia and pre-revolutionary values. 
The period of the Civil War also generated a new type of leader among workers 
and peasants who had the ―psychology of direct action‖ characterized by the 
                                                          
30  Among these are Chapaev and Insurrection by D. Furmanov, Iron Flow by A. Seraphimovich, the first part 
of a trilogy Road to Canvary by A. Tolstoy, Cement by F. Gladkov, Armored Train 14-69 by Vs. Ivanov, and Don 
Stories by M. Sholohov. The most intensive development of Soviet literature occurred in the second half of the 1920s 
(Life of Klim Samgin, essays Around the Union of Soviets by M. Gorky, Destruction by A. Fadeev, Quiet Flows the 
Don by M. Sholohov, Good!, Bug, Bath-House by V. Mayakovski, Spring Love by K. Trenev, and the second part of 
the trilogy by A. Tolstoy). 
105 
 
confidence in unlimited possibilities of ―revolutionary measures‖ for the solution 
of any problem. 
The intelligentsia had different opinions with respect to the process of the 
creation of the new socialist identity. Bolsheviks came to power with next to no 
party members who were active in the arts, or who taught in universities or 
conducted scientific research. Many writers emigrated. Those who stayed in the 
country, either openly or secretly, stood against the Soviet power. Some of them 
preferred a ―neutral‖ position, using the slogan ―pure art‖, which developed out 
of romanticism as a form of anti-artistic emancipation, occupying a higher level 
than political spheres. This neutral position was not appreciated by the 
government, since it secretly called for the opposition of the dictated tradition of 
the revolution, the Communist Party, and Soviet society. The ―Pure art‖ 
movement gradually became the path of passive resistance of artists, writers, and 
painters against the rules imposed on them by the Soviet state. Many fought 
under this slogan simply and solely for the freedom of art from utilitarian goals.  
The resolution of the XV Congress of the party called for ―relating the plan for 
cultural construction with industrialization of the country as an integral part of 
the general plan for the socialist construction in the USSR‖. Ludmila Kon was 
mentioning the article Evaluation of Books for Children, written by N.K. 
Krupskaya where she stated:  
It is necessary to give to teenagers the ―romance‖ of equipment, to show 
achievements in various spheres, future prospects. In addition to the same, it 
is necessary to publish ―industrial‖ books, giving instructions on ―how to do 
something individually‖ (Kon, 1960: 157, my translation).  
The example of the ―industrial book‖ was a creative work of Zhytkovliii, who 
wrote stories on the life of workers and essays on the history of equipment and 
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the production of things: Locomotives (1925), Balloon (1926), Ten-Copeck Coin, 
About This Book, Light without Fire, Telegram (1927). These essays were about 
the origin of things which surrounded a child in his everyday life. Each essay 
contained a detailed story with the technical details on how mechanical and 
everyday things were made, whether a book, a locomotive, or an electric lamp. 
After a few years, A.M. Gorky would speak about the ―industrial‖ books by 
Zhytkov, characterizing them as ―science fiction‖ – due to the language and form 
belonging to fiction; however, they were informative in nature and valuable for 
children to learn about industrial processes. Requirements of the party for the 
content of books were met and tasks of political upbringing were performed.  
During the Soviet epoch it was usual to say that M. Ilyin‘sliv works followed the 
theme of Gorky‘s How a Man Became a Giant. This furthermore underpinned 
the literary method of Socialist realism. The technical progress described by Ilyin 
was related to the historical epoch, the level of science and culture, and the way 
of life of various classes of society during that period. Like Zhytkov, Ilyin was an 
engineer by qualification. He was the author of the book on the first five-year 
plan The Story of the Great Plan (1930) and its continuation Mountains and 
People (1932).  In the 20s, the main theme of his works for children was the 
origin of things and history of material culture. Black on White (1928), What’s 
Time Is It Now (1927), and The Sun on the Table (1927) told the histories of 
books, the watch, and lamps for children. ―There are people who think that each 
invention can belong to one person only‖ Ilyin says at the beginning of the Sun 
on the Table, referring to Edison‘s invention of the light bulb. ―However,‖ he 
continues, ―Edison was one of many scientists who participated in the invention 
of the lamp...‖ (Kon, 1960) 
Reading comments on ―industrial‖ books by the Soviet critic Ljudmila Kon, one 
realizes that the literature was evaluated on how efficiently phenomena of Soviet 
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reality surrounding children was explained to the reader. For example, the 
excursion of the pioneer team to Volhovstroy depicted in a book by P. 
Surozhsky, On Volhovsroy, in Kon‘s opinion poorly reflected reality through the 
perceptions of the characters:  
There are some details of pioneer‘s life in this story. However, all topicality 
of the theme, in essence, limits elements of the ―new‖. Heroes of the story 
lack individuality, their role is [to ask] questions and [to listen] to boring 
answers of the guide (Kon, 1960:258).  
The task of the authors was not only to show to children as readers the 
surrounding world, but also to popularize the Soviet way of life: that of the 
pioneers, and the Young Communist League, among others.  
Taking into account those criteria, books by N. Smirnov and the Chichagovs 
Ahmet in Moscow (on Soviet Moscow), Yegor – Fitter (on electricity) were more 
highly approved of. In addition, it was necessary to reach ―organic unity of the 
plot and informative material‖ (Kon, 1960:261). Even the book by S. Rozanov 
Adventures of Travka (1928, re-published several times), was criticized for the 
author‘s lengthy comments on the operation and components of various types of 
equipment. From Kon‘s point of view, Rozanov succeeded in reflecting the 
world of people and their relations through the perceptions of a small child; 
however, he failed to use such an approach in taking his hero to the world of 
equipment.  
 5.3. Science in Early Soviet State 
Following accusations and fabricated evidence with regard to the so-called 
Petrograd Fighting Organization, famous Russian scientists, professors like M. 
Tihvinsky, V. Tagantsev, were killed. The intelligentsia was not intimidated by 
death sentences. In autumn 1922, a period of numerous deportations began. 
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Among the deported people there were the best representatives of the Russian 
humanist sciences: philosophers N. Berdiev, S. Franc
lv
, S. Bulgakov
lvi
, P. 
Sorokin
lvii
, and B. Brutckus
lviii
 (an economist who anticipated a great deal of 
present-day ideas in the market economy). The vacant niche was occupied by 
―red professors‖ specializing in interpretation of citations of Marx and his 
followers in a non critical form to appease the government. In Experience of 
Curriculum for Political Economy (1923), Alexander Con specified drawbacks of 
such an education as being developed mechanically, without any methodological 
basis:   
The titles of The Capital by Marx and Financial Capital by Hilferding were 
taken as a basis for such curriculum. The authors of numerous curricula of 
similar type probably did not pay much attention to the fact that The Capital 
was not a teaching aid, that the form of such work was defined by the 
principles of theoretical and not pedagogical nature (Con, 1923:5). 
Alexander Con, who himself had to use the curriculum for political economy, 
argued that the inadequate level of education of heads of study groups familiar 
with The Capital and lacking knowledge in political economy hampered the 
efficiency of educational system. Heads of study groups normally could recite 
any of The Capital‘s chapters, and any of its several themes. Mechanically 
following The Capital, they somehow kept up with lecturer. However, any 
attempt to discuss economic or social problems other than the approved patterns 
suggested, showed a lack of any proper idea of the system of capitalist society in 
general.  A lecturer himself, Con concluded that ―completely dissatisfactory 
curriculum was taken as a pattern‖ (Con, 1923: 7). 
However, all spheres of science to which the government paid little attention or 
which in their opinion were not a danger to socialism, had elements of free 
scientific creativity. This refers also to genetics, whose representatives were 
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involved in the greatest scientific discoveries, as well as the theoretical physics 
and mathematics in Russia. Two types of science started their formation in 
Russia: one for talented, professional people who were far from public 
ideological discussions. Their discoveries were classified as useful to the state 
government and meant to popularize its achievements. Scientists refrained from 
protesting against such practices, in exchange for the possibility to work 
peacefully at home. The Soviet state also encouraged talent – especially for those 
who conformed to the Soviet ideal and had been neglected by the Tsarist regime. 
Konstantin Tsiolkovskii, for example, had good proletarian credentials. He came 
from mixed Russian, Polish and Tatar stock, was a modest school-teacher in 
Kaluga and was deaf. He was also a genius in the field of aerodynamics and a 
visionary who helped make space travel possible
lix
. Ignored by the scientific 
establishment, he built Russia‘s first wind tunnel at his own expense, and in 1899 
he published a key paper on atmospheric pressure, also with his own money. 
Once the Soviet regime was in power, however, his research was state-funded; he 
was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences, and allotted a life pension. 
The physicists Kapitsa
lx
 and the economist Kondratiev
lxi 
were among other 
luminaries who shone in this early Soviet period.  
And there was also another science—for internal use—oriented toward the 
creation of efficient communistic propaganda. In the USSR, the Central Institute 
of Labour (CIL) under the direction of A.K. Gastev was responsible for industrial 
sociology and psychology. The first program document of CIL outlined the rules 
developed by A. K. Gastev in his book How to Work. These rules had detailed 
comments, explanations, and supplements. They were actively published in the 
form of posters, leaflets and distributed in workshops and institutions. In the 
middle of the 20s, the scientist developed the idea of the new cultural system, 
synonymous with the scientific organization of labour (SOL). Gastev believed 
that the formation of SOL among the youth was the only method of fighting 
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against the backwardness of the country. The cultural education included 
development of keenness of observation, ability to correctly and clearly express 
one‘s thoughts in various forms, well-trained will and body, observance of 
peculiar routines and organizational approaches, acquisition of technical 
knowledge as well as development of economic initiative and innovation. For 
workers to understand the essence of SOL, Gastev suggested that small united 
disciplined teams should be created at the enterprises for the purpose of their 
personal education and organizations of boy-scouts should be formed to develop 
keenness of observation. In fact, Gastev formulated the state order for the 
qualities of personality that should be formed through schools and state 
propaganda among industrial workers. SOL projects were oriented toward dozens 
of the largest enterprises of the country, including Rostov‘s Factory of 
Agricultural Equipment, Kharkov‘s and Stalingrad‘s Tractor Factories, and 
Uralmashstroy, the mechanical engineering monsters which developed new, 
more advanced forms of organization of labour at manufacturing enterprises. A 
special part of the activities of SOL was the preparation of highly qualified 
workers to work in compliance with production rules and criteria. At training 
centers (their number reached more than 1500) in various cities of the country, 
SOL taught workers how to apply rational approaches and methods of work. 
More than 400 industrial companies cooperated with SOL, obtaining support in 
training qualified workers. Gastev continued to promote this system of labour 
management until his arrest and execution in 1939. 500,000 industrial and 
construction workers and 20,000 instructors and consultants underwent training 
according to the methods of SOL.  
Another pre-condition for social engineering in the USSR was the science of 
reflexology
lxii
. It was developed in the 20s by V.M. Behterev
lxiii
, director for 
research of the brain and psychological activities, founder of the Institute of 
Pedagogy (1907), and the Institute of Social Upbringing. In his work Collective 
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Reflexology (1919, 1921), the socio psychologist emphasized the decisive role of 
hypnosis and imitation in the formation of the public consciousness that the state 
needed. Reflexology methods were actively implemented at schools, factories 
and plants. Their supporters were convinced that man‘s behavior could be 
explained from an exclusively materialistic point of view.  
Social psychology was developing in a rapid manner. Its subject included 
research of human relations, and the analysis of public opinion and people‘s 
ideas. New researches started discrediting Freudianism, as XXth century 
advances in psychology began to show flaws in many of his theories.  Social 
psychology‘s object of research in the period of NEP in Russia was the 
exploration of physic traumas, rather than attributing them to sexual problems 
with a root in childhood. In I E. Fromm‘slxiv Neo-Freudianism, more and more 
attention was paid to the social factors of personality development. 
M. Y. Basov
lxv
, L.S. Vigotsky
lxvi
, P.P. Blonsky
lxvii
, S.L. Rubinshein
lxviii
, and A.N. 
Leontyev
lxix 
neglected the principle of simple adaptation of an organism to the 
environment. ―Activity‖ became the most important category in psychology. 
Needs of the state and the society stimulated research of the matters of pedagogic 
psychology: formation of a team, influence of public environment on personality, 
efficiency of training. The Georgian Psychologist D.N. Uznadze
lxx
 managed to 
create a materialistic alternative to Freud‘s irrational ―unconscious‖, which 
allegedly predetermines individual‘s activities. The scientist developed the 
general psychological theory of integral mindset of an individual formed in the 
course of a human‘s life. This mindset mediated the personality‘s relations with 
the environment through values and actions, leading to satisfaction of one‘s 
needs. The mindset was described as an integral, non-differentiated and 
unconscious state, preceding activity and treated as a mediating unit between the 
psychic and the physical, allowing to neglect  the ―postulate of spontaneity‖.   
112 
 
The famous psychologist L.S. Vigotsky, director of the Experimental Speech 
Pathology Institute of the People‘s Commissariat of Education, in Psychology of 
Art (1925) criticized the theory of ―absorbtion‖ by Bekhterev. Vigotsky 
considered the transformation of feelings outside an individual to be fixed in 
external articles of art, thus having a potential to become instruments in the 
formation of personality. He viewed art as a tool, leading to the organization of 
behavior. Vigotsky was sure that art would play a central role in changing human 
nature in the spirit of socialism. His ideas gave the scientific underpinning to the 
Proletkult.  These were policies created after Lenin‘s "On proletarian culture" 
(1920), directed towards restrictions imposed on the artists while fostering the 
Socialist Realism trends in art. Socialist Realism was directed to educate the 
people in the goals and meaning of Communism.  
 5.4.  Mythologies of the Soviet State 
The social sciences were developing in the USSR within the framework of world 
processes, and in some respects—particularly in the shaping the mind-set of its 
citizens—was far ahead of foreign research. Officials were interested in using 
scientific discoveries to form human needs, interests and values from the 
childhood, thus pre-determining the course of development of the society for 
dozens of years as needed. Ideological propaganda among the population was 
perceived as panacea that would help in finding solutions for any political and 
economic task. Literature for children was a convenient method to introduce 
ideas into the public consciousness. Perception of a child as wax or clay, of 
which it is possible to create everything was cultivated in the USSR in the spirit 
of the behavior science thanks to works by Bekhterev. Fictional characters and 
presentations of contemporary celebrities as embodiments of the values of the 
Soviet state were prominent features of Soviet cultural life, especially at times 
when fostering the concept of the new Soviet person was given special priority 
by the government. The ―New Soviet Men‖ became the myth of the Soviet state 
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Figure 20. This poster contains lines from Lenin‘s speeches 
during the VIII All-Russian Soviet Congress, later in the 
Soviet historiography referred to as ―Lenin on the re-
building of the country‖. Particularly famous is the quote: 
―…this is our second party‘s program…‖ (about 
electrification), ―without [the] plan of the electrification we 
can‘t begin the real building process‖, and ―the growing 
trading, factories, cities, [and] railroads demand a totally 
different development, dissimilar architecturally and size-
wise to the buildings of a patriarchal epoch‖. Tractors, 
factories, the symbol of electricity, the construction site of 
the Dnieper hydroelectric station, and the Turkestan–
Siberian Railway are also present.  
and as equally important as the myth of successful modernization of a backward 
country by  means of education and indoctrination.  
Krzhyzanovsky also tried to write 
―industrial books‖ for children and 
teenagers popularizing ideas of 
electrification. His book Plan of 
Great Work for children about the 
five-year plan was published in 
1930. Rather average from the 
artistic point of view, the book 
consisted of different theses 
Krzhyzanovsky presented to the 
youth. Considering that the Party 
had directly related the process of 
electrification of the country to the 
name of Lenin, laid the foundation 
for the further development of the 
―good-Lenin‖ myth. In Greek 
mythology, Prometheus was a 
champion of human-kind known 
for his wiliness and intelligence, 
having stolen fire from the 
gods and giving it to mortals. 
Lenin in the Soviet literature was 
portrayed in a similar way, as a 
hero challenging past lifestyle, 
power, and laws in order to bring a 
better life to the common people.  
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In his letters from  exile, Lenin wrote some naïve, banal and absurd suggestions 
concerning the convenience of electric power and its transportation. Electricity, 
according to Lenin, was making the social conditions for workers in the West 
easier. This assumption was easily transferred later on to his famous definition of 
the meaning of communism. Those letters and some notes about the polarization 
and propaganda of the GOELRO-Plan during the Soviet period were used to 
prescribe merits for creation of the clear, systematic science of electrification to 
Lenin. 
The poem by N. Zabyla
lxxi 
Lenin Precept was included in the 2
nd
-4
th
 year primary 
school textbook Native Word (Russian: Родное Слово [Rodnoe Slovo], first 
published in 1864, having a total of 146 editions). It vividly illustrates the 
relation between Lenin and electrification, used for the propaganda purposes:  
Lenin left us such precept –  
We will not forget it –  
To switch on the bright light of  
Electric power stations  
To delight people!  
Our dear Ilyich would be happy 
Together with us,  
Light is shining over the country,  
Over rivers and fields.  
Looking at the window in the evening,  
One cannot calculate how many lamps there are,  
Lamps are shining in all houses,  
 Cities and villages. 
 In all parts of the country,  
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 Their number increases from year to year –  
 This way we perform the order  
 Given by Lenin to the people. (Родное Слово [Rodnoe Slovo], 1989:142, 
my translation) 
The interpretation of the pedagogical sense of Lenin‘s life and work is a chapter 
in itself—in the former Soviet Union, Lenin was presented as a genius with the 
―correct‖ solutions to every problem relating to consolidating Soviet power. He 
was characterized by an apologetic stereotype, which remained normative and 
official during the whole of Soviet history. The myth of the ―good Lenin‖ was a 
political instrument, meant to inspire followers at home and abroad. The image of 
―a little man with bright eyes‖ gave a human face to the regime. Perhaps the 
most-famous portrait of Lenin is Lenin at the First Subbotnik
lxxii
 by Vladimir 
Krikhatsky. It appealed to the common people that Vladimir Iljich took part in 
removing building rubble in the Moscow Kremlin. This episode was even 
included for reading in Native Word, telling the story of Lenin carrying a log. 
The rumors spread about Lenin clearing the snow from the walk at the Moscow 
Kremlin‘s entrance every morning.  
The importance of hard-work took deep root, entrenching itself into the 
consciousness of the people of the Soviet State – at least at the level of rhetoric. 
It built a basis for the Stakhanovism-movement – another myth of the Soviet 
state. The reference to this myth is to the falseness of the regime, eager to fill the 
gap between reality and the imaginative situation with lies. Achieving the goals 
of the five-year plan was a top priority as a measure of progress toward a 
communist utopia, so official lying about productivity became part of the 
economic system. 
The story of Stakhanovs‘ life was all too fitting for the Soviet state citizen: he 
was born to a poor bond family, had to work for others to make a living, and had 
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difficulties finishing two and a half years at the rural school. In 1927 he came to 
the town of Kadiyivka in eastern Ukraine (to be renamed as Stakhanovsk in 
1978) and worked at the Tsentralnaja-Irmino mine. Mining was seen as 
backward. Miners did not have a vested interest in being productive, because 
otherwise their quotas—not their salaries—would be increased (as it occurred 
later). The Partorg
lxxiii 
of the mine decided to create a record of a great labour 
achievement and chose Stakhanov to perform it. Stakhanov mined 102 tons of 
coal in less than 6 hours (14 times his quota). In reality, anyone on his place 
could do that, as he received unseen conditions for the unstoppable work with a 
number of helpers on support jobs, though the record was prescribed to him 
solely. His example was printed in newspapers and posters as a model for others 
to follow. He was praised as a great hero, and his productivity caused a number 
of industries to revise their production capacities and increase their quotas. And 
then he drunk himself to death.   
 5.5. Concluding Remarks 
As I have tried to show, literature as well as artistic culture at the beginning of 
the 1920s and beyond bore the consequences of the communist ideological turn. 
The reflection of the society in literature and art was mainly defined by the new 
vision of the world and needs of the country, prescribed by the heads of the 
Bolshevik Party. The interests of officials in the creation of literature for children 
can be explained by the needs to rapidly industrialize the backward state, to 
educate relevant economic staff, and to create devoted citizens. The official 
ideology predetermined a specific type of literary description of fundamental 
social institutions, such as the family, production processes, the state, education, 
religion, public and political organizations. The narrowing of the role of literature 
and art to be asserted as means of programming the consciousness of citizens 
within the framework of social engineering has explicit linkages to the concept of 
―development as unfreedom.‖ 
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In the 1920s, the Soviet government embarked on a campaign to fundamentally 
alter the behavior and ideals of Soviet citizens, to replace the old social 
framework of the Russian Empire with a new Soviet culture, to create ―New 
Soviet Men‖. The political aspect of the social sciences and social engineering 
were, in some respects, a continuation of pre-Soviet state policy. Censorship and 
attempts to control the content of art and writing, as Vigotskyi proposed it, did 
not begin with the Soviets, but were a long-running feature of Russian life. 
However, Soviet censors were not easily duped  and the censorship of 
publications, exhibitions, and theatrical performances enforced strict limits on 
expression. The strict party and security officer‘s control had one more important 
goal. It aimed at convincing (and such goals were achieved) the left-wing 
intelligentsia of the West that socialism promotes the freedom of creative work. 
 Having won the hearts and minds of the progressive thinkers, the Soviet 
authorities hoped to gain access to the public opinion of the West, which it 
planned to change. Such a situation, as it was known to the Bolsheviks due to 
their own Russian experience created favorable conditions for the future 
communist leadership in such countries. Lenin sought to bring the ―proletarian 
culture‖ movement closer to the state and the Communist party. The outcome of 
those measurements and policies in short can be summarized as follows: the 
Bolsheviks promoted education among the population of the state, while they 
looked for ways to restrict free thinking and free expression. The period of NEP 
was the first in the history of the newly established state when people‘s self-
expression was dictated by the need to demonstrate that one was a genuine Soviet 
citizen. 
 Despite all attempts at social engineering, the new socio-economic system didn‘t 
reproduce itself in the structure of the people's character .  Initially, the 
Bolsheviks managed to attract the young people, through the policies of likbez. 
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And the Communists of the industrial epoch sincerely believed in the possibility 
of the formation of a society with perfect social organization and strong 
productive forces. For them, all this was supposed to happen according to the 
plan designed by the leader, who claimed exclusive understanding, beyond 
critique, of the writings of Marx and Engels. But the falseness of the regime, the 
low moral standards of the authorities, supported by the nominally elected 
(appointed in reality) bureaucratic apparatus in its core, contradicted the 
postulated ideal of a  new ethical outlook—an embodiment of Soviet ideals, such 
as selflessness, enthusiasm, high morality, and industry. Instead, they created the 
pre-conditions for Homo sovieticus  
Alexander Benois in his Diary predicted that the national character of the 
majority of the population of the Soviet state—the notorious ―Russian soul‖—
would not allow for the creation of socialist society easily. While socialism 
remained a dream, associated with the developed countries of the West, it was 
something alluring. But the realization of this dream, even by disciplinary means 
(terror), had to overcome a paradoxical ―cultural immunity‖ which was both 
based on passive resistance and on  trained indolence. The unexpected qualities 
of the ―New Soviet Man‖ became a general indifference to labour, and the lack 
of initiative and motivation to work more efficiently and improve productivity. 
The ideological rejection of private ownership resulted in indifference to 
common property. The isolation from the influence of Western culture by 
restrictions on travel abroad and strict censorship of information in the media (as 
well as the abundance of propaganda), effectively left Homo sovieticus with 
images of a little seen and almost unattainable life associated with music, 
Hollywood movies, brand clothes, McDonalds‘ ―tasty‖ hamburgers etc.  This 
corresponds quite well with a concept of close distance, introduced by William 
Mazzarella in Shoveling Smoke. Advertizing and Globalization in Contemporary 
India:  ―The de facto magic of the goods was that they provided concrete, present 
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evidence of this absent source, as conjured in advertising‖ (Mazzarella, 
2007:158). The fascination of the ―exotic‖ and forbidden Western life-style also 
became a feature of Homo sovieticus. Somehow, the imagined perfection of 
products from abroad (on the level of consumption) or music, literature and 
artistic performance became something larger, a symbol of freedom and unity 
with a world where those things, songs, books, and ideas came from. 
 CONCLUSION. DEVELOPMENT AS UNFREEDOM TODAY? 
CONTINUITIES AND RUPTURES  
It is generally accepted in the economic literature that the Soviet state rebuilt its 
economy within a remarkably short time, after it had been shattered from years of 
war and revolution. Moreover, it was also able to build its own industrial zone 
and make a technical advance within a mere decade. Equally prevalent in 
economic texts is an assumption, based on the Solow-model, that the industry, 
built in the Soviet state, declined because of low investments rates. This 
assumption holds explanatory power in economic terms, though it lacks a cultural 
dimension. The most important conclusion of this study is that the process of 
critical inspection—not to mention rejection—of the myth of the cultural 
sustainability of the industry of the Soviet state has not started in the XXI century 
Russia. There is little realization that the combination of methods of terror and 
social engineering implemented by Bolsheviks as main developmental policies 
was a direct continuation of the imperial traditions in Russia after the October 
Revolution.   
The project of the industrialization of the country was initially based on the 
grandiose project  of electrification, and further used as the justification for the 
industrialization‘s projects. The majority of the labour force employed in the 
realization of those projects may have initially believed that they were 
―spontaneously and freely‖ engaged, but in reality they were not free to refuse to 
participate. People were forced to work—because of hunger, for fear of being 
called a parasite and consequently imprisoned, or simply because of being  a 
prisoner in a labour camp. While developing Soviet state at the cost of human 
freedom, authorities made attempts to cover up the violence with works of artists, 
painters, and writers. The industry in the Soviet state (not touching upon the 
problems of a seriously degraded natural environment) was built at the expense 
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of the common people, resulting in falling living standards, deprived economic, 
social and cultural capabilities, and restricted possibilities of movement. Created 
by the combined results of social engineering and authoritarian enforcements to 
work, Homo sovieticus, being an end-product of ―development as unfreedom,‖ in 
his core was not interested in either contributing to the further maintenance and 
modernization of the state, or to supporting the regime.  
The advertised creation of infrastructure, industry, and high levels of education 
and medical care during the existence of the Soviet Union is used now by the 
Russian Federation political elite—to justify the coherence, obedience, and 
gravitation towards the Russian Federation in the former republics of the USSR. 
The actual ecocide and questionable standards of the health-care system remain 
largely un-discussed and un-attendant, little improvements have been done, in 
many places the situation is only getting worse because of the lack of scientific 
expertise, investments, and general neglect of the problems by the weak 
governmental institutions.  
 The Gloomy Statistic  
Modern day Russia is a heir "to a spendthrift psychology that is partly a product 
of the vastness of [Russia's] land and partly a function of a Communist pricing 
system that put no realistic value on assets that everyone owned and no one 
husbanded" (Feshbach and Friendly, 1991:155). The violent break-down of the 
Sayano–Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station on 17 August 2009 became 
known in Russia as the "hydro-Chernobyl" being the largest technogenic 
catastrophe on the territory of the former USSR since 1986. What links the 
disasters in Pripyat and in Khakassia is that they demonstrate the energy 
problems Russia (and the USSR before it) is facing as the result of the 
inefficiency in extracting fuel and generating electricity, while disregarding the 
environmental costs. It is safe enough to predict a series of accidents related to 
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electricity in the near future, as the industrial and residential power consumption 
increases, while the capacities of the machinery functioning in the energy and 
other sectors are constantly diminishing.   
Even the most smoothly-operating regions of the European part of the present 
Russian Federation show the decline of the main industrial funds by  more than 
50% compared to the initial industrial investment. The general situation in this 
sphere is that about 60% of these systems require essential upgrades to maintain 
their level of service. The weakest link of the electrification network is power 
generation. The deterioration of machinery at steam power plants is reaching as 
much as 70%, while for hydro-power stations it is up to 80% (the data are taken 
from the various media-sources; they correspond to the statistics presented by the 
opposition-parties
31
 during the discussion of draft federal budget for 2010—2012 
in the first reading on October 21, 2009). That is to say that the accident which 
occurred on 17 August 2009 at the Sayano–Shushenskaya HPS was inevitable, 
and perhaps even expected. The official explanation of this accident states that it 
was primarily caused by turbine vibrations which led to fatigue damage of the 
mountings of the turbine № 2, including the cover of the turbine. As it turns out, 
this turbine was very ―punctual‖—2009 is the year when it was supposed to be 
removed, based on a work life defined by the manufacturer of 30 years. It is a 
common practice in Russia, however, to continue operating machinery for more 
than 50 years, making small repairs instead of replacement. The same can be said 
of the interpretation of history. It should have been updated—but the old myths 
persist.   
In other industrial spheres the situation is far from being any better. The disrepair 
of the machinery in the key-industries of oil and gas recovery is more than 55%. 
The degradation of the rendering machinery is 75% for oil and 80% for gas. 
                                                          
31 The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Fair Russia 
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More often the question is whether the recovery and export of oil and gas will be 
able to pay their own costs.  
In the metallurgy and coal-mining industries, some 80% of machinery 
deterioration is observable. Unofficial estimates, originating the alternative to the 
official media sources (mostly disseminated via Internet
32
),  state that every 2 
million tons of the extracted coal are paid in Russia with the life of one coal-
miner.  
Decay in the sphere of housing (roofs, walls, etc.) and the communal services 
(sewerage, electricity, etc.) are obvious to even the casual observer—there is no 
need for statistics and calculations. The official data show that 30% of the major 
funds of this branch have deteriorated beyond their specifications.  However, the 
authorities view the increase of disrepair as originating with deferred debts for 
housing and communal services (the reasons for the debts vary from alcoholism 
to low pensions, combined with high food-prices). On September 18, 2009 the 
amount of debts was 158.2 billion
33
 rubles, with 94.8 billion originating in the 
deferred payments by the population. This is a reason for the ongoing campaign 
of collectivization of the apartment-dwellers into so called ТСЖ (an approximate 
translation is ―the comradeship of the owners of housing‖) to facilitate the 
transfer of the burden of house repairs from state to the population, which is not a 
common practice in Russia. This policy is reminiscent in its implementation of 
the creation of the kolkhozes in the Soviet state.  
However, the modernization of mines and repairs to blast furnaces cannot be 
done at the expenses of miners or steelmakers. Technically it is possible for the 
state to legally bind the owners of those enterprises to make more investments in 
renovations of production facilities, but it seems unlikely in the modern, ―un-free 
                                                          
32  Increasingly more reliable and nuanced in high-lightening events compared to the censored TV-channels 
and major newspapers are becoming different Internet discussion forums and social networks like LiveJournal.com 
33  The term is used to denote 10^9 or 1,000,000,000. 
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developing‖ Russia, since the main goal of owners is to take out as much profit 
as possible while minimizing maintenance, investment, safety, educational costs 
and costs related to the environmental protection. 
 The History Repeats Itself 
It is not fair to say that there have been no attempts to improve the economic 
situation in the Russian Federation, apart from further crude exploitation of its 
natural resources. Many hopes to modernize industry are linked to 
nanotechnology and the nano-industry. However, the speech of the former First 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov from June 5, 2007  resembles Lenin‘s  
views of  electrification. The views of nanotechnology expressed in official 
rhetoric as an innovative path of Russia's advancement providing ―real 
opportunities to create a modern economy, raise the nation's standards of living, 
and ensure the proper security for the country‖ raise serious questions about the 
possibility of realizing those plans in the near future. The current situation with 
nanotechnologies in Russia is similar to Coopersmith‘s comparison of the 
GOELRO-Plan with Ronald Regan‘s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)34: 
In both cases, a technical adviser and confidant – Edward Teller and Gleb 
Krzhizanovsky – pushed utopian plans the leader already has an interest in: 
the necessary ideas and institutions already existed; the technology had not 
actually been developed; both leaders invested much political capital; and 
neither plan survived criticism intact (Coopersmith, 1992:152). 
There are also other similarities between Russia‘s past and present. The turbulent 
economic situation in Russia after the October Revolution draws close 
comparisons to the period after the Soviet Union collapse, characterized as being 
rapid and painful transition for the majority of population to a market-based 
                                                          
34  A system of lasers and missiles meant to intercept incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles that was 
quickly labeled Star Wars, an epic space opera, implying that it was science fiction and linking it to Ronald Reagan's 
acting career. 
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economy. Amazingly, the Bolshevik‘s actions at the beginning of their rule were 
mirrored by Boris Yeltsin at the end of the XXth century—the product of an 
imperial apparatus, he began to demolish the USSR from within, and then 
actually rebuilt it into a miniature of the Russian Federation. It is strange to see 
how Western observers have missed this aspect of Yeltsin‘s rule, while viewing 
him as a liberal ruler who promoted freedom of speech and a general openness of 
the country towards the world. Struggling against the menace of ―communistic 
revanchists,‖ he was able to preserve the communists ideology under the screen 
of democratic reforms. Also, he was silently approved by his audience—both 
inside and outside of the country—to reconstruct the system of self-appointed 
dictatorship with the transmission of power not through fair general elections, but 
using the intrinsically anti-democratic procedure of ―preemnichestvo‖ 
(appointment). The strongest critique of his rule in Russia is based on the 
assumption that he lost control over the country and its resources, both natural 
and human. Instead, foreign capital investors and a new type of NEPmans, or 
oligarchs comprising a small group of tycoons in finance, industry, energy, 
telecommunications, and the media took control.  
The long history of ―development as unfreedom‖ results in the contemporary 
Russian state being based on the fundament of business, authoritarian 
governance, and crime.  In Russia, these three spheres have become essentially 
indistinguishable. The popular opinion is that all too often in today's Russia there 
is no contradiction in someone being a business executive, senior government 
official, and crime boss all at the same time.   
 Calls for More Un-Freedom 
Yeltsin's rule laid the groundwork for many in Russia to wish for some form of 
authoritarianism, which could provide at least some measure of stability. 
Vladimir Putin‘s high approval ratings amongst the Russian public throughout 
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his presidential terms and into his second term as Prime Minister are due to the 
impression of him bringing political stability and re-establishing the rule of law. 
High oil prices have contributed to his popularity because of economic growth 
that has been absent since 1990.  
Some oil revenue went to a stabilization fund established in 2004, as a part of 
federal efforts to balance the federal budget during times when oil prices falls 
below a cut-off price, currently set at US$27 per barrel. As the capital of the 
Fund exceeded the level of 500 billion rubles in 2005, part of the surplus was 
used for early foreign debt repayments as well as to cover the Russian Pension 
Fund's deficit. This action was widely criticized, since the early—and large—
foreign debt repayments could have waited, and the money could have 
contributed to the strengthening of the middle class in Russia and investments in 
the country‘s infrastructure. Instead, lessons came too late and the catastrophe 
after the accident which destroyed one turbine at Russia's biggest hydroelectric 
power station has shown that Russia remains a fragile state.  
Once again Amartya Sen‘s assessment has proven to be right—Russia's Soviet-
era infrastructure has degraded, and to restore and renovate it, government must 
be prepared to make significant allocations in Russia‘s budget (which is not 
planned for the coming years‘ spending). Funds stored during the boom years 
will not be enough to rejuvenate roads, pipe-lines, electric stations, airports, or 
other essential infrastructure. To fund needed upgrades and to restore the Sayano-
Shushenskaya plant, the economy, whose gross domestic product is under strain 
in an ongoing economic crisis and decreased by nearly 11 percent (it is possible 
the crisis only has begun in Russia), will have to turn to international debt market 
once again. If the decision in 2005 was to rebuild infrastructure in the country, it 
would have generated many new jobs and created a basis for sustained national 
economic growth, not only because export prices for Russia‘s oil and gas soared, 
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but also because of increased investment growth and government spending (not 
to mention the multiplication effects of these factors). Of course, now it is too 
late to talk about what could have been. The same holds true for criticism of the 
Soviet government for preferring an ambitious, utopian project, and forcing 
population into glorified slavery over offering so much needed help to the 
country‘s citizens. The most that can be expected is to learn from these past 
experiences and advocate for the reforms necessary to end the cycle of weak 
governance in Russia. While you cannot change the past, you can certainly learn 
from the failures of past generations to the benefit of future ones, and I hope to 
contribute to this ideal through my studies and this very thesis. 
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LIST OF ENDNOTES 
                                                          
i
  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (Russian: Влади́мир Ильи́ч Ле́нин), born Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Russian: 
Влади́мир Ильи́ч Улья́нов), and also known by the pseudonyms VI Lenin, Nikolai Lenin and N. Lenin, (April 22, 
1870 – January, 1924), was a Russian revolutionary, a communist politician, the main leader of the October 
Revolution (the second phase of the overall Russian Revolution of 1917), the first head of the Russian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and from 1922, the first de facto leader of the Soviet Union. 
ii
  Mary Therese Winifred Robinson (born 21 May 1944) served as the seventh, and first female, President of 
Ireland, serving from 1990 to 1997, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, from 1997 to 
2002. Robinson's posting as High Commissioner ended in 2002, after sustained pressure from the United States led 
her to declare she was no longer able to continue her work. Robinson had criticised the US for violating human rights 
in its "War on Terror". 
iii
  A term used in a number of disciplines. In historiography, it is a document, recording or other source of 
information that was created at roughly the time being studied, by an authoritative source, usually one with direct 
personal knowledge of the events being described. 
iv
  Yuri Lotman (1922-1993) - a prominent Russian formalist critic, semiotician, culturologist.  He was the 
founder of structural semiotics in culturology and is considered as the first Soviet structuralist. In Tartu (University of 
Tartu, Estonia), he set up his own school known as the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School. Among the other members of 
this school were such names as Boris Uspensky, Vjacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, Vladimir Toporov, Mikhail 
Gasparov, Alexandr Piatigorsky, Isaak I. Revzin, Lesskis, Igor Grigorievitch Savostin and others. As a result of their 
collective work, they established semiotics of culture. 
v
  Semiosphere is the sphere of semiosis in which sign processes operate in the set of all interconnected 
Umwelten (the term is usually translated as "self-centered world"). The concept was first coined by Juri Lotman in 
1984 and is now applied to many fields, including cultural semiotics generally, biosemiotics, zoosemiotics, 
geosemiotics, etc. 
vi
  Michel Foucault 1926 - 1984) was a French philosopher, historian, critic and sociologist. Foucault's work 
on power, power relationships, knowledge, and discourse, has been widely discussed and applied. 
vii
  Antonio Gramsci (January 22, 1891 – April 27, 1937) was an Italian philosopher, writer, politician and 
political theorist. A founding member and onetime leader of the Communist Party of Italy, he was imprisoned by 
Mussolini‘s Fascist regime. His writings are heavily concerned with the analysis of culture and political leadership 
and he is notable as a highly original thinker within the Marxist tradition. He is renowned for his concept of cultural 
hegemony as a means of maintaining the state in a capitalist society. 
viii
  Gramscians look at hegemony in terms of class relations. A class is considered hegemonic if it has 
legitimized its dominance through institutions and concessions. When a class has established dominance in this way, 
as well as in the formal political structural of a state, then it constitutes a historic bloc. 
ix
  The theory is heavily influenced by the writings of Antonio Gramsci. Furthermore, Karl Polanyi, Karl 
Marx, Max Weber, Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault are cited as major 
sources within the Critical theory of International Relations. 
x
  Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zinovyev (October 29, 1922 – May 10, 2006) was a well-known Russian 
logician, sociologist and writer. 
xi
  State Plan of the USSR (State Planning Committee of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR) was the state 
body responsible for the general state plan of development of the national economy of the USSR and control over 
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fulfillment of the national economy plans. Formed on February 22, 1921 by the Decree of the Soviet of People‘s 
Commissars of the RSFSR. 
xii
  Krzhizanovsky, Gleb son of Maximilian (12 (24 January) 1872, Samara — March 31, 1959, Moscow) — 
public figure of the revolutionary movement in Russia, soviet state and political figure; scientist – power engineering 
specialist, academician and vice-president of the AS of the USSR, literary man; soviet economist, Socialist Labor 
Hero. 
xiii
  Technology transfer is the process of sharing of skills, knowledge, technologies, methods of 
manufacturing, samples of manufacturing and facilities among governments and other institutions to ensure that 
scientific and technological developments are accessible to a wider range of users who can then further develop and 
exploit the technology into new products, processes, applications, materials or services. 
xiv
  Scientific management (also called Taylorism or the Taylor system) is a theory of management 
that analyzes and synthesizes workflows, improving labor productivity. The core ideas of the theory were developed 
by Frederick Winslow Taylor in the 1880s and 1890s, and were first published in his monographs, Shop 
Management (1905) and The Principles of Scientific Management (1911). 
xv
  Gastev Alexey son of Kapiton (1882—1938). Main scientific works: How to Work (1921), Labor Systems 
(1924). Work Quota Setting and Organization (1929), Scientific Organization of Labor (1935). A.K. Gastev was a 
specific-type scientist and writer. His main achievement was the Institute of Labor created in 1920 under All-Union 
Central Soviet of Trade Unions (AUCSTU) and transformed in 1921 into the Central Institute of Labor (CIL). He was 
its permanent head up to arrest and tragic death as a result of political repressions of Stalin regime. Scientific ideas 
and thoughts of A. K. Gastev were implemented in works of CIL. 
xvi
  The Russian Provisional Government was formed in Petrograd in 1917 after the February Revolution and 
the abdication of the Tsar Nikolai II. 
xvii
  The Entente Powers were the countries at war with the Central Powers during World War I. The main 
allies were the Russian Empire, France, the British Empire, Italy, the Empire of Japan, and the United States. 
xviii
  Up to August 1919 the British spent an official $239 million aiding the Whites, although Churchill 
disputed this figure at the time as an "absurd exaggeration". 
xix
  The Russian Provisional Government, led by Alexander Kerensky, pledged to continue fighting the 
Germans on the Eastern Front. In return, the U.S. began providing economic and technical support to the Russian 
provisional government so they could carry out their military pledge. The large amounts of war material were stocked 
in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. 
xx
  The Central Powers is one of the two sides that participated in World War I. The Central Powers consisted 
of the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. 
xxi  When the Allies forced the German surrender in November 1918, the Bolsheviks were preoccupied by the 
Civil War. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk marked a significant contraction of the territory which the Bolsheviks 
controlled or could lay claim to as effective successors of the Russian Empire: while the independence of Finland and 
Poland was already accepted by them in principle, the loss of Ukraine and the Baltic states created, from the 
Bolshevik perspective, dangerous bases of anti-Bolshevik military activity in the subsequent Russian Civil War 
(1918–20). Besides, Lenin was not prepared to write off the idea of a zone of nations around the Russian Republic 
which would cohere with it. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of non-Russians who inhabited the lands lost by 
Bolshevik Russia in the treaty, it was an opportunity to attempt to set up independent states not under Bolshevik rule.  
xxii
  Military communism — internal policy of the Soviet state pursued in 1918-1921 during the Civil War. The 
main purpose was to supply the cities and the Red Army with weapons, food and other necessary resources when all 
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normal mechanisms and relations were destroyed by the war. Decision on termination of military communism was 
passed on March 21, 1921 at the X Congress of the LCP (B) and NEP was implemented.  
xxiii
  Latvian riflemen were military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to defend Baltic 
territories against Germans in World War I. In 1917, a large number of Latvian riflemen sided with the Bolsheviks. 
They became known as Red Latvian Riflemen and actively participated in the Russian Civil War. The Riflemen took 
active part in the suppression of anti-Bolshevik uprisings in Moscow and Yaroslavl in 1918. They fought against 
Denikin, Yudenich, and Wrangel. 
xxiv
  Surplus-appropriation system – confiscation from peasants of food surpluses exceeding absolute minimum 
for centralized distribution thereof among other population, centralized rating and distribution of food and other 
goods of first priority approved by the Law on the state monopoly for bread of March 25, 1917. On the basis of the 
Decree of May 13, 1918, All-Russian Central Executive Committee (ALCEC) approved norms of consumption per 
capita – 12 poods of grain, 1 pood of cereals, etc. All bread exceeding such norms was called ―surpluses‖ and was 
confiscated. To perform such task, military labor food units with special authorities were formed. 
xxv
  Grain reserves in the USSR – measures for creation of centralized grain reserves aimed at supplying with 
bread at the price in the interests of all socialist economy in general. V.I. Lenin emphasized the ―bread problem‖ as a 
problem of socialism ―it seems that it is struggle for bread only, while it is struggle for socialism‖.   
xxvi
 Soviet of People‘s Commissars of the USSR (SPC, Soviet of People’s Commissars) — from July 6, 1923 
till March 15, 1946 Supreme Executive and Administrative Body in the USSR (during the first period of existence – 
also legislative), its government (there was the Soviet of People‘s Commissars in each union and autonomous 
republic, for example, the SPC of the RSFSR). 
xxvii
  The Soviet of workers‘ and peasants‘ defense led by V. I. Lenin was formed by the resolution of RCEC on 
November 30, 1928. In April 1920, it was transformed into the Soviet of Labor and Defense (SLD).. 
xxviii
  People‘s Commissariat of Finances (PCF) – state body of RSFSR/USSR in the rank of ministry, 
responsible for financial policy of the former Soviet state in 1917 – 1946. 
xxix
  Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (SSNE) – supreme soviet economic body with status of people‘s 
commissariat in 1917 – 1932. Established under SPC by the Decree of RCEC and SPC of December 2 (15) 1917 to 
organize and manage all national economy and finances. SSNE was composed of sectoral departments (Glavsahar, 
Glavneft, Centrochai, etc.). Province and district soviets of national economy were formed on the local level. During 
the period of Military Communism, all industries, distribution of raw materials and finished products were within the 
competence of the SSNE. After establishment of the USSR, SSNE was authorized to exercise powers of united 
people‘s commissariat. In 1932 SSNE was abolished and replaced by three people‘s commissariats – heavy, light and 
timber industry.  
xxx
  Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU — ruling body of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU composed of most influential members of the Central Committee who defined policy of the party and under 
conditions of one-party system – the whole state. Thus, members of Political Bureau were actually the members of 
the Administration of the USSR, even if they did not hold public offices. First Political Bureau of the CC of RSDLB 
(B) headed by Lenin was formed at the meeting of the CC on October 10 (23), 1917 for political coordination of the 
armed uprising (it was composed of A.S. Bubnov, G.E. Zinovyev, L.B. Kamenev, V.I. Lenin, G.Y. Sokolnikov, I.V. 
Stalin. L.D. Trotsky). Resumed operation as a permanent body in 1919 at the VIII Congress of RCP 9B). Called as 
CC of RCP (B), later – Political Bureau of the CC of RCP (B) and in 1952 – 1966 – Presidium of the CC of the 
CPSU. It was called as before according to the resolution of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in 1966.  
xxxi
  The initiative to enter peace talks with the Central Powers before signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was 
originally based on the hopes of the Bolshevik leaders of exposing their enemies' territorial ambitions and rousing the 
workers of central Europe to revolution in defense of Russia's new workers' state. The Bolsheviks intended to assist 
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fellow revolutionaries on the far political left as soon as they had the chance. The ―great fear‖ in 1918 – which was 
Lenin‘s great hope—was that Bolshevism would spread to the West and particularly Germany and Austria. 
Germany‘s defeat would increase the chances of revolution in central Europe. Despite strikes and demonstrations the 
month before, in protest against economic hardship, the workers of Germany failed to rise up. 
xxxii  Poland was the geographical bridge that the Red Army would have to cross in order to assist the 
Communist movements in Western Europe. By early 1920, the Polish front became the most important war theater 
and a plurality of Soviet resources and forces were diverted to it.  In mid-summer 1920 Lenin ordered the invasion of 
southern and Western Europe, intended to export Communism, if necessary, by force of arms. In early July, with 
initial victories against the Poles, he fantasized about bringing Communism to Italy, Hungary, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, and Germany. He said that even failure in Poland (which soon came) should not stop them, because 
he so firmly believed in world revolution (Gellately, 2007). Clearly, the Soviet expansion was a greater threat to 
freedom than anything the capitalist world presented.  
xxxiii
 Constitutional Democratic Party (―Party C-D‖, ―Party of People‘s Freedom‖, ―Ca-Dets‖, later ―Cadets‖) — 
one of the main political parties in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. Classified in the soviet historiography 
as ―political party of counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeois‖  
xxxiv
 Mensheviks — members of moderate wing of RSDLP headed by Y. O. Martov. RSDLP was split into 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks at the II Congress of RSDLP during voting on the 1st paragraph of the Party‘s 
Constitution. V.I. Lenin wanted to create a solid, determined, well-organized, disciplined proletarian party. Martov 
supporters were for the association with more freedoms. During the voting, Lenin supporters gained majority of 
votes, thus, they were called Bolsheviks. Martov supporters were called Mensheviks. In future, such groups tried to 
cooperate, sometimes, they were divided in opinion; however such split turned to be final. 
xxxv
  Joseph Stalin (born 18 December 1878  – 5 March 1953) was the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee from 1922 until his death in 1953. In the years following Lenin's death 
in 1924, he rose to become the authoritarian leader of the Soviet Union. 
xxxvi
  Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin (24 November 1872 – 7 July 1936) served as People‘s Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government from March 1918 to 1930. 
xxxvii  Alexander Benois was an influential artist, art critic, historian, preservationist, and founding member of 
World of Art-movement among Russian artists. 
xxxviii
  Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov (Дмитрий Антонович Волкогонов in Russian) (22 March 1928, Chita – 
6 December 1995, Moscow) was a Russian historian and officer. A Doctor of Philosophy, Doctor of History, Colonel 
General (1986), Volkogonov was the head of the Institute of Military History at the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet 
Union between 1988 and 1991. Volkogonov is most famous for his trilogy ―Leaders‖ (Вожди, or Vozhdi), which 
consists of the three books about Vladimir Lenin (Lenin: A New Biography), Leon Trotsky (Trotsky: The Eternal 
Revolutionary) and Joseph Stalin (Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy) and Autopsy for an Empire: the Seven Leaders Who 
Built the Soviet Regime (Russian title: Sem Vozhdei), 1998. 
xxxix  The Pale of Settlement (Russian: Черта́ осе́длости, cherta osedlosti) was the term given to a region of 
Imperial Russia, along its western border, in which permanent residence of Jews was allowed, and beyond which 
Jewish residence was generally prohibited. 
xl
  According to Russian census of 1897 the total Jewish population of Russia was 5,189,401 persons of both 
sexes (4,13% of total population). Of this total 93,9% lived in the 25 provinces of the Pale of Settlement. The total 
population of the Pale of Settlement amounted to 42,338,367 - of these 4,805,354 (11,5%) were Jews. 
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xli
  The Jewish Labor Bund, was a Jewish political party in several European countries operating 
predominantly between the 1890s and the 1930s with remnants of the party still active in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom. 
xlii
  Zionism is the international Jewish political movement that originally supported the reestablishment of a 
homeland for the Jewish People in Palestine, after two millennia of exile. 
xliii
  Judaism is a set of beliefs and practices originating from the saga of the ancient Israelites, as embodied and 
codified in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), as later further explored and explained in the Talmud and other texts. 
xliv
  Sergei Mikhailovich Tretyakov (Riga, 1892 – September 10, 1937) was a Russian 
constructivist writer, playwright and special correspondent for Pravda. 
xlv  LEF ("ЛЕФ") was the journal of the Left Front of the Arts ("Levyi Front Iskusstv" - "Левый фронт 
искусств"), a widely ranging association of avant-garde writers, photographers, critics and designers in the Soviet 
Union. It had two runs, one from 1923 to 1925 as LEF, and later from 1927 to 1929 as Novyi LEF ('New LEF'). The 
journal's objective, as set out in one of its first issues, was to "re-examine the ideology and practices of so-called 
leftist art, and to abandon individualism to increase art's value for developing communism." 
xlvi
  Dnieper construction site was a part of fulfillment of the GOELRO-plan. In the Soviet state construction 
began in 1927 and the plant started to produce electricity in October 1932. 
xlvii
  The Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia (1922-1928) , later known as Association of Artists of 
the Revolution (1928-1933) 
xlviii
  Vladimir Vladimirovich Mayakovsky (Влади́мир Влади́мирович Маяко́вский) (July 19, 1893 – April 
14, 1930) was a Russian poet and playwright, among the foremost representatives of early-20th century Russian 
Futurism. 
xlix
  Marc Chagall  (7 July 1887 – 28 March 1985), was a Jewish Russian artist, born in Belarus (then Russian 
Empire) and naturalized in France in 1937, associated with several key art moments and was one of the most 
successful artists of the twentieth century. 
l
  Maxim Gorky was a Russian/Soviet author, a founder of the Social Realism literary method and a political 
activist. From 1906 to 1913 and from 1921 to 1929 he lived abroad, mostly in Capry, Italy; after his return to 
the Soviet Union he accepted the cultural policies of the time, although he was not permitted to leave the country. 
li
  Sergei Sergeyevich Prokofiev  (27 April 1891 - 5 March 1953) was a Russian composer who mastered 
numerous musical genres and came to be admired as one of the greatest composers of the 20th century. 
lii
  Charskaya Lidia, the daughter of Alexey (January 19, 1875— March 18, 1937, Leningrad) was a Russian 
actress and writer. She spent seven years (1886—1893) in Pavlov Institute for Ladies in Saint Petersburg. The many 
experiences and impressions she had during her life there served as material for her future books. She married officer 
B. Churilov, however, their marriage did not last long. Churilov left for Siberia where he did his service, leaving his 
wife with their small child in Saint Petersburg. Having finished theatre courses, L. Churilova was employed by the 
Saint Petersburg Alexander Theatre and worked there till 1924. She started writing due to limited resources – she had 
to raise her son Yury alone. In 1901, a novel Notes by the Student was published in the magazine Heart-Felt Word 
that brought her great success. From that time, novels by L. Churilova were published in such magazines every year. 
During 20 years of her creative life, about 80 works were published. After the revolution, works by L. Churilova were 
no more popular. They were liquidated from libraries and destroyed. Within the period from 1925 till 1929, she 
managed to publish 4 small books for children under the pseudonym N. Ivanova.  
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liii
  Zhytkov Boris (August 30 (September 11) 1882, Novgorod — October 19, 1938, Moscow), was a writer, 
prosaist, pedagogue, traveler and researcher. He authored popular adventure stories and novels as well as publications 
on animals. 
liv
  Marchak Ilya son of Yakov (nickname M. Ilyin, January 10, 1896—1953), Russian writer, engineer-
chemist. Younger brother of S. Y. Marshak. 
lv
  Franc Semen son of Ludwig (January 16 (28), 1877, Moscow — December 10, 1950, London) — famous 
Russian philosopher, religious thinker and psychologist. Co-author of the collections Problems of Idealism (1902), 
Landmarks (1909) and From the Bottom (1918). He tried to achieve a synthesis of rational thought and religious 
belief in traditions of apophatic philosophy and Christian Platonism, with particular influence from Nickolay 
Kuzansky and Vladimir Solovyev (notably, concepts of unanimity). 
lvi
 Bulgakov Sergey son of Nickolay (June 28 (16), 1871, Orlov Province – 1944, Paris) – a Russian 
philosopher, theologist, economist, and Orthodox Church priest. Having defended the thesis for master‘s degree at 
Moscow University, he was employed as ordinary professor at Kiev Polytechnical Institute, Chair of Political 
Economy. During that period, Bulgakov was famous among wide circles of Russian intelligentsia through his public 
lectures combining perfect artistic properties, ideas and sincere intonations. 
lvii
  Sorokin Pitirim son of Alexander (January 23, 1889, V. Turiya of Bologda Province — January 11, 1968, 
Winchester, USA) was a Russian-American sociologist and cultural expert. He was also a leader of right-wing 
socialist revolutionaries; from 1920 - Professor at Petrograd University. From 1922 - in emigration. From 1930 – 
Professor at Harvard University. He considered the historical process as cyclic, consisting of changes of the main 
types of culture based on integrated sphere of values and symbols. Stating that modern culture faces general crisis, 
Sorokin compared it with development of materialism and science and saw the solution in development of religious 
―idealistic‖ culture. He was one of the founders of theories of social stratification and social mobility. 
lviii
  Brutskus Boris (Ber) son of David (nickname B. Benvid, B. Davidovich, October 3, 1874, Polangen, 
Kurland Province — December 7, 1938, Berlin, Germany) was a Russian economist, statistician, agronomist, and 
public figure. Member of the CC of Jewish Colonization Society, and bother of publicist Y.D. Brutskus. He made 
publications in Russian Thought, Life of Jews and other editions. He was influenced by populist ideas, Jewish 
national ideas, and protests due to persecuted Jews in Moscow (1891-92). He participated in public discussions of 
populists and Marxists. 
lix
  Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (September 17, 1857–September 19, 1935) is considered by many as a father of 
theoretical astronautics. His works later inspired leading Soviet rocket engineers as Sergey Korolyev andValentin 
Glushko and contributed to early successes of Soviet space program. 
lx
  Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa  (9 July 1894 – 8 April 1984) was an innovative Soviet /Russian physicist and 
Nobel laureate, who made important discoveries in a number of different areas. 
lxi
  Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kondratiev  (4 March 1892 - 17 September 1938) was a Russian economist, who was 
a proponent of the  (NEP) in the Soviet Union. He proposed a theory that Western capitalist economies have long 
term (50 to 60 years) cycles of boom followed by depression. These business cycles are now called "Kondratiev 
waves". He was executed at the height of Stalin‘s Great Purge and "rehabilitated" fifty years later. 
lxii
  Reflexology was a kind of the behavioral science, whose classical ideas were developed by D.B. Watson 
from 1913 – 1925. Watson believed the subject matter of research should be behavior and not consciousness. 
Researching the direct relation between stimulus and reaction (reflex), behavioral science attracted the attention of 
psychologists researching skills, science, and experience as opposed to associative psychology and psychoanalysis. 
Supporters of behavior science applied two main methods of researching behavior – experiments in laboratories 
artificially created under controlled circumstances and observations in natural environments. According to Watson, 
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manipulation with external irritants made it possible to create a man with behavioral constants. ―Stimulus – reaction‖ 
was the motto of behavioral science. It appeared in the sphere of psychology, reflexology and even entered pedagogy, 
psychiatry, sociology, and the study of art. Despite some achievements within the framework of reflexology it turned 
out to be impossible to get away from the mechanistic interpretation of psychical processes. Watson‘s ideas on 
behavioral science as a new method of control over the individual by society impressed civil servants and big land 
owners. Research carried out by behavioral science followers was supported by the Ford Foundation. 
lxiii
 Behterev Vladimir son of Michael (January 20, 1857 — December 24, 1927, Moscow) — famous Russian 
medical expert – psychiatrist, neuropathologist, psysiologist, psychologist, founder of reflexology and patho-
psychology in Russia. He was also an academician.  
lxiv
 Erich Fromm (March 23, 1900, Frankfurt am Main, — March 18, 1980, Locarno) — social psychologist, 
philosopher, psycho analyst, representative of Frankfurt school, one of founders Neo-Freudianism and Freudo-
Marxism.    
lxv
 Basov Michael son of Yakov (1892—1931) — Soviet psychologist. Specialist in pedagogical psychology, 
pedology. Creator of methods of psychological examination of children of pre-school age. Developer of experimental 
research of inter-psychic functions. Actively used psychological term ―activity‖, proposing to interpret it as a special 
structural phenomenon. In particular, treated conditioned reflex as component of activity of the human organism.  
lxvi
  Vigotsky Lev son of Semen (November 17 (November 5) 1896 — June 11, 1934, Moscow) — Soviet 
psychologist, founder of culture and historical school in psychology. The culture and historical theory by Vigotsky 
created the largest school in Soviet psychology, whose followers were: A.N. Leontyev, A.R. Luria, A. V. 
Zaporozhets, L.I. Bozhovich, P.Y. Galperin, D.B. Elbkonin, P.I. Zinchenko, L.V. Zankov, etc.  
lxvii
 Blonsky Pavel son of Piotr (May 14 (26), Kiev — February 15, 1941, Moscow) — philosopher, pedagogue 
and psychologist.   
lxviii
 Rubishtein Sergey son of Leonid (June 18, 1889, Odessa — November 11, 1960, Moscow) — Russian 
psychologist and philosopher, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (AS) of the USSR, one of the 
creators of the ―activity‖ approach in psychology. Founder of the Chair and Department of Psychology of the Faculty 
of Philosophy of the MSU and the Sector of Psychology of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Author of the 
fundamental book Principles of General Psychology.  
lxix
 Leontyev Alexey son of Nickolay (February 5, 1903— January 21, 1979, Moscow) — a psychologist, he 
studied the problem of consciousness and activity. Founded (1966) and managed the Faculty of Psychology in MSU 
in 1960s-70s. 
lxx
  Uznadze Dmitry son of Nickilay (December 20 (January 1) 1886 (1887), V. Sakara, presently: Zestafonsky 
District, Georgia  — October 12, 1950, Tbilisi) — Georgian psychologist and philosopher developed the general 
psychological theory of mindset, one of the founders and professor at Tbilisi State University (1918) where he 
founded the Chair of Psychology, Director of the Institute of Psychology of the AS of Georgia (1941). Author of 
works Main Principles of the Theory of Mindset (1961) and Experimental Principles of Psychology of Mindset  
(1966). He was educated in Leipzig (1909) and Kharkov (1913) and was founder of the scientific school. He 
developed his own methodological interpretation of the notion of the mindset as the border between subjective and 
objective realms as relates to both psychic and physical reality. In Soviet psychology, Uznadze ―mindset‖ was a legal 
form of ―unconscious‖, which was prohibited in the USSR by supporters of psychoanalysis.  
lxxi
 Zabyla Natalia daughter of Lev (ukr. Забіла Наталя Львівна) (1903—1985) — Ukrainian Soviet prose 
writer, fantasy writer, famous for literary works for children. Author of fantasy books for children of pre-school and 
primary school age, called the Surprising Adventures of Boy Yurchik and his Grandfather. 
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lxxii
  Subbotnik and voskresnik were days of volunteer work in the Soviet Union. The first all-Russian subbotnik 
was held on May 1, 1920, the one attended by Vladimir Lenin. 
lxxiii
  An abbreviation for the "party organizer of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union" (партийный организатор ЦК КПСС) was a person appointed by the CPSU Central Committee to work at 
important places: larger plants, construction sites, kolkhozes, institutions, etc. The position was introduced in 1933. 
The duties of a partorg were political work and supervision of the execution of plans in production, procurement, etc. 
Usually they were recommended to be elected secretaries of the bureaus of local partkoms. 
